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Abstract
Local and regional governments represent the nearest form of
government to the people and their fundamental role in ad-
dressing citizens’ needs is acknowledged worldwide. In line
with the subsidiarity principle, the responsibility of the pub-
lic good and service delivery is primarily upon the territorial
administrations closer to the citizens, with the main advan-
tage of offering more suitable and better tailored solutions at
local level. In a context of scarce resources and tight budget
constraints exacerbated by the ongoing economic crisis, the
achievement of these goals is limited and needs to be pur-
sued in an efficient and effective way. Accordingly, the de-
velopment of tools to evaluate the performance of local and
regional government is required, as well as measures to mon-
itor the progress of the task achievement and instruments to
support over time the decisional process, in the interest of all
the involved shareholders, specially policy makers and citi-
zens, international and civil society organizations.
This dissertation contributes to the knowledge on basic ser-
vice delivery and public expenditure analysis at sub-national
level. Particularly, it deals with the provision of both general
and specific services, namely the education and water sector
ones. From a methodological point of view, innovative meth-
ods are proposed to evaluate the service supply and public
spending in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. To show
the potentiality of the suggested tools, empirical applications
are proposed covering two EU countries, Belgium and Italy,
which are interesting study cases for their common and pe-
culiar features and provide complementary insights.
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In Chapter 2, we propose the innovative use of a compos-
ite indicator to measure the multidimensional aspects of the
local public provision, encompassing several commonly ac-
knowledged municipal tasks, and to investigate the relation-
ship with the local government size, as the decentralization
of public activities to the municipalities calls for a more en-
hanced service provision analysis at the local level. We sug-
gest a robust conditional version of a directional distance Benefit-
of-the-Doubt approach with weight restrictions based on the
municipal expenditure composition. Specifically, we deal with
the presence of undesirable municipal service indicators and
with the heterogeneity among the municipalities in their po-
litical preferences, priority public activities and operating en-
vironment characteristics. To illustrate the applicability of the
suggested method, we show the construction of the munici-
pal service provision composite indicator for 307 Flemish mu-
nicipalities over the year 2006-2011.
As a focus on a particular service, in Chapter 3 the environ-
mental efficiency of 96 Tuscan (Italian) wastewater treatment
plants (WWTPs) is investigated taking into account the qual-
ity of the outgoing water in terms of pollutant. In this re-
gard, the presence of the residual nitrogen in the outgoing
treated water is considered as undesirable output. The effi-
ciency analysis is performed by applying a novel integrated
AHP/non-radial directional distance function approach. The
obtained results are then used to identify the efficiency ex-
planatory variables: among them, the facilities’ capacity, the
percentage of wastewater discharged by the industrial and
agricultural activities and the level of compliance with the
pollutant concentration threshold set by the legislator have a
significant impact on the WWTP performance.
In Chapter 4, a Data Envelopment Analysis model is used
to study the efficiency of Tuscan municipalities’ public ex-
penditure. Five strategic functions of Tuscan municipalities
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are first considered carrying out a non-aggregate analysis;
then the overall expenditure composition of each municipal-
ity and the global spending efficiency are analysed by a pro-
posed composite indicator. The main determinants affecting
the municipalities’ efficiency are further investigated. In par-
ticular, the obtained results may be consistently included in
the long-standing debate on the municipal size, proving that
the bigger the municipality, the greater its level of public ex-
penditure efficiency.
In Chapter 5, we explore whether investment in public school
infrastructure affects students’ achievement. We use data on
extra funding to public high schools after the 2012 North-
ern Italy earthquake and apply a quasi-experimental design
and an instrumental variable strategy. We find that spending
on school infrastructure increases standardized test scores in
mathematics and Italian language, and the effect is stronger
for lower-achieving students and in mathematics. These re-
sults provide evidence in favour of a positive impact of capi-
tal spending in improving the learning environment and per-
formances of high school students.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since 2015, countries from all over the world have adopted the ‘2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development’ to ensure prosperity, social inclu-
sion and environmental sustainability for the benefit of people, planet,
prosperity, peace and partnership (UN General Assembly, 2015). The
Agenda consists of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 169 tar-
gets and 240 indicators to be achieved by 2030. “The SDGs cover issues
that are directly relevant to citizens’ daily lives, including vital challenges
such as poverty, gender inequality, climate change and insecurity, as well
as public goods like education, health, water, energy, air quality, hous-
ing and the conservation of natural resources” (Global Taskforce of Local
and Regional Governments, 2016). In compliance with the subsidiarity
principle, these activities should be provided by the territorial admin-
istration closer to the citizens. The rationale behind this principle lies
in the fact that the forms of government more proximate to the people
have the chance to better identify and fulfil the citizens’ need (Slack and
Bird, 2013). They can offer more tailored solutions and enable citizens’
preferences to be taken into account more accurately, pursuing a higher
level of efficiency in the expenditure management (Da Cruz and Mar-
ques, 2014). Furthermore, a closer interplay between local authorities
and locals aims at promoting higher responsibility and participation at
local level, increasing the level of accountability and stimulating forms of
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local competition (Asatryan and De Witte, 2015). The local and regional
governments represent the form of government closest to the people and
their fundamental role in addressing citizens’ needs is recognized world-
wide (OECD, 2016a). Accordingly, sub-national governments play a cru-
cial coordination part while fostering citizen participation and bringing
higher forms of government closer to the people for the SDGs attainment.
While playing their essential role in delivering basic services, local
and regional governments have to operate efficiently and effectively in a
context of scarce resources and tight budget constraints, which became
even more stringent after the global economic crisis started in 2008. As a
consequence, monitoring the basic service provision and, more broadly
speaking, the SDGs implementation becomes essential: “public sector
organisations, departments and agencies regularly monitor user and cit-
izen satisfaction with public services to evaluate the impact of reforms
and identify areas calling for further actions” (OECD, 2017c). This helps
in supporting and improving over time the performance of local and
regional governments, which should collaborate to ensure a more effi-
cient and integrated approach in the territorial development cooperating
in public good and infrastructure delivery, sharing skills and resources
(Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, 2016). Tools apt to
evaluate the service provision and to control expenditure need to be de-
veloped in the interest of all the involved shareholders, among all policy
makers and citizens, international and civil society organizations. The
achievement of these objectives represents a necessary step towards an
effective, innovative and sustainable financing system (UN General As-
sembly, 2017).
This dissertation contributes to the knowledge on basic service deliv-
ery and public expenditure analysis at sub-national level. Specifically,
it proposes innovative methodologies to address three SDGs-related is-
sues: education facility upgrade for effective learning environment as
part of Goal 4, water sanitation as part of Goal 6, making cities inclusive
and sustainable as part of Goal 11 (for the full list of SDGs we refer to
Figure 1.1). To show the potentiality of the tools and the techniques sug-
gested in this dissertation, empirical case studies are proposed covering
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Figure 1.1: Full list of the 17 proposed Sustainable Development Goals
Source: https://unwomen.org.au/
two EU countries, Belgium and Italy.
In the following, we first introduce more in depth the problem state-
ments addressed in this dissertation. Then, we give a sketch of the the-
oretical framework on which we rely to give answers to the raised re-
search questions: we show how we make a step forward compared to
the existing literature by proposing the innovative use of enhanced tech-
niques. Furthermore, we explore the institutional background on which
we frame our analysis, giving emphasis to the distinctive features of the
contexts under analysis. Finally, the outline of the dissertation is pre-
sented.
1.1 Problem statement
In this dissertation, we contribute to the knowledge on basic service pro-
vision and public spending measurement at sub-national level, consider-
ing methodological and empirical issues. These two topics are comple-
mentary and sides of the same coin. From the one hand, the key for a sus-
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tainable development originates at local level providing services closer
and more tailored to citizens’ need and promoting a bottom up process.
On the other hand, tight and scarce resources limit public goods pro-
vision, forcing the local budget to be efficiently and effectively aligned
with the priorities defined by the political preferences and the specific
features of the local context. Accordingly, the development of tools to
evaluate the performance of local and regional government is required,
as well as measures to monitor the progress of the task achievement and
instruments to support over time the decisional process.
Peer-learning and benchmarking are unanimously recognized as ef-
fective ways to improve government performance (Da Cruz and Mar-
ques, 2014). Local and regional tasks cover a broad variety of inter-
vention areas, such as educational and social care services, water sani-
tation and waste disposal management, local security and housing ser-
vices, among others. The construction of a composite indicator turns
out to be a useful tool to encompass all these aspects in a single index
(Karagiannis, 2017; Nardo et al., 2005; OECD, 2008), enabling then the
comparison among the observed units. However, as concerns the esti-
mation of a synthetic score for service delivery measurement, a number
of issues has to be taken into account and multifaceted aspects have to
be considered. In fact, local government competencies reflect a multidi-
mensional framework and a significant degree of heterogeneity pervades
different spheres of action. For example, municipalities vary in their po-
litical preferences and in their priority activities. Yet, sub-indicators mea-
suring municipal undesirable features, such as the local crime level the
local police has to deal with, deserve to be modelled carefully and at the
same time also the operating context needs to be handled in a proper
way. Additionally, from a policy perspective the interest in measuring
the overall level of delivered services is relevant not only to detect the
best practices, but also to get insights relating the taxation imposed on
citizenship, as citizens pay taxes for the services they receive. The pres-
ence of a trade-off between the amount of provided public goods and
the resources necessary to produce them has been long questioned in the
economic literature. Specifically, there is a significant literature investi-
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gating the existence of an optimal government size across countries (see
for example De Witte and Moesen, 2010), but not across municipalities so
far: this kind of analysis would investigate whether the level of tax bur-
den is fair given the overall level of services or whether there is room to
change the local current government size, looking at the other realities.
Chapter 2 adds to the existing literature providing an innovative tool apt
to include all the raised concerns and suitable to further explore the issue
of citizens’ tax burden.
The overall municipal service provision analysis helps to get a broad
overview of the level of public goods delivered at local level. However,
each local action deserves to be addressed also more in detail, so to go
more in depth and to add complementary aspects for a more insightful
picture of the public sector management. In this regard, water manage-
ment attracts a great deal of attention nowadays. Water is a fundamental
component of human life, but it is not accessible to everyone and en-
vironmentally sustainable everywhere yet. Moreover, given the huge
infrastructural costs related to this industry, an increasing collaboration
building on public-private partnerships is taking off. As a possible con-
sequence, the service might be run in compliance with the private sec-
tor management criteria, that is mainly in terms of economic and finan-
cial profitability. However, when assessing the way water services are
provided, their performance efficiency should be evaluated not only in
terms of economic profitability, but also in line with the environmental
sustainability aspects for the sake of the people and the planet. In this
regard, the presence of residual pollutants in the treated outgoing wa-
ter cannot be neglected and suitable tools should be developed accord-
ingly. The wastewater treatment plants that are more “environmentally”
focused should be valued more for keeping their water quality commit-
ment rather than penalized, as they have on the one hand higher costs of
production, but on the other hand higher quality outcome. Accordingly,
Chapter 3 deals with this topic and provides a novel integrated approach
to measure the wastewater treatment plants, encompassing pollutants’
issues and including environmental sustainability in the water service
provision evaluation.
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However, in the public sector management the focus is not only on
the service provision side, but also on the way resources are spent. The
necessity of combining public service delivery with the containment of
public spending has been considered a keyword of the ‘New Public Man-
agement’ paradigm (Hood, 1991). Despite several criticisms to this ap-
proach in the last couple of decades (for a detailed discussion, see Hynd-
man and Lapsley, 2016, and the references therein), the call for efficiency
and on effective way of delivering public services still applies. The use
of performance evaluation tools and the implementation of an effective
system of incentives are in the agenda of both politicians and academics.
Therefore, the question that needs to be addressed is how to evaluate
the local government service provision encompassing several municipal
tasks, while including at the same time the spending efficiency analysis
aspects. In line with the subsidiarity principle already mentioned above,
local governments are the most involved organizations in this evalua-
tion process, given their increasingly important role in delivering basic
services and addressing citizens’ needs. One of the most debated sources
of spending mismanagement is related to municipal population size. As
expressed in a report by the Council of European Municipalities and Re-
gions, “despite the diversity of the municipal level, some general trends
are visible at European level as municipalities share common preoccupa-
tions. One of their main preoccupations is the quest for the perfect size
which would ensure both local democracy and economic efficiency in the
delivery of local public services. Different solutions are put in place in
order to reach this goal” (Hermenier, 2009). Across Europe, the proposed
solutions to attain the perfect size have been mainly either voluntary or
mandatory merger policies or inter-municipal cooperation forms. The
main difficulty associated to small municipalities is the inability to ex-
ploit scale and scope economies. However, the debate is still ongoing
and no optimal solution has been found yet. On the one hand, the need
to provide more tailored and varied services calls for a joint production.
On the other hand, the local identity deserves to be preserved and val-
ued. For these reasons, the development of tools suitable to measure
local expenditure efficiency in service provision is fundamental to pro-
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vide policy makers objective evidence-based recommendations. Chapter
4 contributes to the literature providing an integrated approach in three
stages to evaluate both separately and together the main municipal func-
tions’ spending efficiency and addressing specifically the municipal size
issue.
As outlined above, public expenditure has to be managed in com-
pliance with the principles of both efficiency and effectiveness. Using
the words of Peter Drucker, ”efficiency is doing things right; effective-
ness is doing the right things”. Despite the fact that isolating the two
concepts might be tricky, we can say that effectiveness analysis aims at
showing how successfully resources have been used in reaching the set
goals. The funding in the education sector represents a significant ex-
penditure item on the overall level of public spending, as education is
considered one of the most important drivers for the long run growth
of a country (European Commission, 2014). In particular, school capital
funding aims both at constructing new school places and at improving
the condition of existing school buildings, by keeping them safe and ad-
equate, reinforcing anti-seismic measures and ameliorating the building
system. Nowadays, the lack of investment in school infrastructure is an
acknowledged issue worldwide 1. However, on the one hand the ef-
fect of resources and, more broadly speaking, of school spending on stu-
dents’ achievement is still debated. Since the “Coleman Report” (Cole-
man, 1966), empirical studies provided mixed evidence, showing a lack
of agreement. On the other hand, the role of the schools’ physical envi-
ronment and their facilities condition in explaining variation in student
learning across schools has been emphasized by educational researchers,
social psychologists and sociologists (Bako´-Biro´ et al., 2012; Earthman,
2002; Haverinen-Shaughnessy et al., 2015; Mendell and Heath, 2004). The
main idea is that a school environment offers the students a more com-
fortable place where to study when it is better-maintained, making the
1In the coming years, huge investments in school infrastructure are planned
in Australia ( https://www.nsw.gov.au), in Italy (http://www.istruzione.it), in In-
dia (http://www.cerestraedufund.com), in UK (https://www.nao.org.uk), in US
(https://www.washingtonpost.com), in Germany (https://www.ft.com), to name few of
them.
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learning process more efficient. Chapter 5 investigates this subject and
attempts to give an answer to the debated theme, using two intertwined
policy evaluation techniques and making use of information obtained
after a series of seismic events that occurred in 2012 in Italy.
1.2 Methodological approach
This work aims at proposing innovative tools and policy evaluation tech-
niques that can support all the stakeholders involved in the decision-
making process, so to monitor the basic service delivery and to evaluate
the resource management, assessing and promoting local action towards
the achievement of the set goals.
The efficiency and effectiveness analysis is an important theme in the
public sector performance literature. As concerns the efficiency analy-
sis, there are mainly two approaches, parametric and the non-parametric
one, that differ in the way the unknown and unobservable “efficiency
frontier” is inferred from the data. The first one imposes a specific pro-
duction function and estimates the error term as the deviation from the
given technology consisting in both statistical noise and detected level
of inefficiency. The econometric “Stochastic Frontier Analysis” (SFA) in-
troduced by Aigner et al. (1977) represents the leading approach among
the parametric techniques. Conversely, the non-parametric approach re-
lies on mathematical programming techniques to evaluate the relative
efficiency of one unit compared to the others. The most commonly em-
ployed optimization tool is the linear programming model referred to
as “Data Envelopment Analysis” (DEA), introduced by Charnes et al.
(1978) and based on the concept of efficiency proposed by Farrell (1957).
The non-parametric approach is particularly suitable for public sector ef-
ficiency analysis: it avoids assuming any specific functional form of the
production frontier, as we do not have a priori knowledge of the public
sector performance functional form nor understanding of the importance
of the different intervention areas, and it gives useful insights to correct
the detected level of inefficiency. With a similar mathematical formu-
lation and inspired by the DEA methodology, the Benefit-of-the-Doubt
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(BoD) weighting technique has been proposed in the literature as an ag-
gregating method to group several dimensions into one single composite
indicator (CI) and labelled as such after Melyn and Moesen (1991). The
composite indicator is a tool commonly acknowledged by academics and
research to group in a synthetic index a multidimensional phenomenon,
not only for benchmarking and performance comparison purposes, but
also for policy analysis and public communication (Nardo et al., 2005;
OECD, 2008; Zhou et al., 2010). In particular, the peculiarity of the BoD
model is that it assigns endogenously the weights for each sub-indicator:
the weights are optimally chosen so to give more importance to what
they can do the best and low importance to what they can do the worst.
As for the methodological contribution to the literature provided by
this work referring to the composite indicator and the efficiency analy-
sis tools, Chapter 2 introduces the development of a new flexible direc-
tional distance function composite indicator to measure the municipal
service provision; Chapter 3 proposes a novel integrated Analytic Hier-
archy Process/Non-radial Directional Distance Function (AHP/NDDF)
approach to evaluate the environmental efficiency of wastewater treat-
ment plants service supply, with a particular focus on the undesirable
output inclusion in the model specification; Chapter 4 provides a novel
3-stage DEA based approach to get an overall picture of the municipal
spending efficiency evaluation.
More specifically, in Chapter 2 we propose a ‘dynamic robust conditional
directional distance Benefit-of-the-Doubt model with ARI restrictions’,
encompassing several municipal intervention areas and integrating the
main advantages of existing model specifications to address a number of
issues that this kind of analysis can bring out. First of all, we deal with
heterogeneity among the municipalities in their political preferences and
in their priority public activities: we combine the insights of fully non-
parametric techniques to grant each municipality the benefit of the doubt
(Cherchye et al., 2007; Melyn and Moesen, 1991) with the weight restric-
tion specification to include municipal budget allocation information.
We also handle the presence of “undesirable” municipal service indica-
tors by using a directional distance function as proposed by Zanella et al.
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(2015), as “more” is not always “better” along the components we eval-
uate the municipal services. Moreover, we perform the analysis within
a robust and conditional approach to include the local government op-
erating environment characteristics (e.g. the income level, the citizens’
structure, the political orientation), the time dimension and to correct for
outlying observations (Ba˘din et al., 2012; Daraio and Simar, 2007; Mas-
tromarco and Simar, 2015). The proposed composite indicator is a step
forward in the Operational Research literature in several directions. First,
there are no studies nor composite indicators encompassing all the listed
issues and/or measuring in a comprehensive way the overall municipal
service provision (for a review, see Fusco et al., 2017; Karagiannis, 2017);
alternatively there are studies focusing only on single services (Rogge
et al., 2017) or not including undesirable features (Afonso and Fernan-
des, 2008; Yusfany, 2015). Second, so far the expenditure composition has
not been included directly in the model in the form of weight restriction
specification, but only in the municipal task aggregating scheme (Bosch
et al., 2012; Helland and Sørensen, 2015). Finally, only few papers deal
with the robust and conditional version of the municipal performance
evaluation (Asatryan and De Witte, 2015; Cordero et al., 2016).
Moving from an analysis encompassing all the main local government
competencies to a specific service sector, a novel integrated Analytic Hi-
erarchy Process/Non-radial Directional Distance Function (AHP/NDDF)
approach is presented in Chapter 3, aiming at assessing the wastewa-
ter treatment plants in terms of environmental efficiency, including for
the first time the presence of residual nitrogen as undesirable output.
The benefits of the two techniques are combined and explained as fol-
lows. Similarly to the standard NDDF approach (Adler and Volta, 2016;
Zhou et al., 2012), the suggested model allows to include simultaneously
inputs, desirable and undesirable outputs and not to overestimate the
efficiency scores. At the same time, the AHP inclusion gives the possi-
bility to directly take into account the decision maker preferences in the
weighting system and to encompass some existing directional distance
function models as special cases. Although several integrated Data En-
velopment Analysis/Analytic Hierarchy Process models have been pro-
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posed in the literature (see for example Pakkar, 2015), the present one
addresses different problems and purposes. Specifically, this model con-
siders the sustainability aspect in the wastewater treatment process as-
sessment, to put emphasis on its environmental impact in terms of pol-
lutants left in the outgoing water. The efficiency analysis literature uses
the notion of undesirable output, when referring to outputs whose in-
crease might not be desirable. In the water sector performance assess-
ment, only few DEA papers deal with the undesirable output. The no-
tion these studies use has a broader meaning with respect to other fields
of application, such as energy and cement sector: in the water service sec-
tor literature, the undesirable outputs encompass unintended bad conse-
quences. There are several ways to model undesirable outputs, depend-
ing on how the production technology process has been formalized. In
compliance with the wastewater treatment plants’ activity, we model the
undesirable output according to the null-jointness and weak disposabil-
ity assumptions.
Finally, Chapter 4 combines the insights of the efficiency model and the
use of composite indicators, by proposing a novel 3-stage DEA based ap-
proach to get an overall picture of local government spending efficiency,
integrating the evidences stemming both from a separate and from a
global analysis. In the first stage, we run a DEA model for each mu-
nicipal function under analysis, to explore the expenditure efficiency at
non-aggregate level in a fully flexible way. The second stage concerns
the aggregate analysis, to get the overall spending overview all at once.
To avoid the curse of dimensionality, we propose the innovative use of a
DEA-like composite indicator. To be in line with the first stage, we look
for a composite indicator that can reflect the idea of the DEA approach:
that is, selecting the most advantageous weights for the individual mu-
nicipality under analysis. Among the composite indicators proposed in
the literature, the Benefit-of-the-Doubt model fulfils this requirement, be-
ing a data-oriented method that assigns the weights in an objective way
to each unit at individual level (Cherchye et al., 2007; Melyn and Moesen,
1991). By construction, the assigned weights’ system is the best for the
municipality under analysis: as a consequence, comparison and rank-
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ings are not on a common system ground. To address this concern and
to enable policy makers to evaluate all the municipalities on the same
scale with a common system of weights, in the third stage we integrate
our model specification with the solution proposed by Despotis et al.
(2002) and advocated by Zanella et al. (2013): the composite indicator
score of all the municipalities is maximized at the same time, using the
same weights across all the units and endogenously obtained within the
algorithm specification.
On the other hand, as concerns the effectiveness analysis, economet-
ric models have been proposed to study how specific circumstances or
implemented policies might affect the economic phenomenon under in-
vestigation. However, the endogeneity issue pervading this kind of anal-
ysis prevents a causal interpretation, granting only a correlation one.
Several reasons, such as omitted variables, reverse causality, measure-
ment error or sample selection might lead to biased estimation. To un-
ravel a causal relationship, econometric techniques such as Instrumental
Variables, Regression Discontinuity Designs, Difference-in-Differences
and Fixed Effects, among others are proposed to address this issue (for
more details, see Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The listed quasi-experiments
rely on several sources of exogeneity, exploiting the geographical loca-
tion, the legal or political institution setting, the administrative rules as
objective thresholds or natural events occurred randomly, for example.
Chapter 5 proposes the use of two intertwined policy evaluation tech-
niques, namely a difference-in-differences estimation and Instrumental
Variable strategy, to explore the impact of school infrastructure spending
on students’ achievement. In this case, we rely on the information pro-
vided after the earthquake occurred in the Northern part of Italy in 2012.
In the educational performance analysis, there are at least two sources of
endogeneity (for a more extensive list, we refer to De Witte and Lo´pez-
Torres, 2017): omitted variable and self selection bias. In fact, while eval-
uating the students’ achievement as the outcome of a process using many
resources, we should acknowledge that not all the inputs are observable,
such as the innate ability of each pupil, the motivations and other fam-
ily information that is not observable. Moreover, there could be also a
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problem of self selection if parents might decide where to send their kids
to school, for example depending on the school physical environment or
on the reputation of the school. The seismic events represent an exter-
nal shock that enables us to compare similar schools with different enti-
tlement for extra-funding: the exogeneity introduced by the earthquake
justifies the assumption of random selection for funding eligibility and
allows us to give a causal interpretation to the effect of school infrastruc-
ture investment on educational attainment. Specifically, the difference-
in-differences approach exploits the information on the allocation pro-
cess, that is whether schools received funding or not; the Instrumental
Variable strategy uses the amount of funding that each school received
as function of pre-determined seismic risks.
Before concluding this section, another methodological aspect deserves
to be mentioned. In fact, ”considering contextual information makes it
possible to understand the major institutional differences and similarities
amongst countries, and thereby help to identify comparators for bench-
marking purposes” (OECD, 2017c). As unanimously acknowledged, the
background conditions matter. Both in the efficiency and the effective-
ness analysis, the operating context is addressed in the model specifica-
tion, in such a way that also this feature can be taken into account. In
the efficiency literature, several approaches have been proposed (for an
extensive review and critical discussion, see for all Bogetoft and Otto,
2010; Daraio et al., 2017; Simar and Wilson, 2007): among others, non-
parametric tests evaluate group differences, they are useful when the
underlying distribution is unknown, but may suffer from limited power;
bootstrap-based inference makes bias-corrections for the efficiency score
computation, but it still assumes the “separability condition”; condi-
tional analysis includes in one-stage the background variables avoid-
ing the assumption of the “separability”, but “if separability holds, the
unconditional estimators converge faster than the conditional counter-
parts” (Daraio et al., 2017). Also in the effectiveness analysis the back-
ground variables are directly included in the regression model as control
variables, to capture the heterogeneity among the units under observa-
tion. In this dissertation we show the possible insights from the applica-
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tion of each of these techniques. In Chapter 2 we estimate the conditional
version of the flexible directional distance composite indicator, so that
the environmental variables are directly included and the direction of
the influence of those variables on the service provision level assessment
can be investigated. In Chapter 3 we perform non-parametric signifi-
cance tests, namely the Mann-Whitney U test to evaluate two group dif-
ferences, while the Kruskal-Wallis test for three groups or more (see e.g.
Kruskal and Wallis, 1952; Ruxton and Beauchamp, 2008, for further de-
tails). In Chapter 4 we run a Tobit analysis using bias-corrected efficiency
scores. In Chapter 5 we directly include some of the school variables in
the model specification as control variables.
It is worth concluding this section by highlighting how different method-
ologies have been used to answer different research questions. Peculiar-
ities of the institutional context, data availability and policy relevance
have boosted the introduction of rather different innovative techniques;
notwithstanding, they should be considered in a complementary way so
to get a broader view of the public sector management.
1.3 Institutional context
This dissertation presents an empirical application of the proposed en-
hanced methodologies for two EU countries, Belgium and Italy. These
two countries are interesting study cases for their common and specific
features, apt to provide complementary insights and informative evi-
dence.
In 2017 both countries provided the Voluntary National Review, avail-
able on the Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, to keep track
of the progress, to share their experiences and to foster the 2030 Agenda
attainment. Specifically, both Belgium and Italy have a similar interest
for the local government analysis and they recognize the importance of
the bottom up approach for the Sustainable Development Goals achieve-
ment, implementing the global challenges at sub-national level. For ex-
ample, in Belgium “one in five Flemish municipalities have already signed
up to the Global Goals, Local Focus Declaration, thereby acknowledging
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the importance of the SDGs and the need to develop local actions in sup-
port thereof. Pilot projects have been launched in 20 municipalities aim-
ing to fully integrate the SDGs in overall policy and long-term plans by
October 2018” (United Nations High Level Political Forum, 2017). 2 An-
other indicative example is the project called “Health for all” of Tuscany
and Tunisia, funded by the United Nations and co-funded by the Tus-
cany Region: it has been presented at the European Development days
in Brussels in the session entitled “Migration, cities and the SDGs. Local
authorities key role in implementing the migration-related targets of the
Sustainable Development Goals”, as an example of the local and regional
crucial role in managing the migration and development puzzle.
Furthermore, both Belgium and Italy share a long-standing interest in
local government efficiency analysis as witnessed by the related existing
literature and specifically in the municipal size issue. An intense wave
of mergers occurred among Belgian local governments between 1975 and
1983, restricting the number of municipalities from 2,663 to 589. 3 Then,
at the turn of the 21st century a new wave of mergers have been planned
and announced in Flanders. 4 Specifically, municipalities have been en-
couraged to merge on a “voluntary” basis and supported with financial
and legal instruments (see for example Sadioglu, 2016) Also in Italy the
municipal merger is still a highly debated and ongoing topic. Munici-
palities are reluctant, especially because the local identity is very strong
and deeply rooted in the past: this is the case for Tuscany, for example.
5 The difference not only in terms of municipal size, but also in terms of
sub-national expenditure between the two countries is evident from the
statistics presented by the OECD (2017d) and reported in Appendix ??.
In particular, Flanders in Belgium and Tuscany in Italy have more or
less the same number of municipalities, but their heterogeneity offers an
interesting framework for different and separate analysis, presented re-
2See for example https://www.herent.be .
3For further details, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion of the Belgian municipalities
4Two Flemish municipalities have very recently decided to merge and others have
already announced the merger by 2018 (http://www.flanderstoday.eu/politics/fifth-
column-united-we-stand).
5For further details, https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusione di comuni italiani
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spectively in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 4, providing new tools of analysis
and evidences addressing issues related to the SDG 11 (“Make cities and
human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”). For Flem-
ish municipalities the service level provision is estimated by the use of an
innovative flexible directional distance composite indicator, identifying
the best practices and the factors that mainly affect the overall evalua-
tion. The obtained service provision index is then used to explore its
relationship with the local government size and to calculate the optimal
municipal tax rate. As regard Tuscan municipalities, the overall level of
municipal spending efficiency is computed by means of an original 3-
stage non-parametric model and in particular the effect of the municipal
size is investigated, given its topical relevance in the policy and academic
debate.
Still referring to Tuscan context, the empirical analysis of Chapter 3
involves the wastewater treatment plants controlled by Acque SpA, a
public-private utility entrusted in 2002 with water services, and located
in the so called “Basso Valdarno” river basin in the Pisa province. This
chapter deals with the SDG 6 (“Ensure availability and sustainable man-
agement of water and sanitation for all”) and specifically the key role
of environmental sustainability in “transforming our world” by 2030.
We provide a novel integrated approach to include pollution directly in
the efficiency assessment of the plants under analysis: if this aspect is
not considered, the “environmentally oriented” plants would be penal-
ized. Moreover, the public-private ownership of the water utility Acque
Spa signals an important phenomenon occurring at international level,
as for example emphasized in the recommendations promoted by the
OECD Council (OECD, 2014): Principle 6 states the need to “mobilise
private actors and financing institutions to diversify sources of funding
and strengthen sub-national capacities”, so as to bridge the infrastruc-
ture financing gap and to develop public-private partnerships (PPP) at
the sub-national level, overcoming the infrastructural and service neces-
sities of a growing global population and the limited available resources
in an efficient and effective way.
Finally, for Chapter 5 the relevance of education facility upgrade for
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effective learning environment is considered, referring to the tasks con-
cerning the SDG 4 (“Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education
and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”). For this topic, Ital-
ian state high schools are considered, not only because of the particular
methodological framework used to evaluate the impact of capital spend-
ing on educational achievement, but also because the Italian context of-
fers an interesting setting for other reasons enumerated as follows. First
of all, in Italy infrastructure spending in state high schools is mainly a
competence at regional level. Additionally, more and more initiatives
emphasize the need for more and better school building maintenance
and call for increasing capital expenditure in schools: the “XV Report On
Safety, Quality And Accessibility To School” provided by a national cos-
tumers’ organization called “CittadinanzAttiva” has denounced on the
news the inadequate maintenance of schoolhouses, reporting that one
in four schools lacks of anti-seismic measures and more than ten years
would be required to repair the school buildings all over Italy (Corriere
della Sera, 28/09/2017). Moreover, in Italy the share in capital expen-
diture is equal to 2%, way lower compared to 7% as the OECD average
and to 8% and 10% in other European countries of similar size, such as
respectively France and Germany (OECD, 2017b). To address this need
of school infrastructure investment, the Italian government has started
financing schools all over the country with a huge amount of money, to
keep them safe and adequate, to reinforce the anti-seismic measures and
to ameliorate the building system (above all, the “safe schools” program
in 2014 and “good schools” law in 2015). However, despite the remark-
able pressure to increase capital spending, the effect on the students’
outcome is still questioned in the related literature. Last but not least,
the schools belong to three different regions, namely Veneto, Emilia-
Romagna and Lombardia: these are the regions affected by the seismic
events occurred in 2012, for which a large amount of funding has been
given to repair and secure safety across the school buildings, giving us
the setting for an interesting quasi-experimental design.
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1.4 Outline of the dissertation
The dissertation is structured in two main parts and it covers six chap-
ters, as displayed in Table 1.1. Part I deals with monitoring basic service
provision and measuring its performance level, presenting first an analy-
sis encompassing all the main municipal competencies and then focusing
on a specific public service. The research questions of Chapter 2 are:
(I) How to measure the overall municipal service level provision in a
single index?
(II) Is there an “inverted U-relationship” between production and gov-
ernment size?
In line with the subsidiarity principle, local governments have expe-
rienced an increasing level of involvement in service provision, as closer
to the citizens and more suitable to capture their specific needs. The
need for more enhanced tools to evaluate the service provision leads us
to answer these two questions. We introduce a flexible and fully non-
parametric composite indicator, suitable to encompass in one single score
multiple municipal intervention areas. While constructing this index,
several issues are taken into account, mostly arising from the fact that
municipalities differ among each other for a number of reasons. Specif-
ically, regarding the political preferences across the municipal activities,
the local budget composition information is directly included in the mo-
del specification. Once a synthetic index is obtained as such, we explore
a long-standing debate, namely whether there exists an optimal govern-
ment size, considered here in terms of tax burden imposed on the citi-
zens. To add further insights to the analysis, the influence of few relevant
municipal characteristics on the service evaluation is explored, by means
of a conditional version of the proposed model specification.
In the next chapter, we focus on a specific service sector, namely water
management. In particular, we analyse the performance of the plants in
charge of treating wastewater (Wastewater Treatment Plants, WWTPs).
The research questions of Chapter 3 are:
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(III) How to evaluate the wastewater treatment plants performance
taking into account environmental sustainability aspects?
(IV) Which are the main determinants affecting the wastewater treat-
ment plants’ performance?
In public sector management, the attention of stakeholders is not only
related to performance evaluation in economic terms, but also in terms
of sustainability. Accordingly, we first propose a model that combines
the benefits of the Non-radial Directional Distance Function and the An-
alytic Hierarchy Process approaches. As from the first approach, we are
able not only to model inputs and good outputs, but also to control for
undesirable outputs. Specifically, in our data specification we identify
the nitrogen left in the outgoing water as an undesirable pollutant, given
its harmful effect on the environment. In addition, from the Analytic
Hierarchy Process approach, we include the policy-makers priorities di-
rectly in the model specification. In particular, two different scenarios
are proposed to show the differences in the evaluation process while tak-
ing or not into account to which extent the plants are “environmentally”
oriented, so to address the environmental sustainability aspect. Further-
more, several characteristics of the WWTPs are explored, so to give the
policy-makers informative suggestions as concerns the main determi-
nants of the WWTP process and their performance.
Part II considers the public spending analysis side, evaluating first
the municipal expenditure efficiency across all main local government
intervention areas and then assessing the effectiveness of a specific sector
funding. The research questions of Chapter 4 are:
(V) How to assess municipal expenditure efficiency, considering mu-
nicipal competencies both one by one and all together?
(VI) How does municipal demographic size affect public spending effi-
ciency?
In line with New Public Management theories, the efficiency and effec-
tiveness analysis of the public sector is a useful step to support the policy
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maker decisional process and ultimately to provide better and more tai-
lored services to the citizens. Accordingly, in this chapter we propose
a 3-stage DEA based model to evaluate the municipal expenditure effi-
ciency considering the main municipal intervention areas both at non-
aggregate and aggregate level. This kind of assessment lends itself well
to further investigations. In particular, we address the ongoing debate
about the optimal municipal size, while exploring at the same time the
impact of other municipal features.
In the next chapter, we consider instead public spending in a specific
sector, namely the expenditure in the education sector. In particular, we
focus on school infrastructure investment and the way it affects educa-
tional achievement. The research questions of Chapter 5 are:
(VII) How can we disentangle the endogeneity arising while assessing
the school resource effectiveness?
(VIII) Does spending on school physical infrastructure affect student out-
comes?
The need to invest in education and, among others, in school infras-
tructure is unanimously acknowledged. Nevertheless, despite the evi-
dent necessity, the effect of resource provision on educational achieve-
ment is still debated. Since the Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966), there is
no conclusive evidence as concerns the impact of investment on student
outcome, whether supportive or harmful, mostly depending on the en-
dogeneity arising in the standard econometric techniques use. For this
reason, we employ a quasi-experimental design and use information on
the extra funding that a specific group of schools received in the after-
math of the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake, to investigate the school
infrastructure effectiveness with respect to student achievement. Specifi-
cally, we use a difference-in-differences strategy to detect whether receiv-
ing funding or not affects the educational attainment. An instrumental
variable strategy explores the intensity effect depending on the amount
of received funding.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation. The main evidence ob-
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tained for the raised research questions is summarized emphasizing the
policy relevance aspects. To conclude, future lines of research are pre-
sented.
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Table 1.1: Dissertation outline
Chapter Research question Method Target
groups
Chapter 1 General introduction
Part I
Service level
provision
Chapter 2 How to measure the overall mu-
nicipal service level provision in
a single index?
Robust conditional Directional
Distance Benefit-of-the-Doubt
with ARI restrictions model
Flemish mu-
nicipalities
Chapter 3 How to evaluate the environ-
mental efficiency of wastewater
treatment plants including un-
desirable output?
Integrated Non-Radial Direc-
tional Distance function and
Analytic Hierarchy Process ap-
proach
Tuscan
wastewater
treatment
plants
Part II
Public
spending
analysis
Chapter 4 How to assess the overall ef-
ficiency of municipal expendi-
ture and which is its relationship
with the municipal size?
Three stage Data Envelopment
Analysis based model
Tuscan mu-
nicipalities
Chapter 5 Does spending on physical in-
frastructure affect student out-
comes?
Difference-in-differences es-
timation and instrumental
variable strategy
Italian
schools
Chapter 6 General conclusion
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Part I
Service level
provision
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Chapter 2
Service Level Provision in
Municipalities: A Flexible
Directional Distance
Composite Indicator
2.1 Introduction
In line with the subsidiarity principle and the New Public Management
theories, a gradual decentralization of the key activities from the national
level to the municipal level has occurred to provide services closer and
more tailored to citizens’ needs. Accordingly, the pressure on the provi-
sion of public goods calls for a more enhanced service level analysis at
the local level and, in particular, for suitable tools to measure and mon-
itor local municipal service provision leading towards effective, innova-
tive and sustainable public sector management. Chapter 2 focuses on
the evaluation of the overall service provision at municipal level, while
Chapter 3 deepens the public goods supply in a specific sector, that is the
water management sector.
Specifically, in this chapter we propose an innovative fully non-parametric
approach to assess in a dynamic framework the local service provision.
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As the municipal tasks cover several multifaceted areas, the proposed
method relies on the construction of a composite indicator, and, more
specifically, a municipal service provision composite indicator. However,
when defining the municipal service provision composite indicator, there
are five issues that we need to tackle in the model specification. First, it is
necessary to acknowledge that municipalities differ in the activities they
develop and do not develop. This decision is often driven by political
preferences over the different municipal competencies. This variety is re-
flected both in terms of local government priorities and in terms of their
peculiar specializations: the municipal budget allocation properly keeps
track of this kind of information. On the one hand, budget shares are the
result of historical choices made by previous governments; on the other
hand, they reflect the current government preferences over different mu-
nicipal intervention areas, depending on municipal characteristics, voter
preferences and perceived local needs. Second, the municipalities differ
not only in what they are willing to do, but also in what they are able
to achieve and the service they can provide. To deal with this kind of
variety among the municipalities under assessment and to grant the fair-
ness of comparison to each of them, we propose a flexible approach that
grants in a fully non-parametric framework each municipality the bene-
fit of the doubt. The approach is combined with the weight restrictions
based on the municipal expenditure composition. In this way we can
provide objectively determined and endogenously flexible weights, but
at the same time we directly constrain them according to the municipal
balance sheets’ information. Third, “more” is not always “better” along
the dimensions we evaluate the municipal service. For example, the mu-
nicipalities have the duty to prevent criminality: in this case, the higher
the level of criminality, the poorer is the level of service the municipality
provides to its citizens in terms of public safety. We deal with this kind
of indicators considering them as undesirable features. For this reason,
we tailor the suggested BoD approach to a directional distance function
as proposed by Zanella et al. (2015). Fourth, the municipal operating en-
vironment characteristics play a role in the public activities delivery, as
they influence the choice and the importance of the different municipal
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areas. To avoid the assumption of the “separability condition”, we per-
form a conditional analysis of the emerging model, combined with its ro-
bust version, to handle the bias stemming from the atypical observations
possibly present in the units under analysis. Finally, as time matters,
a dynamic component is added in the conditional model (Mastromarco
and Simar, 2015) to exploit intertemporal variations in public service pro-
vision (Cordero et al., 2016).
Taking into account the listed issues, we propose an innovative way
to evaluate local municipal service provision. More precisely, we ad-
vocate a composite indicator built on a directional distance BoD mo-
del, including undesirable features and weight restrictions based on the
expenditure composition, performing the robust and conditional anal-
ysis, within a dynamic framework. The composite indicator is applied
to Flemish municipalities to measure municipal service provision of 307
Flemish municipalities over the years 2006–2011.
In a next step we relate the service level provision to local government
size. There is significant literature comparing the optimal government
size among countries (see for example De Witte and Moesen, 2010), but
not among municipalities. Broadly speaking, the main idea is to test
the existence of an “inverted U-relationship” between the production (in
terms of economic growth or economic performance) and government
size, expressed as the share of public sector for the unit under assessment
(in terms of % of expenditure, % of revenues or in terms of tax burden).
In the economic literature, the theory behind the Armey and the Laffer
curves well fits this concept. In the present application, we can consider
the tax burden, measured as the municipal tax revenues over the taxable
income, against the constructed municipal service composite indicators,
to test the existence of a trade-off.
Despite the fact that in the Operational Research literature there is
a huge amount of studies focusing on local governments and their effi-
ciency aspects (for an extensive review see Narbo´n-Perpin˜a´ and De Witte,
2017a,b), the present chapter represents a step forward in several direc-
tions. First, there are no studies that measure in a comprehensive way
the overall municipal service provision (see for all Fusco et al., 2017;
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Karagiannis, 2017). There are studies either proposing this approach
only for specific municipal functions, such as for example the waste col-
lection service (Rogge et al., 2017), or focusing only on the global out-
put assessment and not including undesirable features in the evaluation
(Afonso and Fernandes, 2008; Yusfany, 2015). Second, when construct-
ing the composite indicator we include the information on the expendi-
ture composition share for each municipal area in the weight restriction
specification and not only as a direct weighting scheme to aggregate the
municipal tasks (Bosch et al., 2012; D’Inverno et al., 2017; Helland and
Sørensen, 2015). Finally, with respect to the huge amount of municipal
efficiency papers, just few of them include the robust and conditional
analysis (Asatryan and De Witte, 2015; Cordero et al., 2016), even if local
public services depend on the characteristics of the municipalities and
a fair analysis should account for these differences directly in the main
model specification.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2
discusses the different municipal tasks and it explains accordingly the
data choice. In Section 2.3 the methodological steps leading to the advo-
cated ‘robust conditional directional distance BoD with weight restric-
tions’ composite indicator for the municipal service provision assess-
ment are discussed. Section 2.4 presents the main findings obtained from
the empirical application on Flemish municipalities and the usefulness
of such proposed composite indicator in exploring the influence of both
the municipal background conditions and the government size. Lastly,
Section 2.5 presents some final remarks and conclusions.
2.2 Municipal service level
As suggested by the OECD (2008), when constructing a composite indi-
cator we first have to define its theoretical framework, to clarify which is
the phenomenon we want to measure and which are the sub-components
that can represent it as a whole. Accordingly, we have to make clear
which are the dimensions the municipal service composite indicator we
propose is built on. The services provided by the municipalities vary
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from country to country depending on several factors, such as for exam-
ple the location, the geography, the history and the tradition. However,
there are several commonly acknowledged functions that represent the
main tasks of a municipality. These include general administration, cul-
ture, education and care services, housing and public safety, road main-
tenance and environmental management. For the sake of clarity, we re-
fer to Figure 2.1 for a list of services grouped by the various functions.
These different intervention areas can be seen as the broad categories
along which municipal services’ composite indicator should be assessed.
• Services	for	ins-tu-onal	bodies,	
administra-ve	oﬃce,	civil	
registra-on,	electoral	services	
1.	General	
administra-on	
• Cultural	events,	libraries,	museums	2.	Culture	
• Childcare,	kindergarten,	services	to	
minors,	leisure	structures,	elderly	
care	
3.	Care	services	
• Nursery	schools,	primary	educa-on,	
school	assistance,	school	transport	
and	school	meals	
4.	Educa-onal	
services	
• Spa-al	planning,	provision	of	
construc-on	or	expansion	permits	5.	Housing	
• Services	regarding	viability,	traﬃc	
circula-on,	public	ligh-ng	and	
public	transport	
6.	Road	maintenance	
and	local	mobility	
• Services	regarding	the	municipal	
police,	the	commercial	police	and	
the	administra-ve	police	
7.	Public	safety	
• Services	regarding	the	water	
provision,	the	waste	collec-on,	the	
maintenance	of	green	areas	
8.	Environment	
Municipal	service	
composite	indicator	
Municipal	sub-indicators	
(Municipal	func-ons)	 Municipal	services	
Figure 2.1: Example of services for each municipal function
Once the sub-indicators are identified with the municipal functions,
we have to consequently choose suitable and representative variables, in
compliance with the data availability and the output choice in the related
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local governments’ efficiency literature (for an extensive review, we refer
the interested reader to Narbo´n-Perpin˜a´ and De Witte, 2017a).
For expository purposes, we focus on the Flemish region of Belgium
for which we have exceptionally good data at municipal level. The data
refer to 307 Flemish municipalities over the period 2006–2011. Table 2.1
shows the descriptive statistics of the variables expressed in per capita
values. We proxy the general administration by the number of Net For-
eigners and Households. The cultural events measure the cultural function
indicator. The recipient of the education and care services are respec-
tively the Students in primary school and the Children in kindergarten to-
gether with the Residents over 80. The Built-up area is considered for the
housing and country planning area. For the road mobility we consider
the number of Accidents. For the police function the crime level is mea-
sured by the number of Thefts, Physical and Property crimes. Finally, the
Energy consumption and the Waste production are taken into account for
the environmental management function. 1
1We selected the listed variables as proxy for municipal functions, but also other indi-
cators can be interestingly used in the composite indicator construction. For example, for
Flemish context some indicators used as criteria for funds allocation could be considered
(see e.g. http://www.vvsg.be/Werking Organisatie/Financien/Pages/default.aspx) and
used as scope for further research.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for the municipal service level
Municipal service (per 1000 inhabitants) Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
1. Robust BOD CI for general administration 1842 0.85 0.11 0.73 2.92
Net foreigners 1842 7.44 6.31 0.04 120.8
Households 1842 404.5 23.76 351.33 560.83
2. Cultural events 1842 6.53 5.51 0.3 36.05
3. Robust BOD CI for care service 1842 0.8 0.11 0.56 1.54
Children in kindergarten 1842 37.35 7.37 8.38 96.64
Residents over 80 1842 46.26 9.65 20.19 88.28
4. Students in primary school 1842 63.51 13.47 9.81 145.58
5. Built-up area (Km2) 1842 64.33 21.2 22.34 251.01
6. Accidents 1842 4.44 1.57 0.39 13.37
7. Robust BOD CI for Crime 1842 0.5 0.21 0.11 1.62
Thefts 1842 21.77 12.42 3.44 92.79
Physical crimes 1842 4.91 2.44 0.9 19.56
Property crimes 1842 8.43 3.56 0 34.01
8. Robust BOD CI for environment services 1842 0.61 0.12 0.41 1.46
Waste (Tonnes) 1842 141.08 39.51 56.83 362.63
Energy consumption 1842 7.9 1.8 4.68 22.68
Note: Panel for 307 Flemish municipalities over 2006–2011.
A few additional considerations deserve mention. A recurrent issue
in the non-parametric analysis is the curse of dimensionality, occurring
when considering a high number of variables in the model. To exploit
the data availability and to gather together several aspects of the same
phenomenon, a few solutions have been proposed in the literature, as
for example aggregating first in sub-indicators (Afonso et al., 2005) or
specifying the weight restrictions on a more aggregate level (Morais and
Camanho, 2011). In the present application, for some municipal sub-
indicators a ‘robust Benefit-of-Doubt’ composite indicator has been con-
structed aggregating variables belonging to the same municipal function
(for the methodological details, please refer to Section 2.3). This is the
case for the following functions: the general administration (composite
indicator from Net foreigners and Households), the care services (com-
posite indicator from Children in kindergarten and Residents over 80),
the public safety by a crime index (composite indicator from number of
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Thefts, Physical and Property crimes 2), the environmental management
(composite indicator from Waste and Energy consumption).3
Second, not all the variables included in the analysis are strictly di-
rect measures of the services provided to the citizens, but rather proxies.
This procedure is widely accepted both in the composite indicator and in
the local governments’ efficiency literature to the extent that the selected
variables are clearly representative of the intended composite indicator
(Narbo´n-Perpin˜a´ and De Witte, 2017a; OECD, 2008). For example, in the
current application the number of kids in the kindergarten and the num-
ber of elderly people are used to define the care services function, despite
the fact that they are not direct measures of the actual services, as the
number of meals per pupil or residential aged care might be for instance.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the chosen two groups well
represent the recipient of this kind of services. Moreover, to the best of
our knowledge, there are no available data on the quality of the services
and on the citizens’ coproduction role, even though this type of informa-
tion would add a very interesting dimension to the overall analysis, as
pointed out for example by De Witte and Geys (2011, 2013).
Finally, it is worth pointing out that not all the municipal sub-indicators
represent desirable features, in the sense that “more is better”. In fact,
the municipalities should not only offer the greatest amount of services
they can, but in some cases the service they are supposed to deliver is
to contain as much as they can the production of undesirable features,
such as the number of accidents, the level of criminality and the level
of environmental pollution. To keep the production of these undesirable
indicators as low as possible, municipalities have to spend resources that
would have otherwise spent in producing other services. For example,
municipalities have to pay more subsidies to reduce the level of environ-
mental pollution, in terms of energy consumption and waste production.
2Providing a BoD index for crime rather than just adding numbers captures more infor-
mation: it takes into account the heterogeneity among the different kinds of crime across
the municipalities that would be otherwise wiped out.
3The robust BoD composite indicator has been computed for every year separately. For
the choice of m we choose m=40 and for the bootstrap replications we consider B=2000.
Further details on the choice of m and B are provided in Section 2.3.4 and 2.4.
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In a similar vein, a local government has to spend resources to keep safe
the roads so to minimize the number of accidents and to pay the pub-
lic officers so to protect and help the citizens. Moreover, despite the fact
that quality data are not available as outlined above, the introduced “un-
desirable” outcomes might reflect to some extent quality (e.g., accidents
might partly reflect poor-quality roads). In the current analysis we con-
sider three undesirable and five desirable indicators, the first referring to
public safety, road mobility and environmental management functions,
the second referring to general administration, education and care ser-
vices, culture and housing functions.
In addition to the considerations made so far, it is necessary to ac-
knowledge that also the operating conditions matter when construct-
ing a municipal service composite indicator. In fact, the characteristics
of the municipalities (e.g., size, income, age composition) affect local
public activities and, as a consequence, also the overall assessment of
the aggregate indicator. For this reason, in compliance with the vari-
ables used in the related literature (for an extensive review, see Narbo´n-
Perpin˜a´ and De Witte, 2017b), three groups of background variables need
to be included in the analysis: economic-financial characteristics, socio-
demographic structure and the political dimension. We propose the fis-
cal income, the financial debt and the unemployment as representative vari-
ables of economic-financial characteristics: specifically, they are also in-
formative about the institutional setting in which municipalities have to
operate. The fiscal income is defined as the income per capita and it
represents citizens’ economic level estimated for each municipality. Fi-
nancial debt is measured as the excess of expenditures over revenues per
capita and it reflects three interconnected aspects: namely the level of
made loans, the return on investment and the fiscal revenue capacity. As
stock of deficit, it might be due to decisions rooted in the past, but still
it might influence the current service provision. The unemployment is
the percentage of unemployed residents between 15 and 64 years over
the working population and it can be seen not only as a cost for the mu-
nicipality in terms of social and housing benefits, but also as a signal of
the living conditions in which municipalities have to operate. To frame
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the socio-demographic structure, we consider the residents over 65, the
foreigners and the population growth. The residents over 65 is the share of
retired people over the population and it represents the age composition.
To capture how a municipality is attractive for foreigners and its ethnic
composition, the share of immigrants is considered. Population growth
is the variation of residents that a municipality faces over the years and
it measures whether the provision of services keeps pace or not with the
population growth. Finally, as regards the political aspect, the “Ideological
Complexion of the local Government” (ICG) measures the ideological stance
of the local government on a Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10): a higher ICG
score represents a more right-wing government4. We refer to Table 2.2
for the descriptive statistics of the presented background variables and
Appendix A.1 for additional information on data source and description:
some of them are categorized for methodological reasons (for more tech-
nical details, see Rogge et al., 2017, and the references therein).
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for the municipal background conditions
Background conditions Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Economic-financial components
Fiscal income (e per capita) 1842 16330.52 1924.97 11055.29 24278.23
Financial debt (e per capita) 1842 1014.43 581.88 -1497.33 5402.22
Unemployment 1842 5.52 1.8 2.11 15.19
Socio-demographic components
Residents over 65 (% of total) 1842 0.18 0.02 0.11 0.3
Foreigners (% of total) 1842 0.05 0.06 0 0.48
Population growth 1842 0.64 0.62 -4.51 3.59
Political component
Ideological Complexion of the 1842 5.04 0.71 2.5 6.3
local Government (ICG)
Note: Panel for 307 Flemish municipalities over 2006–2011.
2.3 Methodology
This chapter proposes an enhanced way to measure the local munici-
pal service provision by constructing a composite indicator. As there
4We gratefully thank De Witte and Geys (2009) for providing us this data.
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are several issues that we need to tackle while specifying the model, the
methodological steps leading to the advocated ‘robust conditional direc-
tional distance BoD model with weight restrictions’ are presented in the
next subsections.
2.3.1 The BoD model
Local municipal service provision covers several areas, as presented in
the previous section. Accordingly, we look for an aggregating method
to group several dimensions into one single composite indicator (CI).
As we do not have a priori knowledge of the functional form and un-
derstanding of the importance of the different municipal services, we
consider a fully non-parametric way to avoid any kind of specification
bias. In particular, we choose a Benefit-of-the-Doubt (BoD) weighting
technique, inspired by the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodol-
ogy (Charnes et al., 1978) and labelled as such after Melyn and Moesen
(1991). The peculiarity of the BoD model is that it assigns endogenously
the weights for each municipal service. More specifically, the service pro-
vision level of the municipality under analysis is compared in a relative
perspective to the service level of all the municipalities in the sample:
a higher weight is assigned to a municipal area where the municipality
under analysis provides relatively high service level and a lower weight
where it provides relatively low service level. To put it differently, the set
of weights is defined so that high importance is assigned to municipal ar-
eas with relatively high level of services and low importance is assigned
with relatively low level of services. The optimal weights are determined
in such a way that the composite indicator for the overall level of service
provision of the municipality j0 under analysis is maximized and they
are obtained solving for each municipality j0 the following problem:
CIj0 = max
∑s
r=1 yrj0wrj0
s.t.
∑s
r=1 yrjwrj0 ≤ 1, for j = 1, . . . , j0, . . . , n
wrj0 ≥ 0, for r = 1, . . . , s
(2.1)
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with CIj0 the composite indicator optimal value for the evaluated mu-
nicipality j0; yrj0 denotes the observed service level for the municipal
area r of the evaluated municipality j0; wrj0 the most favorable weight
to the municipal area r for the evaluated municipality j0; yrj the ob-
served service level for the municipal area r of every municipality j in
the dataset; n the number of municipalities under analysis (n=307) and s
the number of municipal functions considered in this application (s=8).
The first constraint in the model formulation is referred to as the “nor-
malization” constraint: the overall municipal composite indicator CIj0 is
maximized subject to an upper bound equal to one. Therefore, the CIj0
value ranges between zero and one: the higher the value, the higher is the
overall service provision level for the evaluated municipality. If CIj0 <1,
it means that, even if the municipality under analysis is evaluated with
its most favorable weighting system, there is at least another munici-
pality providing a higher overall level of service. Hence, there is still
room for improvement in the service provision, given the observed over-
all level of provided services across the whole sample. If CIj0 =1, the
municipality under analysis is not outperformed in terms of the overall
service provision and it is considered as its own benchmark while us-
ing its most favorable weight system. The second constraint imposes the
weights’ non-negativity.
The advantage of using this approach is twofold: first, it allows to
group together several aspects into one single indicator. Second, it en-
sures the fairness of the comparison, weighting more the municipal areas
where higher priority is devoted and, vice versa, weighting less the ones
with lower priority. In this way, each evaluated municipality is granted
the “Benefit-of-the-Doubt” in the assessment and the fairness of the com-
parison is ensured (for more details on the BoD approach, see e.g. Cher-
chye et al., 2007; Rogge et al., 2017; Verschelde and Rogge, 2012).
2.3.2 The directional distance BoD model
In the depicted BoD framework, a higher indicator level in a certain mu-
nicipal area contributes to a better overall service provision assessment:
to this extent, the indicator can be labelled as “desirable”. However, we
have to acknowledge that this is not necessarily always the case among
all the local services. In fact, municipalities might also provide services in
areas where the best they can do is to contain the production of the indi-
cator rather than to expand it and for this reason the label “undesirable”
is assigned. For example, among the environmental services, municipal-
ities are supposed to promote activities to reduce the waste production
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and the energy consumption. As a consequence, the municipal waste
and the energy consumption enter in the model as undesirable indica-
tors: municipalities have to pay more in terms of subsidies to promote a
lower consumption of energy and lower production of waste, devoting
resources that would have otherwise spent on other services.
The inclusion of undesirable features in the construction of compos-
ite indicators is quite recent and it is linked to the performance measure-
ment literature (for an extensive review, see Dakpo et al., 2016; Zanella
et al., 2015). In this study, we propose the model introduced by Zanella
et al. (2015) and advocated by Rogge et al. (2017), namely a directional
distance BoD model. This model combines the earlier listed advantages
of the BoD approach together with the ones of the directional distance
function, introduced by Chung et al. (1997). In fact, the directional dis-
tance model allows to simultaneously contract the undesirable indica-
tors and expand the desirable ones along a specified direction vector
g = (−gb, gy), as shown in its primal formulation (Zanella et al., 2015,
model (7), p.523). However, the multiplier formulation of the directional
distance BoD model (Zanella et al., 2015, model (8), p.523) is preferred to
include weight restrictions in the municipal service level assessment and
it has to be solved for each j0 municipality under analysis:
βj0 = min −
∑s
r=1 yrj0urj0 +
∑l
k=1 bkj0pkj0 + vj0
s.t.
∑s
r=1 gyurj0 +
∑l
k=1 gbpkj0 = 1
−∑sr=1 yrjurj0 +∑lk=1 bkjpkj0 + vj0 ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , j0, . . . , n
urj0 ≥ 0 for r = 1, . . . , s
pkj0 ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , l
vj0 ∈ <
(2.2)
with βj0 the optimal value for the evaluated municipality j0; yrj0 and
bkj0 respectively the observed r desirable and k undesirable indicator
of the evaluated municipality j0; urj0 and pkj0 respectively the most fa-
vorable BoD-weights for the r desirable and k undesirable indicator for
the evaluated municipality j0; yrj and bkj respectively the r desirable
and k undesirable indicator of every municipality j in the dataset; n the
number of municipalities under analysis (n=307); s and l respectively
the number of municipal functions linked to desirable and undesirable
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indicators considered in this application (s=5 and l =3).
Among several direction vectors that can be specified, we choose
g = (−bkj0 , yrj0): in other words, we use the municipal service indica-
tors of the evaluated municipality as the direction vector. In this way, the
composite indicator for the municipal service provision is obtained as
CIj0 = 1/(1 + βj0)
and it ranges between zero and one, where one denotes the greatest level
of service provision as in the basic BoD model.
2.3.3 The directional distance BoD model including weight
restrictions
In the local service provision assessment, there is another aspect that can
not be ignored, namely the political preferences over the different mu-
nicipal intervention areas. There are two interconnected explanations for
this kind of heterogeneity among the municipalities. First of all, there
are municipal functions that deserve higher priorities than others. This
phenomenon is not only quite evident looking at the average expendi-
ture composition across the municipalities, but it is also clearly stated
in certain national legislative systems (for example in Italy there is the
distinction between “fundamental” and “non-fundamental” functions).
Second, every municipality has its own peculiar vocation: a municipal-
ity might be more focused on the tourism sector, another one on cultural
activities, another one on a different economic specialization, just to pro-
vide few examples. In this case, the budget allocation reflects variety
across the municipalities under evaluation, as they consider as more im-
portant.
By including weight restrictions in our model formulation, we can
not only include these value judgements, but we can also address one
common concern related to the great flexibility in the weighting system
associated to the BoD approach. In the DEA/BoD literature several types
of weight restrictions have been considered (for a review, see for all Cher-
chye et al., 2007; Sarrico and Dyson, 2004; Zanella et al., 2015, and refer-
ences therein). In this context, we suggest the assurance region type I
(ARI) weight restrictions as suggested by Zanella et al. (2015) and ad-
vocated by Calabria et al. (2016).5 By adding this kind of restrictions to
5As suggested by Sarrico and Dyson (2004), this kind of choice might penalize the units
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the model specification, we can constrain the relative importance of each
municipal function indicator within a certain range and express it in per-
centage terms, as follows:
φr ≤ urj0 y¯r∑s
r=1 urj0 y¯r +
∑l
k=1 pkj0 b¯k
≤ ψr for r = 1, . . . , s
φk ≤ pkj0 b¯k∑s
r=1 urj0 y¯r +
∑l
k=1 pkj0 b¯k
≤ ψk for k = 1, . . . , l
(2.3)
with s and l constraints respectively for each observed r desirable and k
undesirable municipal indicator.
The question remains on how to specify the importance of each mu-
nicipal indicator and accordingly the bounds φ and ψ. The innovative
way we propose in this chapter is to get this kind of information directly
from the municipal expenditure allocation across the different services.
To the best of our knowledge, in municipal performance assessment the
expenditure composition has been included directly in the aggregation
process, but not in the weight restrictions (see for example Bosch et al.,
2012; D’Inverno et al., 2017; Helland and Sørensen, 2015). In this regard,
the expenditure composition of each municipality is consistent with the
rationale of the “budget allocation” approach as described by Cherchye
et al. (2007).
The proposed method has the advantage to reflect the heterogeneity
across municipalities, granting some leeway but, at the same time, leav-
ing an objective order of importance among the municipal services with-
out imposing any kind of external judgement. In particular, we propose
three sets of restrictions, which vary according to the different specified
bounds.
The first one considers the minimum and the maximum share of ex-
penditure in each municipal area across all the municipalities (“MinMax
restrictions”). In this way, the municipality under evaluation cannot as-
sign lower or greater importance to each municipal indicator than the
one recognized among all the municipalities.
In a second alternative way to specify the restrictions, for each mu-
nicipal indicator the average spending share is considered, identifying
a lower and an upper bound value equal to its ±50% (“Average restric-
tions”). This kind of restrictions circumscribes the average importance
with small or large values. However, as emphasized by Zanella et al. (2015, p. 526), among
other weight restriction alternatives the ARI type is “the best option to construct composite
indicators and ranks”, so to ensure a fair comparison among the units under evaluation.
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of each municipal area according to the priorities acknowledged among
all the municipalities: local governments are given some leeway in decid-
ing their own weights, but at the same time a certain order of importance
among the functions is respected.
Finally, rather than confining a municipality within the overall av-
erage choice, the third specification of restrictions allows each munic-
ipality to set its own weight based on its current spending allocation
(“Municipal-specific restrictions”). To put it differently, the lower and the
upper bound value of the constrains associated to each municipal indi-
cator is equal to ±50% of each municipal-specific expenditure share.
By construction, the three sets exhibit increasingly binding restric-
tions. Table A.4 presents summary information about the weights just
presented for each municipal area: we refer to Appendix A.2 for the
municipal-specific lower and upper bounds.
Table 2.3: Summary of the weights obtained from the municipal expendi-
ture composition
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
MIN 0.08 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03
LOWER BOUND 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05
AVERAGE 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.10
UPPER BOUND 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.22 0.16 0.15
MAX 0.49 0.31 0.23 0.39 0.16 0.33 0.23 0.22
Interestingly, the optimally chosen weights do not only reflect the
importance that each municipal indicator has in the overall assessment
of service level provision, but they can also be interpreted as normal-
ized shadow prices (Coelli et al., 2005). In our application, a shadow
price can describe the way a municipal indicator is affected whenever
another indicator varies, or alternatively how the composition of overall
service provision can change depending on different political choices (for
more technical details, see Fusco, 2015; Grupp and Schubert, 2010). The
shadow prices are useful to determine the “budget shares” (Van Puyen-
broeck and Rogge, 2017).
2.3.4 The robust and conditional directional distance BoD
model
All the steps discussed so far are necessary to grant an increasing level of
fairness in the local service provision assessment. However, there is a last
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aspect that can not be neglected, namely the role of the operating context
under which the municipalities have to operate. First of all, the back-
ground conditions can affect both the supply and the demand side of the
service provision level. For example, as concerns the supply aspect, a
wealthier municipality with a higher level of local revenues might be en-
dowed with more resources to spend. Alternatively, as for the demand
side, a municipality experiencing a higher level of unemployment might
be required to provide a higher number of subsidies, diverting resources
from the provision of additional services. Moreover, background condi-
tions can also have a remarkable impact on the political preferences over
municipal functions, influencing to different extents the components of
the composite indicator and the way they enter in the synthetic index. As
a consequence, the ‘directional distance BoD with ARI restrictions’ com-
posite indicator CIj0 outlined so far has to be adjusted accounting for
the differences in the municipal environmental variables. These can be
grouped in economic-financial characteristics, socio-demographic struc-
ture and political dimension.
Despite the fact that the operating factors are exogenous with respect
to the service provision level and they are not under the control of lo-
cal policy-makers, they affect not only the distribution of the composite
indicator scores, but also their attainable set. For these reasons, the “sep-
arability condition” can not be assumed and we need to use a one-stage
procedure to compute the municipal service provision composite indica-
tor including at the same time the environmental factors: in the literature
this approach is referred to as the “conditional” measurement procedure.
Moreover, we complement the conditional analysis with its robust ver-
sion to mitigate the influence of outlying observations, arising from, e.g.,
measurement errors and atypical observations, using the insights from
the “order-m” approach. For the sake of brevity, we refer for a more for-
mal and extensive explanation of the procedures to Cazals et al. (2002);
Cordero et al. (2017); Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007); De Witte and Korte-
lainen (2013), among others.
For the computation of the robust municipal service composite indi-
cator, we run a Monte-Carlo algorithm performing B computation rounds
(where B is large): the bootstrap replicates reduce the impact of the outly-
ing observations. In each b round (b = 1, . . . , B), first m municipalities are
drawn with replacement from the original sample of n units and then the
m-sample ‘directional distance BoD with ARI restrictions’ composite in-
dicator CIb,mj0 is computed. Finally, the robust composite indicator CI
m
j0
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is obtained as the arithmetic average of the B CIb,mj0 , as follows:
CImj0 =
1
B
B∑
b=1
CIb,mj0
TheCImj0 score might be larger than one: this means that the municipality
j0 under evaluation is providing a higher service level than the average
m municipalities it has been compared with as its reference sample.
To include also heterogeneity among the municipalities captured by
the z background variables, the Monte-Carlo simulation procedure is the
same but in the drawing. The m municipalities are drawn with replace-
ment and with a particular probability based on an estimated kernel den-
sity function. The idea is to draw m municipalities with a higher proba-
bility of being similar to the municipality j0 under evaluation (and lower
probability of being dissimilar): in this way, the municipal service provi-
sion level composite indicator
CIm,zj0 =
1
B
B∑
b=1
CIb,m,zj0
is assessed considering similar background conditions and ensuring a
greater level of fairness in the comparison among the municipalities un-
der analysis. In this case, a CIm,zj0 score larger than one means that the
municipality j0 under evaluation is providing a higher service level than
the average m municipalities with similar background characteristics,
while CIm,zj0 = 1 denotes a similar service provision level.
Finally, as we want to extend the model to a dynamic framework to
exploit intertemporal variations in municipal service provision (Cordero
et al., 2016), we further adjust the robust conditional composite indica-
tor CIm,zj0 including the time dimension, according to the insights of the
approach proposed by Mastromarco and Simar (2015). Accordingly, the
composite indicator CIm,z,tj is computed over all the combinations of
municipality j = 1 . . . , j0, . . . , n and time period t = 1 . . . T (where T = 6
in our application) and time is also included as an additional condition-
ing variable together with z.
Furthermore, the computation of the robust unconditional and con-
ditional composite indicators provides two more additional useful in-
sights. By means of a non-parametric statistical inference, we can de-
tect whether the environmental variables are on average statistically sig-
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nificant with respect to the composite indicator scores and which is the
direction of the influence of the environmental variables on the service
provision level assessment. More specifically, the ratio of the uncondi-
tional CImj and conditional CI
m,z,t
j composite indicator scores can be
non-parametrically regressed on the external variables. By construction,
the unconditional CI score is at most (less than or equal to) the condi-
tional CI score. Accordingly, a positive coefficient denotes a favourable
effect of a contextual variable on the service provision level score: when
the variable increases, the conditional CI score gets closer to the uncondi-
tional one. For a negative coefficient, the opposite holds: the contextual
variable has an unfavourable effect on the service provision level assess-
ment, as the conditional CI score increases when the variable increases.
To put it in an alternative way, the background condition acts as an un-
favourable context if, as the variable increases, its CI score increases only
because evaluated among similar municipalities and the service provi-
sion level it can afford is lower compared with the one of municipalities
facing different background conditions. For the sake of brevity, we omit
further technical and theoretical details: we refer the interested reader to
Ba˘din et al. (2012); Daraio and Simar (2007).
To recap, in this methodological section the steps leading to the advo-
cated ‘robust conditional directional distance BoD with ARI restrictions’
composite indicator CIm,z,tj for the municipal service provision level as-
sessment are presented. To facilitate further research and to allow for
practical policy implementation, the code is available upon request.
2.4 Results
In this section we present the empirical application of the proposed method
on a sample of 307 Flemish municipalities over the years 2006–2011. First,
we make some comments on the evidence stemming from the inclusion
of different weight restriction specifications and from the comparison
with the robust and conditional versions, including the analysis of the
influence of the municipal operating context. Second, we include some
findings exploring the relationship between the obtained municipal ser-
vice composite indicator and the local government size.
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2.4.1 The municipal service provision composite indica-
tor results
We show the results of the estimated robust conditional municipal ser-
vice composite indicator, for different weight restriction specifications
(MinMax, Average and Municipal-specific) as presented in section 2.3.3. We
estimate different conditional models, depending on the group of back-
ground variables as introduced in section 2.2. Model 1 includes the eco-
nomic and financial characteristics that might affect the municipal ser-
vice delivery, namely the level of fiscal income, the level of financial debt
and the unemployment rate. In Model 2, the socio-demographic struc-
ture is also added, by including the share of elderly people, the share of
foreigners and the municipal population growth. The political compo-
nent is considered together with the economic and socio-demographic
characteristics in Model 3, by using the Ideological Complexion of the
local Government (ICG). Moreover, in every model specification a year
dummy is also included to run the analysis in a dynamic framework.
For the sake of comparison, the unrestricted unconditional, the uncondi-
tional and the robust unconditional models are also estimated. Table 2.4
shows the descriptive statistics of the estimated composite indicator re-
sults.
The results can be explored along two complementary dimensions.6
The first one is related to the use of the weight restrictions. Not surpris-
ingly, the inclusion of the weight restrictions lowers the values of the
composite indicators with respect to the unrestricted model: every mu-
nicipality under analysis is forced to choose its own optimal system of
weights only within a certain range. Moreover, for each model specifica-
tion the three different sets of weight restrictions lead to a lower average
service provision: as pointed in section 2.3.3, they are by construction in-
creasingly binding. Including the information on the expenditure com-
position does play a role in the composite indicator estimation through
alternative weight specifications. In addition, further information can
be retrieved from the shadow prices, as they are useful to determine the
“budget shares” (Van Puyenbroeck and Rogge, 2017). In particular, we
can observe that imposing weight restrictions gives back more reliable
results as closer with the current composition. Budget allocation can-
not be changed drastically, as otherwise suggested by the unrestricted
results, and a minimum expenditure share is granted to each function
6Results and main inference analysis are obtained by using Matlab 16a, R and Stata 13.
The codes are available upon request.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of the service provision composite indicator
scores estimated for 307 municipalities over 2006–2011
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Unrestricted Unconditional 0.8388 0.0643 0.6357 1.0000
Unconditional
MinMax restrictions 0.7832 0.0670 0.6302 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.7178 0.0649 0.5883 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.7067 0.0723 0.5121 1.0000
Robust Unconditional
MinMax restrictions 0.9618 0.1097 0.8024 2.0825
Average restrictions 0.8752 0.0937 0.6994 1.5803
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.8663 0.1042 0.6650 1.8782
Robust Conditional Model 1
MinMax restrictions 0.9753 0.0315 0.8047 1.0012
Average restrictions 0.9215 0.0612 0.7029 1.0008
Municipal average restrictions 0.9158 0.0673 0.6585 1.0001
Robust Conditional Model 2
MinMax restrictions 0.9969 0.0093 0.8895 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.9846 0.0275 0.7766 1.0000
Municipal average restrictions 0.9832 0.0312 0.7140 1.0000
Robust Conditional Model 3
MinMax restrictions 0.9983 0.0059 0.9097 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.9906 0.0197 0.7775 1.0000
Municipal average restrictions 0.9893 0.0234 0.7172 1.0000
Note: Unrestricted indicates the absence of weight restrictions. MinMax restrictions refer
to the minimum and maximum share of expenditure in each municipal area across all the
municipalities. Average restrictions consider the average spending share (lower and up-
per bound equal to its ±50%). Municipal-specific restrictions are based on the municipal-
specific current spending allocation (lower and upper bound equal to the ±50% of each
municipal spending share).
Model 1 includes the economic and financial characteristics (Fiscal income, Financial debt
and Unemployment). Model 2 adds to the economic and financial characteristics the
socio-demographic structure (Share of elderly people, Share of foreigners and Popula-
tion growth). Model 3 adds to the economic-financial and socio-demographic variables
the political component (Ideological Complexion of the local Government). In every con-
ditional model specification a year dummy is also included.
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in this way, avoiding zero weights whenever a minimum amount of in-
vestment is required in a certain municipal function. For the full list of
results, we refer to Appendix A.4 for the shadow price and the budget
share results.
The second dimension refers to the inclusion of robust and condi-
tional analysis.7 The scores tend to increase when performing the robust
and the conditional analysis compared to the unconditional estimation.
This evidence shows the methodological importance of such an inte-
grated analysis: the atypical observations and the background variables
do affect the composite indicator. Specifically, in the present application
when considering the operating environment each municipality has to
work in, it turns out that there is no longer much room for improve-
ment left as the mean scores are almost equal to one in the conditional
model results.8 On the one hand the evidence shows that this set of vari-
ables explains largely the service level provision in municipalities; on the
other hand, the conditional analysis helps in identifying the correlation
between some municipal characteristics and the service provision level.
The influence of the contextual variables on the municipal service
provision level can be detected by looking at the robust unconditional
and conditional estimates together, as explained in section 2.3.4. Table 2.5
presents the results of the statistical inference. For the sake of brevity,
only the results for the MinMax restrictions are presented along the chap-
ter: the results are robust across the three weight restriction specifications
and we refer to Appendix for the complete list of results. The direction of
the influence of the environmental variables is in line with the main evi-
dence described in the literature on local government’s efficiency (see for
all Narbo´n-Perpin˜a´ and De Witte, 2017b). Concerning the economic and
financial characteristics, the level of fiscal income plays an unfavourable
role in the municipal service provision assessment. When local govern-
ments have a greater amount of financial resources, the politicians might
spend in a less prudent way and the citizens might be less motivated to
monitor the expenditures: as a result, the overall level of delivered ser-
vices seems to reduce. The financial debt has an unfavourable correlation
7After a sensitivity analysis for the choice of m (m=10, 20, ..., 100), we choose m=40
for which there is a remarkable decrease of the super-efficient municipalities. As for the
bootstrap replications, we consider B=2000.
8In Appendix A.3 the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients across the different
weight restriction specifications and model distributions are reported to further investi-
gate the impact on the ranking and on the best practices among the municipalities under
evaluation.
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too. When the level of local government debt is higher, more resources
will be spent on debt interests and amortization payments: therefore less
resources will be available and this will bring to an overall lower level
of service provision. Less amount of resources is available to provide
municipal services also when there is a higher level of unemployment:
higher spending is devoted to social and housing benefits. Hence, in
the overall service provision assessment also this variable plays an un-
favourable role.
The dataset covers the 2006-2011 period, which mostly coincides with
the term of local authorities elected in 2006. As in Cordero et al. (2016),
we adopt a dynamic approach to exploit intertemporal variations in pub-
lic service provision and to observe whether municipalities made some
changes during their electoral term. Interestingly, if we consider the time
trend looking at the partial plot for the year variable (see Figure 2.2) com-
bined with the economic characteristics, we can see that 2008, the year of
the economic crisis, is the most unfavourable as concerns the municipal
service provision (the same is observed in each weight restriction speci-
fication). However, from 2009 increases in public service provision have
been recorded. This phenomenon might be linked to the fact that in 2009
a new legislative era began at national level. One of the main priorities of
the government was to stimulate public service provision at local level
in line with the subsidiarity principle (Sadioglu, 2016). Therefore, the
negative impact of the crisis might have been balanced by the renewed
attention on local service provision.
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Figure 2.2: Intertemporal variation of the service provision when consider-
ing economic variables
When including also the socio-demographic characteristics, the in-
teractions among the variables lead to contradicting evidence related to
the direction of the influence of the level of fiscal income and financial
47
debt, playing as counteracting factors. For example, this might be due to
the fact that municipalities are more concerned with the public resources
management when they have a higher level of accountability or when
they pay more attention on cost saving due to their financial problems.
In addition, the results of Model 2 on the socio-demographic structure
show that the share of elderly people and of foreigners has a favourable
effect on the municipal service provision assessment, whenever it is sta-
tistically significant. These population groups are the recipients of sev-
eral municipal services provided with the aim of satisfying their needs:
the higher the number of people in these categories, the greater the level
of scale economies exploitation. Vice versa, when the level of population
growth is too high, the municipalities might not be able to completely
satisfy overall citizens’ demand and therefore, all else equal, it will lead
to a lower level of provided services.
Finally, Model 3 includes also the information on the political compo-
nent, namely the Ideological Complexion of the local Government (ICG),
that captures the ideological stance of the municipality on a Left-Right
scale. We observe that a low level of municipal service provision is as-
sociated with a more right-wing government. In fact, as a common hy-
pothesis a more left-wing coalition is more prone to have a larger public
sector.
Table 2.5: Influence of background conditions on municipal service com-
posite indicator
MinMax weight restrictions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value
Economic-financial
Fiscal income Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Financial debt Unfavourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Unemployment Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.170 Unfavourable 0.085 *
Socio-demographic
Residents over 65 Favourable 0.075 * Favourable 0.000 ***
Foreigners Favourable 0.045 ** Favourable 0.080 *
Population growth Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Political
ICG Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Note: The background variable has an unfavourable influence on the service provision assessment when the municipal composite indicator score
increases only because the municipality under assessment is evaluated among similar municipalities: the service provision it can afford is lower
compared with the one of municipalities facing a different context. The opposite holds when a background variable is found to have a favourable
influence.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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2.4.2 Municipal service provision and government size
Once the overall level of service provision is estimated, we can use the
obtained composite indicator score not only for benchmarking and for
detecting the best practices, but also to explore the relationship between
the service level and several municipal aspects. Among those, referring
to the second question raised in the introduction, we want to investi-
gate whether there is a trade-off between the service level and the local
government size. For this application, the tax rate is defined as the ratio
between “Total tax revenue per capita” (Totale belastingontvangsten per in-
woner) and “Taxable income per capita” (Belastbaar inkomen per inwoner).
To test the existence of such a relationship, the regression model to be
estimated is the following:
CIj = β0 + β1GOV sizej + β2GOV size
2
j + j
As evident from the plots in Figure 2.3, the “inverted U-relationship” is
recurrent in every model and weight restrictions specification, both for
the unconditional and the conditional estimates that take into account
the municipal background variables in one-stage: β2 is almost always
negative and statistically significant.
To calculate the optimal municipal tax rate that can maximize the ser-
vice provision level, the following equation should be used:
∂CI
∂GOV size
= 0
and then the optimal point is computed as follows:
GOV size∗ = − β1
2β2
Table 2.6 presents the optimal tax rate computed across the differ-
ent model specifications. The optimal value ranges between 2.04% and
5.30%. The actual average tax rate in Flanders between 2006 and 2011
is equal to 3.75% and it has been computed as the average across 307
municipalities over the years under analysis: it results quite below the
optimal average 4.30% computed across the different model specifica-
tions. More specifically, when considering both the economic variables
and the expenditure structure by using the weight restrictions, the aver-
age optimal size is systematically higher than the one set by Flemish local
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governments over the years 2006–2011. In Appendix A.6, the results are
presented also for the conditional model specification encompassing also
Socio-demographic and political variables.
Table 2.6: Optimal tax rates across different model specifications
Unconditional Robust Model 1
MinMax 2.04% 3.65% 5.30%
Average 5.00% 4.83% 5.29%
Municipal average 4.07% 3.58% 4.96%
Note: MinMax restrictions refer to the minimum and maximum share of expenditure in
each municipal area across all the municipalities. Average restrictions consider the average
spending share (lower and upper bound equal to its±50%). Municipal-specific restrictions
are based on the municipal-specific current spending allocation (lower and upper bound
equal to the ±50% of each municipal spending share).
Model 1 includes the economic and financial characteristics (Fiscal income, Financial debt
and Unemployment).
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The municipal tax burden is on the horizontal axis and the municipal composite indicator is on the vertical axis.
Figure 2.3: “Inverted U-relationship” between municipal tax burden and
municipal service provision level
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2.4.3 Robustness checks
To conclude this section, it is worth to point out that as a robustness
check a further analysis is performed excluding from the sample the
largest cities (so-called “Centrumsteden”9) to avoid possible criticism on
the municipal size effect, even if the robust analysis should have taken
this issue already into account. The main findings are confirmed and the
results are presented in Appendix A.7.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we propose an innovative tool to measure municipal ser-
vice provision level, a robust conditional directional distance Benefit-
of-the-Doubt with weight restrictions composite indicator. To show the
usefulness of the proposed approach, we compute the municipal service
provision composite indicator for 307 Flemish municipalities over the
year 2006–2011.
The advocated model specification is fully flexible, able to capture the
multifaceted aspects involved in local public goods provision evaluation
and, in particular, heterogeneity among the municipalities in their activ-
ities, to grant a fair analysis. Accordingly, local political preferences and
municipal characteristics are directly embedded in the model. Overall,
the approach ensures an objective way to determine how each munic-
ipal area enters in the evaluation, while granting the most favourable
aggregating scheme for the units under analysis. The information on
the municipal expenditure composition is included through the weight
restrictions specification. The directional distance function formulation
makes possible the evaluation even along undesirable features, which
should be reduced rather than maximized in the problem. The robust
conditional version of the model controls for the municipal operating
context and the time dimension.
The proposed composite indicator not only groups together all these
components, going a step forward in the existing literature, but it also
allows further investigation. First of all, we can explore how municipal
characteristics influence overall service provision through statistical in-
ference, detecting whether the background condition inclusion favours
9The “Centrumsteden” indicates 13 Flemish city centres, with relatively high numbers
of inhabitants, that play a central role in the employment, care, education, culture and
recreational activities. https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centrumstad
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or not the assessment. More broadly, the obtained composite indicator
can be used to explore the relationship between the provided municipal
services and some relevant issues in municipal management, as for ex-
ample government size expressed in terms of the tax burden imposed on
citizens, which pay the taxes for the local public goods they receive.
In the empirical application, we find an unfavourable influence in the
municipal service provision assessment regarding the considered eco-
nomic variables, namely the level of fiscal income, financial debt and
unemployment. As concerns the share of elderly people and foreigners,
a favourable influence is found, while for the population growth the op-
posite holds. Finally, a left-wing government favours municipal activi-
ties. As regards the relationship between the municipal service provision
composite indicator scores and the tax burden, an “inverted U-shape” is
recurrent in every model and weight restriction specification, confirming
the hypothesis proposed in the economic literature: beyond an optimal
point, despite a higher level of revenues, a lower level of public goods is
provided to the citizens.
The analysis proposed in this chapter has the benefit of framing a
broad view of all the services received by the citizens. However, it does
not contain information about the quality of the provided services, de-
spite its relevance in the overall service assessment and in terms of citi-
zens’ satisfaction evaluation. The next chapter enables us to go deeper in
this topic, while focusing on a specific sector though, namely the water
sector. In particular, it considers the environmental sustainability in the
water management performance measurement.
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Chapter 3
Water pollution in
wastewater treatment
plants: an efficiency
analysis with undesirable
output
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we introduced how to evaluate public service
provision, encompassing all the main intervention areas at local level.
However, we could not include in the analysis an important aspect, namely
the quality aspect. This chapter addresses this issue, focusing on a spe-
cific sector where the quality aspect is noticeably important, that is the
water management sector. Water is a very important component of hu-
man life, but still it is not accessible to everyone and environmentally
sustainable everywhere. Accordingly, on the one hand an increasing col-
laboration between public and private organizations is taking off to face
the huge infrastructural costs and to make the service affordable for all
citizens. On the other hand, the offered service needs to be in compliance
with the environmental sustainability criteria not only for the people but
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also for the planet. In this chapter we consider wastewater treatment
as one of the main services provided by the water industry, focusing in
particular on the environmental impact of the plants under analysis.
Over the last decades, wastewater treatment has received growing at-
tention worldwide as one of the relevant activities to ensure environmen-
tal sustainability. Referring to Goodland (1995, p. 3), environmental sus-
tainability “seeks to improve human welfare by protecting the sources of
raw materials [food, water, air and energy] used for human needs and
ensuring that the sinks for human wastes are not exceeded, in order to
prevent harm to humans”. More precisely, environmental sustainability
is defined as “a set of constraints on the four major activities regulating
the scales of the human economic subsystem: the use of renewable and
non-renewable resources on the source side, and pollution and waste as-
similation on the sink side” (ibidem, p. 10). The same concept has been
proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) in the OECD Environmental Strategy for the First Decade
of the 21st Century (OECD, 2001, p. 6). The document considered “as-
similation”, one of the four specific criteria for environmental sustain-
ability, as “the releases of hazardous or polluting substances into the en-
vironment shall not exceed their assimilative capacity”. Obviously, the
stated criterion is intrinsically linked to wastewater treatment and the
water and nitrogen cycles are directly involved in the definition of en-
vironmental sustainability: since the main goal of wastewater treatment
is to remove nitrogen and other pollutants from the ingoing water, this
activity is extremely relevant on the sink side.
It is worth recalling that Environmental Sustainability is one of the three
pillars of Sustainable Development and its key role is universally ac-
knowledged1. Even the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN
General Assembly, 2015) confirms the triple bottom line (social, environ-
mental and economic) approach and it defines 17 Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) to be implemented and achieved by 2030. In this con-
text, the improvement of water quality is considered a necessary step to
ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation
for all (Goal 6, ibidem): water quality has to be improved “by reducing
pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous
chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewa-
1During the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (UN General Assem-
bly, 2002) the three pillars of Sustainable Development were identified by the words People
(social sustainability), Planet (environmental sustainability) and Prosperity (economic sus-
tainability) (see also Moldan et al., 2012).
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ter and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally” (Target
6.3., ibidem). Among the pollutants to be removed from water after the
treatments, nitrogen is considered the most relevant one. Eutrophication,
reduction of crop quality, pollution of groundwater and death of aquatic
life are part of the fallout of an excessive presence of nitrogen.
The main objective of this chapter is to assess the environmental ef-
ficiency of wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) by including in the
analysis the residual nitrogen in the outgoing water. Looking at the
wastewater treatment plant as a production process, the presence of ni-
trogen in the treated water can be considered an undesirable output. In
the water sector efficiency literature, few papers deal with undesirable
outputs (De Witte and Marques, 2010; Herna´ndez-Sancho et al., 2012;
Molinos-Senante et al., 2014a, 2015b; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008) and none
of them are related to the quality of the outgoing water in terms of left-
over pollutants. In line with part of the existing literature on undesirable
output, the WWTP performance is evaluated using a Non-radial Direc-
tional Distance Function (NDDF) approach. As the WWTPs under anal-
ysis exhibit variable returns to scale, the Kuosmanen technology is con-
sidered (Kuosmanen, 2005) and a vector directional distance function is
proposed. The efficiency scores are computed by solving a DEA-like pro-
gram whose objective function is the weighted sum of the vector function
components and the corresponding weights are determined by the Ana-
lytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). The integration between NDDF and AHP
allows to generalize the framework proposed by Zhou et al. (2012) and
by Adler and Volta (2016).
The described methodology is used to evaluate 96 WWTPs located
in Tuscany (Italy). According to the different parameter specifications of
the NDDF model, different efficiency scores are computed. The obtained
results are then used to identify the variables affecting the efficiency. On
the basis of the WWTP features, it is evident that the facilities’ capac-
ity, the percentage of wastewater discharged by industrial and agricul-
tural activities and the level of compliance with the pollutant concen-
tration threshold set by the Italian legislator exhibit an incontrovertible
impact on the WWTP performance. The policy implications of the find-
ings are mainly twofold: firstly, the WWTPs should exploit larger scale
economies. Secondly, the water utilities, the environmental agencies and
the regulators should promote inspection activities to stimulate a better
functioning in particular of those plants that treat only domestic sewage
and do not respect the nitrogen concentration regulatory limit.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 a
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review of the related literature is presented and in Section 3.3 the adopted
methodology is described. Then, the next three sections are devoted
to the empirical analysis. More precisely, data choice can be found in
Section 3.4, while the critical discussion of the performed WWTPs effi-
ciency analysis is in Section 3.5 and in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7 the main
findings of the analysis are summarized, together with some concluding
remarks. Appendix B.1 includes a short description of the wastewater
treatment process.
3.2 Related literature
Among the huge amount of quantitative studies on the water sector (Berg
and Marques, 2011; Worthington, 2014), the wastewater treatment plant
efficiency analysis has gained growing attention in recent years, i.e. start-
ing from the 2000s (for a review, Fuentes et al., 2015). In this strand of lit-
erature, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the most used technique: it
can manage a multiplicity of inputs and outputs and it does not require
the selection of a specific functional form, thus resulting useful to esti-
mate different model specifications, e.g. non-radial DEA (Herna´ndez-
Sancho et al., 2011a; Molinos-Senante et al., 2014b), DEA with uncer-
tainty (Sala-Garrido et al., 2012a), DEA metafrontier approach (Sala-Garrido
et al., 2011), Malmquist Productivity Index (Herna´ndez-Sancho et al.,
2011b; Molinos-Senante et al., 2015a). Moreover, several studies propose
a further assessment of the WWTP environmental impact by means of a
second stage analysis, to detect the effects of specific WWTP features on
the efficiency. The most common practice is to perform non-parametric
tests such as the Mann-Whitney U test and the Kruskal-Wallis test, since
they do not need the normal distribution assumption of the efficiency
scores (e.g. Herna´ndez-Sancho and Sala-Garrido, 2009; Molinos-Senante
et al., 2014a; Sala-Garrido et al., 2012a). In line with this strand of litera-
ture, the present chapter provides new evidence on the WWTP efficiency
assessment, providing also a second stage analysis. Despite the great
environmental impact of the wastewater treatment process, few papers
take into account the sustainability aspects. This lack of consideration
could lead to biased estimates in the performance assessment: those util-
ities that devote more resources to increase their environmental sustain-
ability are penalized and turn out to be less efficient compared to those
that ceteris paribus spend less. To address this issue in the production ef-
ficiency analysis, most studies introduce an undesirable output: it refers
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to those outputs whose increase may not be desirable. In the water sec-
tor performance assessment, few DEA papers deal with the undesirable
output. With respect to other fields of application such as energy and ce-
ment sector, the notion of undesirable output has been conceived with a
broader meaning. Looking at the various contributions, the undesirable
outputs encompass unintended bad consequences (or negative externali-
ties) which can be largely attributed to the production process, given the
fact that producing good outputs is accompanied by the production of
bads (Fa¨re et al., 2014). More precisely Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008) consider
as non-desirable output the unaccounted-for water losses, De Witte and
Marques (2010) and Herna´ndez-Sancho et al. (2012) use the water losses,
Molinos-Senante et al. (2016, 2015b) and Romano et al. (2017) introduce
variables representing the lack of service quality such as the value of
penalties, the number of complaints, the number of unplanned interrup-
tions and the number of connected water service properties with water
pressure below a reference level. Concerning the WWTPs, only Molinos-
Senante et al. (2014a) deal with undesirable output by considering the
CO2 emission resulting from the WWTP activity. Except for this study,
the environmental impact issue has not been addressed: as far as the
authors know, none of the studies on the efficiency analysis considers
outgoing water pollution. This chapter contributes to the literature ad-
dressing this gap and considering the nitrogen left in the water after the
treatment as undesirable output (for more details Section 3.4 and the Ap-
pendix).
From a methodological point of view, there are several ways to model un-
desirable outputs, depending on how the production technology process
has been formalized. Following Dakpo et al. (2016), a first approach con-
siders the undesirable outputs as inputs and implicitly assumes its strong
disposability. To mitigate this unrealistic assumption, a second strand of
approaches considers undesirable outputs under the null-jointness and
weak disposability assumption (see for all Fa¨re et al. (1989) and for more
recent contributions Fa¨re et al. (2014), Adler and Volta (2016) and Fa¨re
et al. (2016)). However, in the attempt to better understand the role of
undesirable outputs for some production processes, alternative appro-
aches have been recently developed. They basically rely on the presence
of some inputs directly responsible for pollution and to the possibility
of identifying two distinct technologies, one related to the production
of desirable outputs and the other specifically taking into account how
certain inputs generate pollution. In this line, Murty (2010) defines un-
desirable output as a by-product incidental output; Hampf and Rødseth
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(2015) assume the weak-G disposability on inputs and outputs; Sueyoshi
and Goto (2012a,b) identify two different notions of disposability, the
natural and the managerial one, to describe the managers’ response to
the environmental regulations by exploiting the presence of two sub-
technologies2. The presence of two different technologies appears par-
ticularly suitable for the energy, petroleum and cement sector. By con-
trast, looking at the WWTPs’ activity (see also Section 3.3), there is no
input which can be directly associated with the chosen undesirable out-
put, the nitrogen left in the water, and it is not possible to separate the
production process into two distinct technologies. Therefore, in compli-
ance with the above mentioned second strand of the literature, the un-
desirable output is modelled by assuming null-jointness and weak dis-
posability. Regarding the efficiency assessment with undesirable output,
different types of models have been used (see in particular the recent sur-
veys by Dakpo et al. (2016) and Liu et al. (2016)). Among them, it is worth
mentioning the standard DEA model, the slack-based DEA model and
its extension, the model based on Russell index, the network DEA mo-
del and the Directional Distance Function (DDF) model. This latter one
occupies a prominent role since it allows simultaneously for desirable
output expansion and input/undesirable output contraction (see for ex-
ample Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2005), Zhang and Choi (2014) and references
therein): it is referred to as radial DDF if there is a proportional adjust-
ment of the variables (Chambers et al., 1996, 1998; Chung et al., 1997;
Fa¨re and Grosskopf, 2004). Referring to the undesirable output specifi-
cally in the water sector, the DDF is considered a very suitable approach
and hence it is the most developed method (e.g. Molinos-Senante et al.,
2014a, 2016, 2015b; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008, 2011). As Fukuyama and
Weber (2009) underline, the radial DDF may overestimate the efficiency
when there exist non-zero slacks. To overcome this problem, several
authors propose a non-radial DDF approach where slacks are directly
incorporated in the efficiency measures (e.g. Barros et al., 2012; Cheng
and Zervopoulos, 2014; Fa¨re and Grosskopf, 2010; Fukuyama and We-
ber, 2009). A formal definition of the non-radial Directional Distance
Function method (NDDF), together with several environmental indexes,
is given in Zhou et al. (2012). With a similar approach, Adler and Volta
(2016) suggest an economic environmental directional distance function
with variable returns to scale. Going further with the NDDF approach,
2For a detailed discussion on the role of the undesirable output in the production pro-
cess and how it can be included in a non-parametric efficiency analysis see for all Førsund
(2008), Dakpo et al. (2016) and references therein.
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in the present chapter the non-radial directional distance function is con-
ceived as a vector function whose components are the scaling factors as-
sociated with the reduction of inputs, the good output expansion and the
reduction of the undesirable output. With a standard technique of vec-
tor optimization, a solution is found by choosing a proper scalarization
(see for example Pomerol and Barba-Romero, 2000). More precisely, the
vector objective function is replaced by the normalized weighted sum
of its components and the weights are analytically defined, according to
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1977, 1990). A NDDF ap-
proach is then integrated by the AHP; the model proposed by Zhou et al.
(2012) can be seen as a particular case. There, the normalized weight
vector is chosen by “assigning the same importance” to the set of inputs,
the set of outputs and the undesirable output; the same happens among
the input and good output variables (see also Section 3.3). It is worth
underlining that with respect to the current analysis, although several
integrated DEA/AHP models have been proposed in the recent litera-
ture (see for example Pakkar (2015) and references therein), they address
different issues and they serve different purposes.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 The WWTP production technology
The overall production process of a WWTP is characterized by a very
high environmental impact and therefore the efficiency assessment of a
plant cannot be separated from its sustainability performance evaluation.
Therefore, the environmental production technology has to take into ac-
count inputs, good (desirable) outputs and bad (undesirable) outputs.
Inputs are described by vector x = (x1, ..., xN ) ∈ RN+ , while good and
undesirable outputs are represented by y = (y1, ..., yM ) ∈ RM+ and b =
(b1, ..., bJ) ∈ RJ+ respectively. The environmental production technology
is characterized by the following set T = {(x, y, b) : x can produce (y, b)}
or alternatively P (x) = {(y, b) : (x, y, b) ∈ T}. Regarding inputs and
good outputs, the environmental production technology satisfies the stan-
dard axioms of production theory (for further details see Fa¨re and Grosskopf,
2003): i) inactivity is always possible, i.e., (0, 0, 0) ∈ T ; ii) finite amount
of inputs can produce only finite amount of outputs; iii) T is convex; iv)
good outputs are strongly disposable, i.e., if a given amount of inputs
can produce a certain level of outputs, even a smaller quantity of out-
puts can be produced.
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According to a very standard approach (see for all Fa¨re et al., 1989, 2014),
in the present chapter, the undesirable output is considered as an un-
intended “by-product” of the production process and the technology is
assumed to verify the following assumptions: (i) null-jointness, i.e., if
(x, y, b) ∈ T and b = 0, then y = 0; (ii) weak disposability of undesirable
outputs, i.e., if (x, y, b) ∈ T , then (x, θy, θb) ∈ T , with θ ∈ [0, 1]. Roughly
speaking, null-jointness implies that there is no possibility to eliminate
the undesirable outputs without stopping the good output production.
Weak disposability states that a proportional reduction of undesirable
outputs is possible only if it is accompanied by a corresponding propor-
tional reduction of good outputs (for further discussion, see Section 3.4).
Looking at the wastewater treatment production, there is no empiri-
cal evidence allowing the description of the process by means of a spe-
cific functional form; therefore, non-parametric approaches are the most
developed in this framework and, among them, DEA models occupy a
prominent position. The technology set is then described by means of in-
equality and equality constraints which characterize DEA models. More-
over, preliminary analysis on the present data set show that the produc-
tion processes of wastewater treatment plants exhibit variable returns to
scale3. Following Kuosmanen (2005), the production technology can be
then described as follows
Tl = {(x, y, b) :
K∑
k=1
λkykm ≥ ym, ∀m
K∑
k=1
λkbkj = bj , ∀j
K∑
k=1
(λk + µk)xkn ≤ xn, ∀n
K∑
k=1
(λk + µk) = 1 λk, µk ≥ 0, ∀k}
(3.1)
where k is the number of observed production units, i.e. DMUs (in the
specific context of the present chapter, WWTPs); ykm is the m-th desir-
able output produced by the k-th DMU and ym is the m-th desirable
output produced by the evaluated DMU. Similarly, bkj (x
k
n ) is the j-th
undesirable output (n-th input) produced by the k-th DMU and bj (xn)
is the j-th undesirable output (n-th input) associated with the evaluated
DMU; λk + µk represents the intensity weights for constructing the con-
vex combinations of the observed DMUs. Strong disposability of inputs
and good outputs are formalized by the inequality constraints and weak
disposability of bad outputs is described by the equality constraints re-
3Regarding the scientific debate about the proper way of modelling weak disposability
and variable returns to scale see also Chen and Ang (2016).
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lated to b.
3.3.2 The Analytic Hierarchy Process/Non-radial Directional
Distance Function approach
Taking into account the Kuosmanen technology, the environmental ef-
ficiency analysis of WWTP is performed by introducing the following
vector non-radial distance function:
→
V D(x, y, b) = sup{(βx, βy, βb) : (x, y, b) + g diag(βx, βy, βb) ∈ Tl} (3.2)
where β = (βx, βy, βb) = ((βxn)Nn=1, (βym)Mm=1, (βbj )Jj=1) is the scaling
vector function. More precisely, βym is the scaling factor of output m, βbj
and βxn represent the scaling factor of the j-th undesirable output and
n-th input respectively; g = (gx, gy, gb) = ((gxn)Nn=1, (gym)Mm=1, (gbj )Jj=1)
is the explicit directional vector in which the input-output combination
will be scaled (Zhou et al., 2012). For each DMU, the value of the vector
non-radial distance function can be obtained by solving the following
DEA-like vector maximization problem
max β = (βx, βy, βb)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
(λk + µk)xkn ≤ xn + gxnβxn , ∀n
K∑
k=1
λkykm ≥ ym + gymβym , ∀m
K∑
k=1
λkbkj = bj + gbjβbj , ∀j
K∑
k=1
(λk + µk) = 1
λk, µk ≥ 0, ∀k
βxn ≥ 0, βym ≥ 0, βbj ≥ 0 ∀n, ∀m, ∀j
(3.3)
The above general formalization can be differently specified according to
the form of β and g and hence Problem 3.3 can be seen as a general frame-
work encompassing some relevant directional distance function models.
In the present analysis, the following specifications are considered: i)
β = (βx) and g = (−x, 0, 0), ii) β = (βx, βy) and g = (−x, y, 0), iii)
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β = (βx, βy, βb) and g = (−x, y,−b). In the first case, the model allows
for the reduction of inputs, while in the second case it deals with simul-
taneous input reduction and output expansion. The third specification of
β and g takes into account the input and bad output reduction together
with the output expansion. The vector formulation emphasizes that im-
provements for inefficient DMUs can be suggested through different di-
rections; the non-radial approach is therefore taken to its extreme. How-
ever, from a mathematical point of view, a vector maximization problem
has multiple non-dominated solutions and, among them, it is necessary
to identify the most suitable ones with respect to the environmental ef-
ficiency analysis of the DMUs 4. Following a very standard approach
(see Pomerol and Barba-Romero, 2000), the vector maximization prob-
lem can be solved by maximizing a scalar function of the typewTβ where
w = ((wxn)
N
n=1, (wym)
M
m=1, (wbj )
J
j=1) is the normalized weight vector,
that is
N∑
n=1
wxn +
M∑
m=1
wym +
J∑
j=1
wbj = 1 and wxn ≥ 0, wym ≥ 0, wbj ≥ 0,
∀n,m, j. Once the set of weights is chosen, the environmental efficiency
score of each DMU is obtained by solving the following scalar problem
max wTβ
s.t.
K∑
k=1
(λk + µk)xkn ≤ xn + gxnβxn , ∀n
K∑
k=1
λkykm ≥ ym + gymβym , ∀m
K∑
k=1
λkbkj = bj + gbjβbj , ∀j
K∑
k=1
(λk + µk) = 1
λk, µk ≥ 0, ∀k
βxn ≥ 0, βym ≥ 0, βbj ≥ 0 ∀n, ∀m, ∀j
(3.4)
4DEA vector optimization problems have been introduced even in other different con-
texts. Among them, an interesting contribution is the one by An et al. (2016) where a Nash
bargaining approach is proposed.
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In this regard, the non-radial directional function model proposed by
Zhou et al. (2012) (see Problem 12 p. 629) can be seen as a particular case
of Problem 3.4 5.
As regards the weights’ assignment, in the authors’ opinion, the decision
maker (in the present analysis the water utility) should be allowed to
determine a set of weights according to the specific features of the eval-
uated production process. To address this issue, the Analytic Hierarchy
Process appears a valuable tool. AHP has been developed by Saaty at
the end of the seventies (Saaty, 1977) and later widely applied in differ-
ent fields and contexts. In the present case, the AHP model is able to
define a set of weights w which take into account the preferences of the
decision maker (DM) on the relative importance of inputs, good and bad
outputs. The DM is asked to establish if inputs are more important than
good outputs and to define the intensity of such importance. The com-
parison yields a number which is determined on the basis of the standard
AHP scale, from 1 (Equal Importance) to 9 (Extreme Importance).
Similar judgements have to be given between inputs and bad outputs
and between good and bad outputs. Therefore, the following 3 by 3 ma-
trix A is obtained 
x y b
x axx axy axb
y ayx ayy ayb
b abx aby abb

Clearly aij > 0, aii = 1 and aij = 1aji ∀i, j. A is called pairwise com-
parison matrix; the set of global weights w = (wx, wy, wb) is the normal-
ized eigenvector associated with the dominant eigenvalue of matrix A
(see for all Saaty, 1990). Going on with the pairwise comparisons among
inputs, the relative weights of input variables are determined. More pre-
cisely, according to the DM preferences a pairwise comparison matrix I
is constructed. The normalized eigenvector r associated with the domi-
nant eigenvalue of matrix I represents the relative weights of input vari-
ables and hence the weight associated with the n-th input is defined as
wxn = wxrn. The weights for desirable and undesirable output are com-
puted following the same procedure. Furthermore, to detect the incon-
sistency of the DM preferences, the following Inconsistency Ratio is com-
5Zhou et al. (2012) deeply investigate the relationship among their models and the most
relevant distance function models (radial and non-radial) in the recent literature. Their
considerations still apply for the present chapter.
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puted: IR =
αmax − n
(n− 1)CRI , where αmax is the dominant eigenvalue of the
pairwise comparison matrix, n is the dimension of the matrix and CRI
represents the coefficient of random inconsistency which is computed by
calculating
αmax − n
(n− 1) for randomly filled reciprocal matrices (see Saaty,
1990). If IR > 0.1, then inconsistency occurs and the DM has to revise
her/his judgement.
Following the AHP approach, the system of weights suggested by Zhou
et al. (2012) can be obtained by considering pairwise comparison matri-
ces whose entries are all ones.
Once the set of weights are determined, Problem 3.4 is solved for
each DMU; the higher the optimal value, the lower the efficiency level
of the evaluated unit. In line with Zhou et al. (2012), the obtained scores
are then used to construct normalized efficiency indexes, where 1 corre-
sponds to the best performance and 0 to the worst. Obviously, according
to the specification of g and β different models can be considered and
then different water efficiency performance indexes (WPI) can be con-
structed. The present analysis deals with the indexes presented in Ta-
ble B.1.
Table 3.1: Indexes
Input model Input/Good Out. model Input/Good/Bad Out. model
β β = (βx) β = (βx, βy) β = (βx, βy, βb)
g g = (−x, 0, 0) g = (−x, y, 0) g = (−x, y,−b)
Index WPI1 = 1−
N∑
n=1
wxnβxn WPI2 =
1−
N∑
n=1
wxnβxn
1 +
M∑
m=1
wymβym
WPI3 =
1−
 N∑
n=1
wxnβxn +
J∑
j=1
wbjβbj

1 +
M∑
m=1
wymβym
3.3.3 Identifying WWTP efficiency explanatory variables
In line with a growing part of the literature, a second-stage analysis
is performed to identify whether there is a relationship between some
WWTP features and the efficiency scores obtained as described in the
previous section. Regression analysis is one of the most common method-
ological approach, but its application presents few drawbacks: among
them, there are the misspecification of the model because of omitted vari-
ables that should have been introduced rather in the first stage (Herna´ndez-
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Sancho et al., 2011b) and inaccurate results that might arise from se-
rial correlation between the error term and the covariates in the sec-
ond stage (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Therefore, in this chapter a dif-
ferent approach is preferred and it is applied into two steps: first of
all, the WWTPs have to be categorized into groups by different oper-
ational factors that could affect the WWTP performance; then, a test
is performed to assess whether or not there is statistically significant
difference between/among groups according to the explanatory factor
under scrutiny. As the WWTP sample does not satisfy all the neces-
sary assumptions to apply parametric and statistical tests such as the
t-test or the analysis of variance-ANOVA (Herna´ndez-Sancho et al., 2011b;
Molinos-Senante et al., 2014b), the corresponding non-parametric test is
performed: the Mann-Whitney U test applies for two groups, while the
Kruskal-Wallis test for three groups or more (see e.g. Kruskal and Wallis
(1952) and Ruxton and Beauchamp (2008) for further details). The null
hypothesis states that the groups/samples originate from the same pop-
ulation, while the alternative hypothesis asserts that they originate from
other populations. The null hypothesis is rejected for a p lower than or
equal to 0.05: if this is the testing result, it is possible to conclude that the
factor under investigation does affect WWTP efficiency.
3.4 Data
The empirical analysis involves 96 wastewater treatment plants located
in Tuscany and controlled by Acque SpA, a public-private utility en-
trusted in 2002 with water services in the so called “Basso Valdarno”
river basin in the Pisa province. Data are provided by Acque Spa and
refer to 2014. The data grid for this study has been constructed with
the support of the Tuscan water authority staff and the technical staff of
Acque SpA and Ingegnerie Toscane. The data have been gathered by
a team of engineers and their consistency has been double-checked by
Acque management and researchers. In compliance with the basic DEA
requisites, the sample consists of a group of homogeneous WWTPs to be
compared: the units under analysis refer to those plants that have costs
both for the water treatment and for the sludge process and they have
been refined by means of a preliminary outlier detection analysis.
As a fundamental step in the efficiency assessment, the variables have
been selected not only according to the related literature, but also accord-
ing to the opinion of the engineers and the data availability (e.g. Fuentes
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et al., 2015). Before defining the variables, it is worth pointing out that as
concerns the input and output choice, a selection screening process has
been executed as proposed in Golany et al. (1994): in particular, the corre-
lation analysis between pairs of factors turns out to be useful to identify
redundant variables and then to increase the discriminatory power of the
DEA method. Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables
introduced as follows.
Input. According to the mainstream literature, costs for the wastewater
treatment functioning are considered as inputs. They can be taken both
at an aggregate level as total costs (e.g. Da Cruz et al., 2012; Molinos-
Senante et al., 2014a) or at a disaggregate level (e.g. De Witte and Mar-
ques, 2012; Herna´ndez-Sancho et al., 2011a,b; Herna´ndez-Sancho and
Sala-Garrido, 2009; Molinos-Senante et al., 2014b; Sala-Garrido et al., 2012b).
In this analysis three different cost items have been identified: (x1) ma-
terials and energy costs; (x2) staff and maintenance costs; (x3) sludge
transport and disposal costs: they all are expressed as e/year.
Desirable output. Looking at the literature on WWTP efficiency evalua-
tion, basically two approaches can be identified for the output choice.
In the first one, the volume of treated/delivered water and/or the pop-
ulation served are considered as output. The papers by e.g. De Witte
and Marques (2010), Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2011), Da Cruz et al. (2012),
De Witte and Marques (2012) belong to this first strand of literature. Al-
ternatively, outputs can be chosen among the eliminated contaminants
and the quantity of pollutants removed to value the production of a
plant or as the difference between the pollution level in the influent and
effluent, namely Net Environmental Benefits (see for example Fuentes
et al., 2015; Herna´ndez-Sancho et al., 2011a,b; Hsiao et al., 2007; Molinos-
Senante et al., 2015a; Sala-Garrido et al., 2012a, 2011, 2012b). After the
preliminary screening process and in compliance with the first strand of
the literature, the treated water, expressed inm3, is chosen as output (y1).
Considering in addition the main WWTP competences and the engineer-
ing expertise, a second output (y2) has been selected, the Kg of removed
sludge; actually it is by far the largest removed constituent (for further
details see the Appendix B.1).
Undesirable output. As already pointed out in Section 3.2, there are no
efficiency analysis papers dealing with WWTP water pollution as an un-
desirable output. Once the wastewater enters in the treatment plant, it is
characterized by the presence of several constituents. Even though one
of the main objectives of a WWTP should be the removal of as many
contaminants as possible and to get the water purified for further reuse,
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it is almost impossible to remove them completely and so they are still
present in the ongoing wastewater. The higher the pollutants in the out-
going wastewater, the higher the negative impact on the environment.
Among the constituents, nitrogen is one of the most preeminent pollu-
tant and its relevance is widely acknowledged in the related literature
(see e.g. Lorenzo-Toja et al., 2015): accordingly, this chapter introduces as
undesirable output the quantity of nitrogen which remains in the outgo-
ing wastewater. It is worth pointing out that the chosen undesirable out-
put can be seen as a bad externality and as an unintended by-product of
the production process in the sense of Fa¨re et al. (2014), but it is far from
the definition of by-product given by Murty (2010). Actually, looking at
the data and at the treatment process, the assumptions of null-jointness
and weak disposability are fulfilled, ruling out other approaches pro-
posed in the literature to model the undesirable outputs6.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Inputs Desirable outputs Undesirable output
Materials+ Staff+ Sludge transport+ Treated Removed Residual
Energy Maintenance disposal water sludge Nitrogen
e e e m3 Kg Kg
Mean 41,894.25 13,556.09 33,190.35 402,233.20 503,315.50 5,557.39
Std. Dev. 86,448.89 23,710.57 67,347.96 942,951.40 757,611.10 11,745.93
Min 1,270.81 375.19 316.90 1,515.00 2,000.00 70.75
Max 529,684.70 145,919.00 447,154.00 6,234,272.00 4,659,130.00 78,551.83
3.5 The WWTPs performance assessment
3.5.1 Model set-up
As explained in Section 3.3.2, the choice of the normalized weight vector
w is a key element of the analysis: in the following, two sets of weights
are used. The first one is constructed by assigning the same importance
to the three groups of variables (inputs, good and bad outputs) and the
6In the presented WWTP framework, there are no inputs which are specifically related
to the “production” of undesirable output and therefore one of the five attributes for the by-
product technology “a` la Murty” fails to be verified. Therefore, the technology proposed
in Murty et al. (2012) cannot be used in the present context. The authors are grateful to an
anonymous referee for giving the opportunity to better clarify this important and debated
aspect (for a broader overview, see Dakpo et al., 2016).
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same applies inside each group (see also Section 3.3.2). The obtained
weight vector coincides with the one proposed by Zhou et al. (2012).
Referring to the second set, different pairwise comparison matrices are
taken, following a discussion with the water utility staff. More precisely,
the importance of the undesirable output is judged “very strong” with re-
spect to good output (input). On the input side, the first two inputs share
the same level of importance and they are strongly more important than
the third input. Finally, with respect to the kg of removed sludge, the im-
portance of treated water is judged very strong. Table 3.3 describes the
chosen pairwise comparison matrices, the associated inconsistency ratio
(IR) and the corresponding generated weights.
Table 3.3: AHP-non-radial set of weights
Global comparison Inputs Good Outputs Bad Output
Matrix

1 3 1/7
1/3 1 1/9
7 9 1


1 1 5
1 1 5
1/5 1/5 1

 1 7
1/7 1

IR 0.0692 0 0
WPI1 Weights (1, 0, 0) (0.455, 0.455, 0.09)
WPI2 Weights (0.75, 0.25, 0) 0.75 ∗ (0.455, 0.455, 0.09) 0.25 ∗ (0.875, 0.125)
WPI3 Weights (0.149, 0.066, 0.785) 0.149 ∗ (0.455, 0.455, 0.09) 0.066 ∗ (0.875, 0.125) 0.785
Before showing the obtained results, it is worth pointing out that a
further index WPI0 has been computed in addition to the three indexes
described in Section 3.3.2 and listed in Table B.1: for the sake of compari-
son, WPI0 has been constructed by considering a non-radial Directional
Distance Function model where the undesirable output is completely ig-
nored. Referring to the parameter specification, the form of β and g has
been set as β = (βx, βy) and g = (−x, y), while the equality constraint as-
sociated with the weak disposability of the undesirable output has been
cancelled. The set of weights of WPI0 coincides with the one for WPI2.
3.5.2 Results
For both sets of weights and for the 96 WWTPs, the efficiency indexes
have been computed. Table 3.4 presents in a synthetic way the main de-
scriptive statistics of the results: the full list of the results are in Appendix
B.2. The first part of the table is denoted as “Non-radial” and it refers to
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the set of weights proposed by Zhou et al. (2012). The second part is re-
ferred as “AHP-non-radial” and it is related to the set of weights coming
from the pairwise comparison matrices of Table 3.37.
Table 3.4: Efficiency score for each Wastewater Performance Index
WPI0 WPI1 WPI2 WPI3
Non-radial
Mean 0.430 0.654 0.556 0.564
Std. Dev. 0.322 0.277 0.349 0.338
AHP-non-radial
Mean 0.419 0.647 0.571 0.623
Std. Dev. 0.333 0.290 0.338 0.306
No efficient WWTPs 19 33 33 31
Not surprisingly, the number of efficient units increases as the unde-
sirable output enters in the analysis. In fact, the wastewater treatment
plants might face higher costs because of their water quality concern:
the more their effort, the more efficient the wastewater treatment process
and the lower the quantity of dangerous nitrogen in the outgoing water.
If this aspect is not considered in the WWTP performance assessment,
the “environmentally oriented” WWTPs will be penalized.
By comparing the results across the three models with the undesirable
output (WPI1, WPI2 and WPI3), more discriminating power is shown
by the one where the contraction of both inputs and bad output and the
expansion of outputs are simultaneously considered (WPI3). Looking
inside the same model specification, the number of efficient units does
not change even if the normalized weight vector varies. However, the
different weighting scheme affects the WWTP performance assessment
in terms of efficiency scores: as it will be clarified in the next section, it
influences also the explanatory variable investigation. Not surprisingly,
the WPI2 and WPI3 efficiency scores in the AHP-non-radial case are
higher than in the non-radial one: those plants who are more “envi-
ronmentally” focused are valued more for keeping their water quality
commitment when the undesirable output is taken into account and its
importance is considered way more important than the other variables
in the assessment.
7All models have been implemented using MATLAB 9.0 R2016a.
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3.6 A step further in the WWTPs performance
assessment
Once the wastewater environmental performance indexes have been ob-
tained, a further analysis has been performed. Firstly, the variables af-
fecting the WWTP environmental impact and their efficiency assessment
have been detected. Then, the main evidence has been discussed so to
give the water authorities and the decision makers additional insights
for the WWTP management.
3.6.1 External factor choice
In compliance with the related literature (e.g. Herna´ndez-Sancho et al.,
2011a,b; Molinos-Senante et al., 2014a,b, 2015a) and according to the opin-
ion of the engineers, the data availability and the WWTP main activities
(for more technical details see the Appendix), the following external fac-
tors have been put under scrutiny. (1) Age: two groups of WWTPs have
formed depending on whether the buildings are under 30 years old (that
is after or before 1985). The thresholds have been set considering that the
useful life of a WWTP is averagely 25/30 years, so that a plant over 30
years old is outdated. (2) Plant capacity expressed as Population Equiv-
alent8: the facility size can be expressed in terms of per capita and per
day pollution load; three groups have been defined in accordance with
the Decision on Implementation Programmes (European Commission,
2007): i) less than 2000 PE, ii) between 2000 and 10,000, and iii) greater
than 10,000. (3) Sewage system: WWTPs have been split into two groups,
as they can have either a separate or a combined system. (4) Kind of
treatment: two groups have been defined as the WWTPs in the sample
use either secondary or tertiary treatment. (5) Technologies: referring to
the wastewater treatment technology, WWTPs have been divided into
two groups, as they can use or not activated sludge process. (6) Esti-
mated dry weather flow: it refers to the wastewater flow occurring during
the dry season when groundwater infiltration and surface runoff have
a minimum influence: i) less than 100,000 m3/year, ii) between 100,000
and 500,000 m3/year, and iii) greater than 500,000 m3/year. (7) Wastew-
ater discharged by industrial and agricultural activities (expressed as %): the
WWTP sample has been clustered in three different groups, consider-
8“1 P.E. (Population Equivalent)” means the organic biodegradable load having a five-
day biochemical oxygen demand (BOD5) of 60 g of oxygen per day (directive 91/271/EEC).
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ing separately i) those with no wastewater discharged by these activi-
ties at all, ii) those with a percentage lower than 10, and iii) those with
one higher than 10. (8) N Concentration regulatory limit: since the detri-
mental effect of nitrogen in terms of eutrophication and environmental
impact on plant and aquatic life is acknowledged also by the national
legislator, two groups of WWTPs have been distinguished depending on
whether the outgoing nitrogen concentration is below or above the limit
(30 mg/L) set by the legislative decree 152/2006.
3.6.2 Results and policy remarks
Table 3.6 presents the Mann-Whitney U and Kruskal-Wallis test results
and the average efficiency scores, together with the efficient WWTP per-
centages and the standard deviations, for each Water Performance Index
and for both the weighting schemes over the WWTPs under analysis,
grouped according to the described explanatory variables9. Before go-
ing into detail, the results suggest two preliminary considerations. First
of all, when the undesirable output is considered in the efficiency as-
sessment, there can be different test outcomes: this is the case between,
on the one hand, WPI1 and, on the other hand, WPI2 and WPI3. As
already highlighted in Section 3.5.2, the inclusion of the undesirable out-
put in the WWTP technology process allows those more “environmen-
tally focused” plants to be evaluated in a fairer way and, more broadly
speaking, it better depicts the overall WWTP process framework. Ac-
cordingly, the factors that might affect the performance assessment are
better captured when also the undesirable output is included in the anal-
ysis. Moreover, it can be observed that there are no remarkable differ-
ences across the two different weighting scheme proposed in the current
analysis. However, this might not have been the case if the water utilities
would have assigned different level of importance to the inputs, good
and bad outputs at the efficiency analysis stage.
Among the examined factors, the facility capacity seems to play an
important role. In fact, considering as its proxy both the Population
Equivalent and the dry weather flow, the efficiency means are greater for
WWTPs with bigger capacity than for smaller plants and the Kruskal-
Wallis test results lead to reject the equality of means hypothesis espe-
cially in the WPI3 model. These evidences are consistent to each other
and in line with other empirical applications (e.g. Herna´ndez-Sancho
9Descriptive statistics and test results have been obtained using Stata 13.
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et al., 2011b; Molinos-Senante et al., 2014a,b). This suggests water util-
ities’ room for improvement in terms of unexploited economies of scale:
large plants show a good hydraulic performance and their pumps achieve
a high productivity. Furthermore, a higher scale of operations allows the
adoption of more advanced technology and therefore a higher removal
rate is obtained.
A different reasoning applies for the aspects related to the adopted tech-
nologies: the Mann-Whitney U test results do not lead to reject the null
hypothesis. In fact, the distinction between secondary or tertiary, com-
bined or separate, activated sludge process usage or not usage, does not
suggest statistically significant differences and therefore these variables
cannot be considered as explanatory factor for the efficiency assessment
in this context. For example, the lack of significance between secondary
and tertiary treatment might rely on the opposite effects exerted by high
advanced treatment process (as tertiary) on costs and quality: as a mat-
ter of fact, costs grow up for the relevant capital expenditure as well as
the water quality is improved. In general, these evidences are in line with
other applied studies: one explanation can be related to the WWTPs sam-
ple choice. In fact, to perform an efficiency analysis, the units have to be
rather homogeneous in the treatment process: looking at the specific fea-
tures of the sample under analysis, this requirement is fulfilled despite
the different classification. However, exploring these factors has at least
two advantages: firstly, it is useful to double check the selected sample
in the first stage of the analysis. Secondly, it is possible to observe the
characteristics of the most efficient WWTPs: on average, there are higher
efficiency scores and higher presence of efficient plants in the group that
shares a tertiary, separate technology and does not use activated sludge
process. Then, an interesting consideration stems from the feature re-
lated to the wastewater discharged by the industrial and agricultural ac-
tivities: the efficiency score averages increase as the percentage of the
efficient WWTPs increases, but the rejection of the test null hypothesis
depends on the model specification. In fact, the null hypothesis is re-
jected for both the weighting schemes only when the undesirable output
is considered: this might suggest that the efficiency assessment can be
conditional upon the main target of the WWTP operators. The result
is in conflict with prior literature that shows a poor performance among
the plants treating sewage from factories and farms (Guerrini et al., 2016).
The novelty of the result obtained in the current chapter can be attributed
to the measurement of nitrogen as undesirable output in the efficiency
model, mainly for two reasons. First of all, the sewage produced by some
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farms and factories (mainly paper mills in the Pisa area) is poorer of ni-
trogen than the domestic wastewater: accordingly, the residual amount
of this pollutant after the treatment process is rather low, making the
plants performance better. Moreover, the plants treating sewage from
factories generally turn out to be more “environmentally” oriented. In-
stead, referring to the year of the plant, the Mann-Whitney U test results
do not enable to reject the null hypothesis in most cases. Consistently
with other studies (e.g. Herna´ndez-Sancho et al., 2011b; Molinos-Senante
et al., 2014a,b), age cannot be considered as a determinant factor in the
efficiency assessment.
Lastly, it is possible to observe that the two groups obtained following
the concentration limit set by the Italian legislator are statistically dif-
ferent whenever the undesirable output is taken into account. This in-
formation provides useful insights: in fact, even if few efficient WWTPs
are found among those above the set threshold, the efficiency score av-
erage is way larger in the case the plants manage to keep the outgoing
concentration below the limit. Accordingly, this evidence suggests that
the “environmentally focused” WWTPs benefit in terms of performance
assessment rather than being damaged, despite their water quality com-
mitment and the incurred high costs to develop a good treatment with
high pollutant removal rate.
In terms of policy implications, the obtained results could provide
useful suggestions for the water utilities, the environmental agencies and
the regulators. For example, since “big is better” for wastewater treat-
ment, the utilities’ managers should plan to exploit larger scale economies:
this would imply higher cost savings, but at the same time higher envi-
ronmental standards achievement. From the point of view of the envi-
ronmental agencies, the highest efficiency scores obtained by the plants
serving factories and farms suggest to perform an inspection activity
on small plants treating only domestic sewage. Moreover, the environ-
mental controls concerning the nitrogen concentration regulatory limit
should also be increased, so to stimulate a better functioning of those
plants that do not respect the set threshold and show a lower perfor-
mance level. Finally, the evidence shows the water authorities the bene-
fits that could arise from an integrated performance assessment that pe-
nalizes WWTPs aiming only at getting cost savings and achieving poor
environmental standards. The results obtained by the adoption of the
“environmental performance index” might suggest water regulators a
benchmarking model for the WWTPs and a yardstick competition to wa-
ter utilities regulation.
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Table 3.5: WPIs by explanatory factors and Mann-Whitney U/Kruskal-Wallis test results
Non-radial WPI1 WPI2 WPI3
Explanatory factor
Total
WWTPs
% Eff. Mean Std. Dev. Test % Eff. Mean Std. Dev. Test % Eff. Mean Std. Dev. Test
Year
<1985 44 36% 0.677 0.278 0.5185 36% 0.611 0.322 0.0637 34% 0.626 0.311 0.0584
≥ 1985 52 33% 0.634 0.277 33% 0.510 0.366 31% 0.511 0.353
PE
<2,000 57 32% 0.644 0.269 0.0536 32% 0.510 0.355 0.0577 28% 0.497 0.343 0.0138
2,000 - 10,000 29 31% 0.606 0.288 31% 0.560 0.324 31% 0.601 0.303
10,000 - 150,000 10 60% 0.852 0.220 60% 0.812 0.289 60% 0.837 0.271
Estimated Dry Weather Flow
<100.000 63 29% 0.625 0.264 0.045 29% 0.497 0.342 0.0207 25% 0.486 0.329 0.0027
100,000 - 500,000 25 40% 0.651 0.307 40% 0.610 0.348 40% 0.656 0.318
>500.000 8 63% 0.889 0.170 63% 0.861 0.227 63% 0.888 0.200
Sewage System
Combined 39 28% 0.608 0.280 0.2103 28% 0.487 0.356 0.0741 26% 0.491 0.340 0.0657
Separate 57 39% 0.686 0.273 39% 0.604 0.339 37% 0.613 0.330
Level of Treatment
Secondary treatment 92 34% 0.644 0.277 0.0885 34% 0.542 0.348 0.0885 32% 0.548 0.336 0.0704
Tertiary treatment 4 50% 0.892 0.125 50% 0.881 0.139 50% 0.918 0.106
Technologies
Others 6 50% 0.778 0.276 0.3619 50% 0.731 0.347 0.2726 33% 0.642 0.356 0.7348
Activated sludge 90 33% 0.646 0.277 33% 0.545 0.348 32% 0.558 0.338
% industrial WW
No activity 60 30% 0.628 0.267 0.1144 30% 0.509 0.341 0.0366 27% 0.508 0.330 0.0102
≤ 10% 26 40% 0.650 0.317 40% 0.599 0.366 40% 0.636 0.339
>10% 10 60% 0.845 0.231 60% 0.826 0.262 60% 0.852 0.238
N Concentration regulatory limit
Below (≤30 mg/L) 69 39% 0.668 0.291 0.6805 39% 0.601 0.349 0.0419 39% 0.631 0.333 0.0015
Above (>30 mg/L) 27 22% 0.619 0.239 22% 0.443 0.326 15% 0.391 0.289
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Table 3.6: WPIs by explanatory factors and Mann-Whitney U/Kruskal-Wallis test results
AHP-non-radial WPI1 WPI2 WPI3
Explanatory factor
Total
WWTPs
% Eff. Mean Std. Dev. Test % Eff. Mean Std. Dev. Test % Eff. Mean Std. Dev. Test
Year
<1985 44 36% 0.692 0.277 0.1495 36% 0.628 0.312 0.0434 34% 0.677 0.278 0.0953
≥ 1985 52 33% 0.609 0.297 33% 0.524 0.354 31% 0.577 0.323
PE
<2,000 57 32% 0.634 0.286 0.1142 32% 0.518 0.347 0.0242 28% 0.540 0.320 0.0009
2,000 - 10,000 29 31% 0.605 0.291 31% 0.586 0.306 31% 0.694 0.240
10,000 - 150,000 10 80% 0.840 0.251 80% 0.833 0.266 60% 0.889 0.180
Estimated Dry Weather Flow
<100.000 63 29% 0.615 0.281 0.0777 29% 0.506 0.334 0.0071 25% 0.539 0.308 0.0003
100,000 - 500,000 25 40% 0.651 0.308 40% 0.637 0.321 40% 0.741 0.240
>500.000 8 63% 0.883 0.200 63% 0.878 0.209 63% 0.916 0.156
Sewage System
Combined 39 28% 0.581 0.295 0.0659 28% 0.513 0.339 0.114 26% 0.575 0.308 0.2261
Separate 57 39% 0.691 0.280 39% 0.611 0.334 37% 0.656 0.303
Level of Treatment
Secondary treatment 92 34% 0.636 0.290 0.1074 34% 0.557 0.337 0.092 32% 0.609 0.305 0.0734
Tertiary treatment 4 50% 0.899 0.144 50% 0.898 0.147 50% 0.938 0.099
Technologies
Others 6 50% 0.788 0.304 0.3078 50% 0.751 0.350 0.2794 33% 0.674 0.358 0.8534
Activated sludge 90 33% 0.637 0.288 33% 0.560 0.336 32% 0.620 0.304
% industrial WW
No activity 60 30% 0.619 0.281 0.0727 30% 0.527 0.330 0.0631 27% 0.569 0.307 0.0073
≤ 10% 26 40% 0.637 0.327 40% 0.615 0.345 40% 0.716 0.253
>10% 10 60% 0.857 0.220 60% 0.821 0.286 60% 0.870 0.222
N Concentration regulatory limit
Below (≤ 30 mg/L) 69 39% 0.660 0.301 0.5191 39% 0.625 0.329 0.005 39% 0.719 0.262 0.0001
Above (>30 mg/L) 27 22% 0.612 0.261 22% 0.434 0.327 15% 0.378 0.277
75
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, 96 wastewater treatment plants located in Tuscany (Italy)
are evaluated through a novel integrated AHP/NDDF approach. The
wastewater treatment plants production process is described by the fol-
lowing variables: material and energy costs, staff and maintenance costs
and sludge transport and disposal costs are chosen as inputs; treated wa-
ter and kg of removed sludge are the desirable outputs while the unde-
sirable output is represented by the quantity of nitrogen in the outgoing
wastewater. The selection of nitrogen as undesirable output is related to
the environmental quality of the outgoing water and adds a new dimen-
sion to the literature on the WWTP efficiency analysis.
From a methodological point of view, this chapter goes a further step
along the path traced by Zhou et al. (2012). The vector directional dis-
tance function allows a new formulation for the simultaneous reduction
of inputs and bad outputs together with the expansion of good outputs.
According to the specification of the non-radial distance function and the
explicit directional vector, different combinations of inputs/outputs can
be analysed and thus different efficiency indicators can be constructed.
The normalized weight vector is selected by taking into account the deci-
sion makers’ preferences (water utility managers, water authorities) and
following the AHP methodology. In this regard, the suggested model
encompasses the one proposed by Zhou et al. (2012). In the empirical
analysis, two different sets of weights are specified presenting thus two
models. In the first case (Non-radial model), the associated weight vec-
tor coincides with the one in Zhou et al. (2012). In the second case (AHP-
non-radial model), the set of weights is constructed starting from the wa-
ter utility staff suggestions. The computed environmental indexes differ
across the two models, although the efficient units are the same.
The environmental efficiency is explained by means of several vari-
ables related to the technical features of the WWTP. Irrespective of the
model specifications, the population equivalent size and the estimated
dry weather flow have a significant impact on the WWTP performance.
This evidence represents a clear indication for water utilities in term of
WWTPs’ size. On the other hand, whenever the expansion of outputs
and the contraction of undesirable output are allowed, the efficiency
scores for both the Non-radial and the AHP-non-radial model are af-
fected by the percentage of the discharged industrial wastewater and by
the plants’ ability to respect the legal nitrogen concentration threshold.
From the environmental agency side, the introduced performance in-
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dexes suggest inspection activities to control those plants that treat only
domestic sewage and/or do not respect the nitrogen concentration regu-
latory limit.
In the present application, WWTP efficiency is addressed together
with the environmental sustainability issue, specifically referring to the
quantity of nitrogen in the outgoing water. The analysis of the environ-
mental quality of the treated water might take into account other relevant
residuals such as phosphorus, pharmaceutical pollutants, toxic metals
and therefore further undesirable outputs might be chosen. In this con-
text, the proposed methodology might be very promising for further in-
spections on the environmental efficiency of the wastewater treatment
plants.
This chapter deals with the service provision analysis of a particu-
lar sector, namely the water management. Specifically, it addresses the
analysis of the wastewater treatment services: plants are valued more if
more “environmentally” focused and committed to water quality, pro-
viding more sustainable and better quality services. However, the mea-
surement of service provision is only one side of the coin. The other is
the evaluation of the way resources are spent: Chapter 4 and 5 explore
this complementary and crucial topic in public sector management.
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Part II
Public spending
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Chapter 4
Global public spending
efficiency in Tuscan
municipalities
4.1 Introduction
In the first part of this dissertation, service provision has been under
analysis. However, the necessity of combining public service delivery
with the containment of public spending calls for further investigation,
checking whether public expenditure is managed in compliance with the
principles of efficiency and effectiveness. This chapter offers an analysis
on municipal spending efficiency, while the next one investigates the ef-
fectiveness of public resources. Specifically, while Chapter 2 aimed to
measure public service provision embedding in a synthetic index several
municipal service indicators, this chapter deals with the efficiency as-
sessment of municipal expenditure, linking resource management with
the provision side . Accordingly, a different methodology is proposed to
addressed the different policy-relevant research question.
After decades of research, local government efficiency evaluation is
still at the centre of political and academic debate, in the public sector
literature, and even more, in the public administration and management
literature. Economic performance measurement and comparison at each
government level remain a relevant issue in the current agenda, being a
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recurrent theme during the evolution of public sector management along
its three different phases (Osborne, 2006). The first one goes from the late
19th century through the late 1970s/early 1980s; at least in the majority
of European countries, the state was supposed to satisfy all the social
and the economic needs of its citizens. Recalling a very famous sentence,
this should have been done “from the cradle to the grave”. “Adminis-
tration”, “bureaucracy” and “public service provision” characterized the
activity of the public administration in that period. The second phase
can be associated with the “New Public Management (NPM)” paradigm
(Hood, 1991). In this era, “market”, “managerialism”, “input and out-
put control”, “performance evaluation” got a foothold in public admin-
istration (Hughes, 2003); both theoretical and political debates faced the
necessity of combining public service provisions with the containment
of public spending. So, since the beginning of the 1990s, “efficiency”,
“effectiveness” and “quality service” have become the keywords of pub-
lic sector management (Keating, 1998). From the late 1990s, the New
Public Management paradigm has been heavily criticized and much em-
pirical evidence underlined its failure: this has lead to new proposals
which attempt to give a more modern idea of Public Management Gov-
ernance (see for example Dunleavy et al. (2006); Osborne (2006)). Even in
these new contexts, performance evaluations are still considered as a key
tool, something essential for policy makers’ decisions. The provision of
a robust efficiency measurement and the implementation of an effective
system of incentives are in the agenda of both politicians and academics
(Da Cruz and Marques, 2014).
Local governments are the most involved organizations in the evaluat-
ing process; during the last years, many key public functions have been
transferred from national to local authorities and hence these latter ones
have increased their importance (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008; Afonso
and Venaˆncio, 2016; Doumpos and Cohen, 2014; Lo Storto, 2016). As it
is better specified in Section 4.2, there is a growing number of papers
dealing with efficiency evaluations of local governments and the iden-
tification of those environmental variables which may affect efficiency.
Several different aspects of local government activity have been evalu-
ated with different techniques. The present chapter fits into this wide
literature and in particular it aims at evaluating the efficiency of the Ital-
ian municipalities located in Tuscany.
To respect the budget constraints, the national government often makes
cuts in transfers to regional and local governments and tries to reorga-
nize public service supply. Referring to Italy, this subject is very relevant
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due to the stringent budget constraints imposed at European level, like
the Stability and Growth Pact and more recently the Fiscal Compact. Of
course, this strengthens the importance and the usefulness of efficiency
evaluations. In Tuscany and, in general, in the Italian context, the pres-
ence of inefficiency in municipal expenditure is due to at least three as-
pects: the presence of much too small municipalities, the partial overlap-
ping of functions carried out both by provinces and municipalities and
the lack of a unitary management for densely populated metropolitan
areas (Iommi, 2011). In this chapter the first aspect is specifically inves-
tigated: small municipalities turn out to be inefficient because they are
unable to exploit scale economies in the provision of public goods and
services and, as a consequence, the services they can provide are poorer
and limited to essential needs. So, the issue of local governments’ opti-
mal size to settle these diseconomies is still controversial and matter of
debate. In particular, Tuscany has promoted institutional and adminis-
trative reforms to overcome the presence of too many fragmented mu-
nicipalities and to define appropriate territorial areas for planning and
supply of public services: since the 1970s, there was awareness among
scholars and regional administrators that very small municipal dimen-
sions affected public service supply and that institutional boundaries
were de facto already overcome in the everyday life of families and busi-
nesses. The 68/2011 regional law represents an example of the legisla-
tor’s attempt to define the optimal municipal size to offer fundamental
public services by promoting joint management and/or merger among
the smallest Tuscan municipalities. In this context, expenditure efficiency
analysis of Tuscan municipalities is proposed through a Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA). This chapter contributes to the literature by sup-
plying new evidence concerning efficiency analysis of local governments
and by proposing an innovative use of a composite indicator. Addition-
ally, the obtained results can help the policy-maker to identify inefficient
municipalities and to give suggestions on possible reorganizations of lo-
cal governments.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 pro-
vides a literature review to place this research into context. Section 4.3
introduces the model specification, describing the 3-stage DEA based ap-
proach performed in the analysis. Section 4.4 presents the empirical anal-
ysis, explaining the data choice and the critical discussion of the obtained
results. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Literature review
Despite the fact that the measurement of efficiency in the private sec-
tor dates from the seminal contribution of Farrell (1957), the issue of
local governments efficiency has been addressed just since the 1990s.
The existing literature on municipal efficiency analysis can be divided
into two branches (Doumpos and Cohen, 2014). On the one hand, there
are numerous studies on individual public services, such as solid waste,
sewage disposal, water, energy provision, hospitals, municipal savings
banks, public libraries, road maintenance, fire protection, care for the el-
derly sector, local police services, public transportation and pre-school
education (for an overview see Bo¨nisch et al., 2011). On the other hand,
there are studies that analyse global municipal efficiency for various coun-
tries: Belgium (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; De Borger et al., 1994; Geys
and Moesen, 2009), Finland (Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2005), Norway
(Borge et al., 2008), Brazil (De Sousa and Stosˇic´, 2005), Spain (Balaguer-
Coll et al., 2007, 2013; Benito et al., 2010; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al.,
2013; Prieto and ZofIo, 2001), Portugal (Afonso and Fernandes, 2006,
2008; Afonso and Venaˆncio, 2016; Da Cruz and Marques, 2014), Czech
Republic (Sˇt’astna´ and Gregor, 2015), Japan (Nakazawa, 2013; Nijkamp
and Suzuki, 2009), Germany (Geys et al., 2010; Kalb et al., 2012), Greece
(Athanassopoulos and Triantis, 1998; Doumpos and Cohen, 2014) and
Italy (Agasisti et al., 2016; Boetti et al., 2012; Bollino et al., 2012; Lo Storto,
2013, 2016) (for earlier studies review see De Borger and Kerstens, 2000;
Worthington et al., 2000). This second type of studies sometimes at-
tempts to analyse the relationship between municipal performance and
some important topics, like the relevance of municipal size, the effect
of public function decentralization on the municipalities, the impact of
fiscal decentralization, the influence of the effects of spatial closeness be-
tween municipalities, and other aspects. According to many authors,
there is an advantage in the use of a comprehensive approach, compared
to the studies focused on specific functions: it is the ability to take into
account the opportunity cost perceived by the municipality in deciding
the allocation of resources to different services, the possible synergies of
expenditure and the quantification of the total savings of resources. Fol-
lowing this part of the efficiency literature, in this chapter a global public
expenditure efficiency analysis of the Tuscan municipalities is performed
through DEA and, as far as the authors know, this is the first application
for the Tuscan region. The choice of the Tuscan framework is undoubt-
edly linked to its topical feature: even the Tuscan legislator has promoted
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institutional and administrative reforms to overcome the presence of in-
efficiency in municipal expenditure, in particular in relation to municipal
size. For this reason, in this context specific attention is dedicated to the
municipal size effect on expenditure efficiency, adding new evidences to
the existing literature (see for example Bo¨nisch et al., 2011; Doumpos and
Cohen, 2014).
From a methodological point of view, there are alternative available
methods for the efficiency analysis of production processes in both pri-
vate and public sector. They differ mainly in the way the unknown and
unobservable “efficiency frontier” is inferred from the data. These dif-
ferent techniques can be classified basically in two alternative appro-
aches: the econometric and the optimization approach. The first one
specifies a production function and normally recognizes that the devi-
ation away from this given technology (as measured by the error term)
is composed of two parts, one representing randomness (or statistical
noise) and the other inefficiency. Among the various techniques belong-
ing to the econometric approach, “stochastic frontier analysis” (SFA), in-
troduced by Aigner et al. (1977), plays a central role. Following Wor-
thington (2000), the first studies of local government cost efficiency with
this approach are proposed by De Borger and Kerstens (1996), Deller
et al. (1988) and Hayes and Chang (1990). Using this technique, a sizeable
structure is imposed upon the data from a strict parametric form and dis-
tributional assumption, to determine the absolute economic efficiency of
the units under analysis against some imposed benchmark (Dollery and
Wallis, 2001). On the contrary, the mathematical programming approach
seeks to evaluate the relative efficiency of one unit compared to the oth-
ers. The most commonly employed version of the optimization approach
is the linear programming model referred to as “data envelopment anal-
ysis” (DEA), introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), based on the concept of
efficiency proposed by Farrell (1957). DEA essentially calculates the eco-
nomic efficiency of a given organisation with respect to the performance
of other organisations producing the same good or service, rather than
against an idealised standard of performance. Given its non-parametric
basis, it is possible to considerably vary the specification of inputs and
outputs and not to specify a particular form. Still following Worthing-
ton, De Borger and Kerstens (1996) and Eeckaut et al. (1993) give the
first contributions for the local government cost efficiency analysis with
this technique. Moreover, a less-constrained alternative to DEA often
employed in the analysis of public sector economic efficiency is known
as “free-disposal hull” (FDH), introduced by Deprins et al. (1984) and
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applied to local governments for the first time by De Borger and Ker-
stens (1996) and by De Borger et al. (1994). The methodological literature
to date provides inconclusive evidence concerning the sensitivity of lo-
cal government efficiency rankings to these alternative technologies. It
should be emphasised that the SFA and DEA approaches address differ-
ent questions, serve different purposes and have different informational
requirements (Dollery and Wallis, 2001): for these reasons, DEA and SFA
should be considered as complementary methods in local public sector
efficiency analysis. Recently, Da Cruz and Marques (2014) carried out a
very detailed and systematic literature review of the papers published
in peer-reviewed and top-ranked journals dealing with the global per-
formance of local governments: DEA, FDH or SFA methodologies are
mostly used and the data choice is strictly affected by the local govern-
ments’ range. In particular, as regards the data choice, the efficiency
analysis at the global level covers several areas of municipal activity:
many inputs and outputs related to different municipal areas have to be
considered. To globally encompass all the municipal functions in a sin-
gle indicator, several ways have been proposed in the recent literature.
Some authors conceive a multi input-output DEA model (see Balaguer-
Coll et al., 2007; De Borger et al., 1994; Worthington, 2000), while some
others aggregate the different functions by constructing a composite in-
dicator. Regarding this latter approach, it is worth citing the contribu-
tion of Afonso and Fernandes (2008). The authors use a Total Municipal
Output Indicator (TMOI) to put together different outputs (a similar ap-
proach can be found for example in Afonso et al., 2005). They assume
that the TMOI depends on several economic and social variables, be-
longing to different policy areas. For each policy area a total municipal
sub-indicator (TMSOI) must be previously computed: this indicator is
calculated by centring each variable around the mean of all observations
and then using an unweighted average of all variables for a policy area.
Then, the TMOI is computed as the sum of all the sub-indicators. DEA
analysis is then performed using as output of the model either the com-
posite TMOI or alternatively the several sub-indicators. Another way of
constructing composite indicators is based on the so-called “Benefit of
the doubt” approach (see Cherchye et al., 2007). In this case, separate
sub-indicators are first computed for different objects and then they are
aggregated in a composite indicator by means of their weighted sum.
The weights are chosen so to maximize the value of the composite in-
dicator: in other words, they are the most favourable weights for the
evaluated unit. However, in constructing the overall efficiency score, a
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common system of weights would be preferable; in this light, Despotis
et al. (2002) suggests a procedure which remains in “the spirit” of DEA
and which determines the same weights for every unit. This kind of com-
posite indicator is often defined as DEA-like composite indicator and it
is used in several different contexts, such as the assessment of the human
development index and the evaluation of quality of life and well being
(see for example Bernini et al., 2013; Despotis, 2005). As far as the au-
thors know, it has not yet been applied to local government expenditure
efficiency analysis: this chapter contributes to the literature by introduc-
ing the use of this DEA-like composite indicator for the computation of
the global efficiency scores. Moreover, to validate the provided results
and to give an interpretation of the global efficiency scores in terms of
municipal expenditure composition, also a further composite indicator
is proposed.
4.3 Model specification
To evaluate overall spending efficiency, a 3-stage DEA based approach is
performed: first of all, individual efficiencies associated with five major
municipal functions are computed; then the municipal global efficiency
index is generated considering a common set of weights; finally, statis-
tical analysis is used to assess the effect of some contextual variables on
the global efficiency indicator. In the following, each stage is explained
in more details.
4.3.1 Stage 1: DEA for each individual municipal func-
tion
As it has been already underlined in Section 4.2, DEA is a non-parametric
technique which is particularly suitable in evaluating the efficiency of the
public sector. It does not require any specific functional form of the pro-
duction frontier and gives intuitive ideas to correct the found inefficiency.
Through a linear programming approach, DEA constructs the efficient
frontier; first of all for each unit to be evaluated, the so-called Decision
Making Unit (DMU), the set of inputs and output are detected. Then
DEA models analyse whether either a given output quantity is produced
with minimum input (input-oriented DEA model) or the maximum out-
put is produced with a given input quantity (output-oriented DEA mo-
del). The efficiency score varies from 0 to 1 and is determined by the
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ratio between the weighted sum of outputs and the weighted sum of in-
puts. Moreover, regarding the possibility of allowing variable returns to
scale or not, two different specifications can be distinguished: the con-
stant returns to scale DEA model (CRS) and the variable returns to scale
DEA model (VRS), introduced respectively by Charnes et al. (1978) and
Banker et al. (1984).
In the present analysis, Tuscan municipalities are the evaluated DMUs.
As a first step, to perform a global efficiency analysis, five DEA mod-
els are run to separately assess the efficiency of the following municipal
functions: “General administration” (GA), “Social Services” (SS), “Edu-
cational services” (ES), “Road maintenance and local mobility” (RM) and
“Local police” (LP). Those functions have a strategic role in local govern-
ment policy and occupy a prominent position in the municipal budget.
The peculiarities of municipal activities suggest to use the input-oriented
DEA model with variable returns to scale (VRS). 1 For the GA function,
as well as the SS and the ES functions, a “one input-one output” model
is used, while in the case of RM and LP functions a “one input-two out-
put” model is chosen (for further specification, see Section 4.4.1). The
obtained basic efficiency scores are then aggregated to analyse the over-
all spending performance, as explained in the next stage.
4.3.2 Stage 2: Aggregating for overall efficiency analysis
Regarding the overall efficiency, several preliminary considerations should
be done. The global municipal spending efficiency could be evaluated
by considering a DEA model with all the input and output variables
detected for the non-aggregate analysis. Nevertheless, this straightfor-
ward and easy choice does not result so appealing. As DEA allows flex-
ibility in the choice of weights on the inputs and outputs, the greater
the number of included factors, the lower the level of discrimination be-
tween efficient and inefficient units: so, discrimination can be increased
by being parsimonious in the number of variables. In other words, by
increasing the number of inputs and/or outputs, there is automatically,
by construction, an increase in efficient DMUs. This reasoning becomes
very evident looking at the DEA results stemming from the municipal
analysis: gradually adding a function, in the VRS model, the number of
efficient municipalities increases more and more, out of a sample of 282
1Nevertheless, CRS model might also be estimated to provide additional information on
the municipal size debate, computing the scale efficiency as the ratio between CRS and VRS
efficiency scores (Cooper et al., 2011). This analysis is kept as scope for further research.
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units under analysis. In fact, just considering the “General administra-
tion” function there are only 5 efficient municipalities. Considering also
the function for “Educational services” the number of efficient munici-
palities increases at 20. Then, adding the function for “Social Services”
49 municipalities result to be efficient. Finally, the number of efficient
municipalities becomes very big introducing the “Road maintenance and
local mobility” function, i.e. 82 efficient municipalities, and then the “Lo-
cal police” function, i.e. 107 efficient municipalities: obviously, having so
many efficient municipalities is not very informative and it’s quite unrea-
sonable. In the literature, there is an open theoretical debate on this issue.
From one hand, different suggested “rules of thumb” are proposed in or-
der to achieve reasonable level of discrimination; for example, there are
proposed rules in Bowlin (1998) and in Dyson et al. (2001). On the other
hand, the definition of a stringent rule seems to be too rigid and useless
in relation to the research needs (see, e.g., Cook et al., 2014; Cooper et al.,
2011). Referring to this issue, alternative approaches have been proposed
in the municipal expenditure efficiency analysis (see Section 4.2).
The solution adopted in the present analysis consists in the introduc-
tion of a new composite indicator which aggregates the efficiency scores
of the single functions and more specifically by means of a weighted av-
erage of the basic efficiency scores. The weights are determined focusing
on two main objectives: first of all, they have to generate a DEA-like in-
dex, so not to penalize the units under analysis; then, they have to avoid
arbitrary choice, giving a common base for municipality comparison.
To reach these goals, the “benefit of the doubt” approach (see Bernini
et al., 2013; Cherchye et al., 2007) represents a necessary intermediate
step to generate the municipal global efficiency index with a common
set of weights. More precisely, for every municipality j0 a preliminary
composite indicator is constructed, solving the following maximization
problem:
CIj0 = max
wj0
k∑
i=1
yij0wij0
k∑
i=1
yijwij0 ≤ 1 j = 1, ...,m
wij0 ≥  i = 1, ..., k.
(4.1)
where m is the number of evaluated municipalities, k is the number of
the considered functions, yij represents the DEA efficiency score related
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to the ith function of the jth municipality and wj0 = (wij0)
k
i=1 is the
weight associated with the municipality j0. The overall efficiency score
is obtained by taking a weighted sum of the five non-aggregate efficiency
scores and, according to Problem 4.1, it corresponds to the optimal value;
the optimal weights are the most favourable for the evaluated municipal-
ity j0. Moreover Problem 4.1 can be seen as a standard DEA model where
there is a dummy input and the non-aggregate efficiency scores are seen
as output variables. As it is observed in Bernini et al. (2013), the afore-
mentioned Composite Indicator provides a different set of weights for
each DMU and this prevents DMU’s comparison on a common base. In
this light, Despotis et al. (2002) states that a common set of weights can
be determined by solving a suitable vector optimization problem and the
corresponding solutions are found by solving the following minimiza-
tion problem:
min
wi,dj ,z
t 1m
m∑
j=1
dj + (1− t)z
k∑
i=1
yijwi + dj = CIj j = 1, ...,m
dj − z ≤ 0 j = 1, ...,m
dj ≥ 0 j = 1, ...,m
wi ≥  i = 1, ..., k
z ≥ 0
(4.2)
where wi represents the weight assigned to the ith function and dj “mea-
sures” the distance between the “collective” score and the most favourable
score for the jth municipality, namely CIj which is obtained by solving
Problem 4.1. By construction, dj is non-negative for every DMU and z
represents the maximum of dj ; therefore z is the distance between the
“collective” score and the DEA-like composite indicator of the most pe-
nalized DMU (see also Bernini et al., 2013). As t varies from 0 to 1, dif-
ferent sets of common weights are determined and each of them has
different meaning. In the present analysis, t = 0 is considered as the
most suitable choice given the institutional framework outlined in the
introduction of this chapter. In fact, one of the main sources of ineffi-
cient resource management has been linked to unexploited economies
of scale due to the presence of many small municipalities. When t = 0,
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Problem 4.2 gives the set of common weights which minimizes z, that
is, which maximizes the efficiency score of the most penalized DMU.
Accordingly, even the municipalities that are expected to be the most
inefficient (namely the smallest ones) cannot complain of unfairness as
concerns the choice of the model. The set of common weights is then
used to compute the new composite indicators attesting the municipali-
ties’ global spending efficiency.
In the local administrators’ opinion, the overall efficiency of a mu-
nicipality has to be evaluated through the analysis of the expenditure
composition arising from its municipal balance sheet. In this light, the
obtained composite indicators are compared with a second kind of global
efficiency scores. Even in this latter case, the composite indicator is the
weighted sum of the single functions’ efficiency scores, but each func-
tion enters in the composite indicator with the same proportion that the
given function has with respect to the total expenditure. This other in-
dicator takes into account the local administrators’ perception and it is
also helpful in validating the first DEA-like indicator. Moreover, to con-
struct a composite indicator with a common system of weights among
all the municipalities, the single function efficiency scores are weighted
according to the Tuscan mean expenditure composition. For each munic-
ipality, the comparison of the two “expenditure composition” indicators
may provide suggestions to enhance efficiency.
4.3.3 Stage 3: Investigating municipal expenditure effi-
ciency explanatory variables
Finally, an interpretation of the obtained indicators is provided by clus-
tering the Tuscan municipalities according to the following main munici-
pal features and consistently with the Tuscan hallmarks: size, geography,
tourism degree and socio-economic structure through the local labour
system classification. This analysis aims at investigating how specific
municipal features affect local public expenditure management and its
efficiency.
With the same purpose, a Tobit regression model is also estimated.
This approach aims at evaluating the correlation between the efficiency
scores and the municipal characteristics, partly complementing the clus-
ter analysis as introduced above. The global efficiency scores are ex-
plained taking into account municipal characteristics referring to the eco-
nomic, social and political context. As suggested in the recent litera-
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ture (see e.g. Agasisti and Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2015; Da Cruz and Mar-
ques, 2014; Lo Storto, 2016), to properly conduct the third stage analy-
sis, bias-corrected efficiency scores are computed using a bootstrap pro-
cedure (see Simar and Wilson, 2000, 2007) and then used as dependent
variable in the regression model. Bootstrap-based inference makes bias-
corrections for the efficiency score computation, but it still assumes the
“separability condition”. In this chapter, we show the insights stemming
from the application of this technique. On the contrary, in Chapter 2 the
conditional analysis has been alternatively considered, to include in one-
stage the background variables avoiding the assumption of the “separa-
bility condition” (Daraio et al., 2017), so to show the application of both
techniques and the consistency of their results.
4.4 Empirical application
4.4.1 Data, inputs and outputs
A fundamental step in the definition of municipal efficiency analysis re-
gards the choice of the decision variables, both for the computation of the
efficiency scores (inputs and outputs) and for the explanation of its de-
terminants. The Italian institutional framework strongly influences the
data choice, regarding both the municipal expenditure areas and their
related inputs/outputs. Specifically, “General administration”, “Social
Services”, “Educational services”, “Road maintenance and local mobil-
ity” and “Local police” are considered, as they represent not only the
most fundamental competencies for the municipal budget (about 73%
of total current expenditure in 2011, reference year of the analysis), but
also for the services provided to the citizens, detailed in the following
according to the municipal balance sheet expenditure items 2.
• General administration: it provides services regarding the institu-
tional bodies, the administrative office, the management of tax rev-
2Among the excluded municipal functions, a remark has to be made about the “Envi-
ronmental management” function. It presents very heterogeneous expenditure items (e.g.
urban services, environmental conservation services, waste disposal service), that heav-
ily differ among municipalities according to their own characteristics. Another source of
heterogeneity comes from the presence of two different taxation systems for environmen-
tal services, namely the TARSU (“Tassa Rifiuti Solidi Urbani”) system and the TIA (“Tariffa
Igiene Ambientale”) system. Since DEA requires homogeneous units to be compared, the
authors have preferred excluding this function from the current analysis.
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enue, the technical office, military services registry, civil registra-
tion and electoral services, vital records and statistics.
• Educational services: it provides services regarding the nursery
schools, primary and secondary education, school assistance, school
transport and school meals.
• Social services: it provides services regarding childcare, kinder-
garten, services to minors, leisure structures, facilities and care for
the most vulnerable population groups such as elderly and immi-
grants.
• Road maintenance and local mobility: it provides services regard-
ing viability, traffic circulation, public lighting and public trans-
port.
• Local police: it provides services regarding the municipal police,
the commercial police and the administrative police.
In the empirical literature there is a general consensus regarding the
choice of cost related observations as input (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008;
Doumpos and Cohen, 2014; Kalb et al., 2012; Lo Storto, 2016): accord-
ingly, the municipal current expenditure of each municipal area is used
as input indicator, taken in non-aggregate way and expressed in absolute
value. Data come from the available municipal balance sheets, published
by the Home office Ministry (Ministero degli Interni) and refer to 2011.
Regarding the output choice, as evident in the existing literature, it
is difficult to find data that directly measure municipal production re-
sults: so, just surrogate measures of municipal demand are considered
for performance indicators, often used as proxies for the related services
provided to the citizens. In addition, there is no information about quali-
tative results of municipal activities: so, just quantitative data have been
employed in the analysis. Moreover, the data available for some per-
formance indicators sometimes have missing data with respect to some
municipalities and certainly they become useless in the analysis. Tak-
ing into account these difficulties, the outputs proposed in the literature
have been considered and function by function the variables have been
selected.
The total population is considered as proxy for the various administra-
tive tasks, as in Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007); Boetti et al. (2012); Da Cruz
and Marques (2014); De Borger and Kerstens (1996); De Sousa and Stosˇic´
(2005); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb et al. (2012); Lo Storto (2016); Nakazawa
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(2013). For the education services, the school age population (3-13 years
old) has been taken as the catchment area of the services supplied by
municipality (e.g., Boetti et al., 2012; Borge et al., 2008; De Borger and
Kerstens, 1996; De Borger et al., 1994; Geys et al., 2010; Geys and Moe-
sen, 2009; Kalb et al., 2012). Regarding social services, the output is
given by the number of municipal citizens from 0 to 5 years old (for
kindergarten and school canteen services) plus the number of the over
65 (for elderly provision) plus the number of immigrants (immigration
needs), as in Afonso and Fernandes (2006); Boetti et al. (2012); Borge et al.
(2008); De Borger and Kerstens (1996); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb et al. (2012);
Nakazawa (2013). Local police activities as well as the road maintenance
and local mobility function are measured by the total amount of kilome-
tres of roads to be supervised/maintained and by the amount of resi-
dent population plus the average annual tourist presence since they are
considered as proxy of the potential users of these services (e.g., Afonso
and Venaˆncio, 2016; Boetti et al., 2012; Da Cruz and Marques, 2014; Geys
and Moesen, 2009). In compliance with part of the existing literature,
even the size of the municipal area could have been chosen as output
at least for the administrative services, for the local police function and
for the road maintenance one. Despite this, the geographical and socio-
economic characteristics of Tuscan municipalities make this choice inap-
propriate. A preliminary statistical analysis has shown a strong bias in
the outcomes due to the high heterogeneity related to this variable. How-
ever, given the importance of this aspect, the size of the municipal area is
taken into account in the econometric analysis by means of the variable
“density”.
Data are collected from the statistical database DEMO ISTAT, the Mo-
bility and Transport Regional Observatory and Tuscany Region survey.
They all refer to 2011, consistently with the expenditure side, and they
cover 282 Tuscan municipalities. Despite Tuscany has 287 municipalities,
data were not available for two of them and three municipalities have
been detected as outliers. In fact, from a first analysis on municipalities’
features, Firenze has been considered absolutely out of scale in compar-
ison with all the other municipalities. This intuition has been confirmed
by a super-efficiency DEA analysis which has been performed to detect
outliers (see for all Banker and Chang, 2006). Actually, a super-efficiency
DEA model has been run function by function: two more municipalities
have been detected as outliers and therefore dropped from the current
analysis.
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present the dataset descriptive statistics re-
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spectively for the relevant input and output variables.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for DEA dataset – Input.
INPUT N Mean Stdev Min Max
General administration (103 e) 282 2843.708 4788.804 143.12 41457.83
Local police (103 e) 282 566.7216 1211.233 2.717 10696.06
Educational services (103 e) 282 1177.73 2146.233 41.306 18580.92
Road maintenance and local mobility (103 e) 282 857.3745 1937.075 15.823 18751.71
Social services (103 e) 282 1653.309 3730.047 5.042 35413.89
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for DEA dataset – Output.
OUTPUT N Mean Stdev Min Max
Total population 282 11650.6 20235.62 394 184885
Length of roads (Km) 282 139280.9 157103.9 0 1353082
Population + Tourist presence 282 11998.32 20536.98 493.4521 186104
Population 3-13 282 1107.486 1954.895 20 19640
Population 0-5 + Over 65 + Immigrants 282 4348.447 7763.503 142 77943
4.4.2 Results
In this section, the DEA efficiency scores for 282 Tuscan municipalities
are presented; they are computed by Coelli’s software “DEAP Version
2.1: A Data Envelopment Analysis (Computer Program)” (Coelli, 1996).
The assessment of expenditure performance is expressed in terms of DEA
scores by values between 0 and 1: the municipalities with a score equal
to one are those that are fully efficient.
As explained in the previous section, for each fundamental municipal
function a VRS analysis is done and for the global analysis the DEA-like
composite indicator is computed. Table 4.3 presents in a synthetic way
the main descriptive statistics of the results both for each municipal area
and for the overall level: the full list of the results is in Appendix C.1.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of the efficiency scores at local and global
level.
Mean Stdev Min Max
Percentiles
10◦ 25◦ 50◦ 75◦ 90◦
General administration 0.59 0.19 0.15 1.00 0.37 0.46 0.58 0.73 0.84
Local police 0.43 0.23 0.02 1.00 0.14 0.26 0.42 0.56 0.76
Educational services 0.43 0.16 0.13 1.00 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.51 0.61
Road maintenance 0.35 0.20 0.03 1.00 0.14 0.20 0.30 0.43 0.61
Social services 0.45 0.24 0.02 1.00 0.18 0.27 0.40 0.57 0.83
DEA-like Overall 0.44 0.13 0.15 1.00 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.52 0.61
A question may naturally arise: do specific municipal features af-
fect local public expenditure management and its efficiency? To address
this question, four main municipal characteristics are considered in line
with the Tuscan hallmarks: size, geography, tourism degree and socio-
economic structure through the local labour system classification. Since
from a qualitative point of view the outcomes are the same both at non-
aggregate and at overall level, for the sake of brevity only the descrip-
tive statistics for the composite indicator are reported below in Table 4.4
and 4.5, even if it should be taken in mind that the efficient municipali-
ties considered as peer for all the other inefficient ones vary according to
each function, both in terms of number of efficient units and in terms of
municipal typology. In the following, the four listed aspects are shortly
analysed.
To explore the effect of municipal size, the efficiency scores are clus-
tered in eight different classes: as the municipal population size increases,
the average of the efficiency scores among each class increases. As re-
gards the biggest class, there is the highest minimum value of efficiency
score and the highest maximum value, equal to one, meaning that ac-
cording to this analysis the most and fully efficient municipality belongs
to this class and it is the provincial capital Prato. Broadly speaking, all
the provincial capitals result to be the most efficient municipalities: this
can be seen graphically from Figure 4.1 3. Moreover, the geographical
distribution of the municipal population size reflects a similar distribu-
tion in terms of the expenditure efficiency scores: the darker the area,
3Figure 4.1(b) is obtained by “Stata” program.
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the more populated and efficient the municipality. This evidence makes
stronger the reasoning about municipal size: the bigger is the municipal
catchment area, the lower the average cost in the provision of municipal
services, which in turn makes possible to provide more differentiated
and complex services. In particular, as regards the small municipalities,
the inefficiency source can be related to the presence of too many small
fragmented municipalities: this might suggest an aggregation among
the smallest municipalities to exploit scale economies, in line with the
legislative measures proposed by the Tuscany region to overcome this
problematic aspect.
(a) By dimensional classes (b) By global efficiency scores
Figure 4.1: Geographical distribution comparison.
To check whether the municipal geography plays a role in the re-
sources management, the “mountain” feature is considered. In line with
the Italian legislation (Law 991/52, Law 657/57 and Law 142/90), the
“mountain classification” distinguishes three categories: totally moun-
tain, partially mountain and non-mountain. The lowest efficiency scores
are present in the mountain municipalities: certainly, the difficult terrain
and the smallest presence of the resident population make more ineffi-
cient the provision of the services.
As tourism is a very important Tuscan feature, the degree of munici-
pal tourism involvement is obtained dividing into quartiles the ordered
per capita tourist presence. The highest level of inefficiency is present in
the municipalities with high level of tourism, while the opposite holds
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for those municipalities with very low level of tourism. In general, it’s
possible to observe that considering an increasing level of tourism, the
average level of efficiency systematically decreases. Certainly, a remark
must be made when considering the tourist presence: vacation property
owners are not taken into account, even though they might represent a
non-negligible part of the catchment area of the municipal services and
so lower the inefficiency scores. Anyhow, especially the tourist munic-
ipalities subject to strong seasonality face higher costs than others (e.g.
this is the case of the sea places).
Finally, local labour systems are used to investigate the Tuscan mu-
nicipalities’ socio-economic structure: they are territorial units of daily
activities of the population that lives and works there and consist of sev-
eral adjacent municipalities, geographically and statistically comparable
with each other. The classification is based on the ISTAT (Italian National
Institute of Statistics) elaboration. The lowest average efficiency level is
present in the systems without specialization, while the opposite holds
for the urban systems and the manufacturing systems in textile, leather
and clothing. In relation to this last mentioned class, it’s worth noting
that the obtained most efficient municipality, Prato, belongs precisely to
it.
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of global efficiency scores.
Mean Stdev Min Max
Size class
From 0 to 1.000 inhab. 0.37 0.12 0.16 0.58
From 1.001 to 2.000 inhab. 0.32 0.09 0.20 0.62
From 2.001 to 3.000 inhab. 0.36 0.06 0.19 0.51
From 3.001 to 5.000 inhab. 0.39 0.08 0.22 0.57
From 5.001 to 10.000 inhab. 0.45 0.10 0.15 0.71
From 10.001 to 20.000 inhab. 0.54 0.09 0.37 0.75
From 20.001 to 60.000 inhab. 0.55 0.12 0.35 0.82
Over 60.000 inhab. 0.71 0.16 0.44 1.00
Mountain class
Non-mountain 0.49 0.13 0.15 1.00
Partially mountain 0.49 0.14 0.22 0.92
Totally mountain 0.37 0.10 0.16 0.61
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of global efficiency scores (cont’d).
Mean Stdev Min Max
Tourism class
Very low tourism 0.48 0.14 0.20 0.82
Low tourism 0.47 0.15 0.23 1.00
Medium tourism 0.45 0.12 0.22 0.80
High tourism 0.38 0.11 0.15 0.62
Local labour system class
Without specialization 0.37 0.08 0.24 0.57
Urban systems 0.49 0.13 0.21 0.80
Tourism and agricultural vocation 0.39 0.14 0.19 0.82
Manufacturing in the textile, leather
and clothing
0.49 0.14 0.20 1.00
Other manufacturing made in Italy 0.45 0.14 0.16 0.92
Heavy manufacturing 0.41 0.11 0.15 0.66
4.4.3 A different way of aggregation
As pointed out before, there are several ways to aggregate the funda-
mental function efficiency scores into a composite indicator, according to
the different assigned system of weights. Therefore, at this point of the
analysis, a different composite indicator is proposed: it is computed as
the weighted average of the function efficiency scores, using the weights
they have in the total expenditure, so to represent in a synthetic way the
average municipal spending efficiency results.
First of all, it is a useful tool as a “robustness” check of the results
obtained with the DEA-like aggregating approach: Figure 4.2-4.5 show
that for the four mentioned municipal features the comparison of the
two indicators exhibits the same trend. Intuitively, this might suggest
two considerations. First of all, the DEA-like CI has been constructed so
to give higher importance to the functions that indeed represent a higher
share of expenditure in the budget allocation. Moreover, municipalities
devote the more attention in the management of the resources the greater
is the relevance of the function (as by construction higher weights are
assigned to higher non-aggregate efficiency scores). This evidence might
depend on the structure of the data or be generalized as a property of the
model: this question represents an interesting topic for further research.
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Furthermore, though from a technical point of view the proposal of
this kind of indicator might be simpler, from a normative point of view it
might give more intuitive and then useful suggestions for the legislator
and for the local governments to find room of improvements in resource
management. To reach this goal, both the composite indicator obtained
by using each municipal expenditure composition and the one obtained
by considering the Tuscan mean expenditure composition are necessary:
the descriptive statistics are listed in Table 4.6. Using this approach, on
the one hand, it becomes possible to make some considerations about
the effect of the municipal expenditure allocation among the different
functions on the average inefficiency. On the other hand, the units under
analysis can be divided into groups according to different level of effi-
ciency, the most frequent municipal features can be identified and com-
pared with the commented evidences of the previous section.
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics of the scores for municipal and Tuscan av-
erage weights.
Mean Stdev Min Max
Percentiles
10◦ 25◦ 50◦ 75◦ 90◦
Municipal weights 0.47 0.14 0.13 1.00 0.30 0.37 0.46 0.57 0.64
Tuscan weights 0.49 0.14 0.16 1.00 0.33 0.39 0.47 0.59 0.66
The proposed procedure is the following. First of all, the municipal-
ities have to be divided according to two features. The first regards the
relative level of efficiency: it is the difference between each municipal
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composite indicator (computed considering the own municipal expendi-
ture composition) and the median of all these computed indicators, so
to have the relative efficiency of each municipality (to be noticed that
the median quite coincides with the mean). The second feature regards
the expenditure composition: it is the difference between each munici-
pal composite indicator computed considering the municipal expendi-
ture composition and the one obtained taking the Tuscan average expen-
diture composition. If this difference is positive, this suggests that the
municipality has chosen a composition that allows it to achieve a better
level of average efficiency rather than in any other resources allocation;
if the difference is negative, then the municipality has chosen a composi-
tion that brings it to achieve a worse level of efficiency.
Then, Figure 4.6 shows the combination of these two dimensions in a
graphical and intuitive way to distinguish four groups of municipalities:
on the vertical axis there is the relative efficiency, while on the horizon-
tal axis the expenditure composition aspect is considered. Municipalities
are laid out into four quadrants according to the following way: for y
positive values the municipalities belong to the Efficient quadrants, that
is they are more efficient than the median, while for x positive values the
municipalities belong to the Better quadrants, that is they have an expen-
diture composition that allows them to achieve a better level of average
efficiency; the opposite reasoning holds respectively for the Inefficient
and the Worse quadrants.
As evident, it can be said that the municipalities in the Efficient-Worse
and Inefficient-Worse quadrant have possible room of improvement in
the efficiency level just changing a little the composition of the expendi-
ture. Certainly, this suggestion should be handled carefully, especially
for two reasons: the change in expenditure brings a change in the DEA
model input, so to modify endogenously the level of the efficiency; sec-
ondly, especially for the smallest municipalities there are some binding
thresholds of expenditure that cannot be avoided. Even so, the munici-
palities in the Inefficient-Worse and Inefficient-Better quadrant certainly
could improve their level of efficiency at least solving the present mis-
management problems and their causes. So, in conclusion, the Efficient-
Better quadrant seems to collect the municipalities that behave better,
according to this analysis.
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Figure 4.6: Municipalities by relative efficiency and expenditure composi-
tion.
In a synthetic way, Table 4.7 shows the main features of each quadrant
according to the already used dimensional, mountain, tourism and local
labour system classes and referring the number of present municipali-
ties (in the table shortly DMUs). The dimensional class which reveals the
highest percentage of the best performing municipalities (Efficient-Better
quadrant) is the one with over sixty thousands of inhabitants. Referring
to the other classifications, the highest percentage of the best perform-
ing municipalities lies in the non-mountain class, in the low-tourism one
and in the manufacturing systems in the textile, leather and clothing one.
As evident, these features recall those already presented in the previous
results. Similar way of reasoning can be given for the other quadrants.
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Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics of each quadrant.
Efficient-Better Efficient-Worse Inefficient-Better Inefficient-Worse
quadrant quadrant quadrant quadrant
Dimensional class DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % TOTAL
From 0 to 1.000 inhab. 3 18% 2 12% 1 6% 11 65% 17
From 1.001 to 2.000 inhab. 1 3% 3 8% 12 30% 24 60% 40
From 2.001 to 3.000 inhab. 3 11% 3 11% 8 29% 14 50% 28
From 3.001 to 5.000 inhab. 6 13% 9 19% 7 15% 26 54% 48
From 5.001 to 10.000 inhab. 8 13% 29 46% 6 10% 20 32% 63
From 10.001 to 20.000 inhab. 9 18% 34 69% 3 6% 3 6% 49
From 20.001 to 60.000 inhab. 4 15% 18 67% 1 4% 4 15% 27
Over 60.000 inhab. 2 20% 7 70% 0 0% 1 10% 10
TOTAL 36 13% 105 37% 38 13% 103 37% 282
Mountain class DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % TOTAL
Non-mountain 21 16% 61 48% 17 13% 29 23% 128
Partially mountain 5 12% 23 55% 2 5% 12 29% 42
Totally mountain 10 9% 21 19% 19 17% 62 55% 112
TOTAL 36 13% 105 37% 38 13% 103 37% 282
Tourism class DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % TOTAL
Very low tourism 15 21% 33 47% 3 4% 19 27% 70
Low tourism 8 11% 31 44% 11 15% 21 30% 71
Medium tourism 7 10% 30 43% 8 11% 25 36% 70
High tourism 6 8% 11 15% 16 23% 38 54% 71
TOTAL 36 13% 105 37% 38 13% 103 37% 282
Local labour system class DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % DMUs % TOTAL
Systems without specialization 4 12% 8 24% 3 9% 18 55% 33
Urban systems 3 7% 22 51% 4 9% 14 33% 43
Tourism and agricultural
vocation systems
5 12% 9 21% 9 21% 20 47% 43
Manufacturing systems in the
textile, leather and clothing
12 16% 37 50% 7 9% 18 24% 74
Other manufacturing systems
made in Italy
5 13% 18 45% 5 13% 12 30% 40
Heavy manufacturing systems 7 14% 11 22% 10 20% 21 43% 49
TOTAL 36 13% 105 37% 38 13% 103 37% 282
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4.4.4 Efficiency explanatory variables: Tobit regression
To summarize the evidence of the Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 and in com-
pliance with some of the existing literature (e.g. in Athanassopoulos and
Triantis, 1998; Boetti et al., 2012; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Worthing-
ton, 2000), a Tobit regression is implemented to explain the global effi-
ciency scores. In the literature, the consistency and the validity of the
commonly used Tobit and OLS regression models have been put under
scrutiny. To address these issues, additional techniques have been pro-
posed, as for example sensitivity analysis and bootstrap procedures (see
e.g. Da Cruz and Marques (2014); Lo Storto (2016)): the last mentioned
is the one considered in this analysis. It’s worth pointing out that also
other estimation models such as the Maximum Likelihood Estimation-
MLE (see e.g. Poveda, 2012) and the Generalised Method of Moment-
GMM estimation (see e.g. Poveda, 2014) have been recently used to de-
tect the effect of environmental variables on the efficiency scores. Over-
all, in this context the main interest is to get in a synthetic way what are
the underlying causes of the estimated efficiency gaps and the potential
determinants of municipal inefficiency, summarizing the main outcomes
of the analysis so far proposed.
The explanatory variables are chosen considering the existing liter-
ature and refer to three types of variables related to: i) the economic
and financial aspects ii) the municipal characteristics and iii) the poli-
tics components. The two variables, “autonomy” and “revenues” belong
to the first type. As in Boetti et al. (2012), the variable “autonomy” mea-
sures the degree of accountability of local governments with respect to
citizens, here defined as the ratio of local taxes to the total expenditure.
The variable “revenues”, given by the ratio of total revenues and total
resident population, is a proxy of soft budget constraints (Reingewertz,
2012): governments with less revenues are assumed to be more careful
to control their expenditure (see also Kornai et al., 2003; Sˇt’astna´ and
Gregor, 2015). The municipal characteristics refer to geo-demographic
and touristic aspects that could explain efficiency scores. Demograph-
ical aspects are measured through dummy variables (e.g. Boetti et al.,
2012; Doumpos and Cohen, 2014; Sˇt’astna´ and Gregor, 2015): “Dim1”
for municipalities from 0 to 5.000 inhabitants, “Dim2” for municipalities
from 5.000 to 10.000 inhabitants, “Dim3” for municipalities from 10.000
to 20.000 inhabitants, “Dim4” for municipalities from 20.000 to 60.000
inhabitants and “Dim5” for municipalities over 60.000 inhabitants. Re-
garding geo-demographic aspects, as in Athanassopoulos and Triantis
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(1998); Doumpos and Cohen (2014); Geys et al. (2010); Kalb et al. (2012);
Lo Storto (2016), the “density” of the municipality and the variable “moun-
tain”, equal to 1 for mountain municipalities according to the Italian leg-
islation, are considered. According to Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013); Benito
et al. (2010); Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2013); Da Cruz and Marques
(2014); De Sousa and Stosˇic´ (2005), the importance of tourism is taken
into account through the variable “tourism”, defined as the ratio be-
tween the average annual tourist presence and the total population. The
variable “second mandate” is finally introduced to take into account the
potential influence of political factors on efficiency scores. Data are col-
lected from the municipal balance sheets, the statistical databases DEMO
ISTAT and ISTAT, Tuscany Region survey and ANCI TOSCANA and
they all refer to 2011.
The Tobit regression is run for both the bias-corrected4 global effi-
ciency scores, the DEA-like and the average one, considered as the de-
pendent variable, and implemented by the software “Stata”. Table 4.8
contains the Tobit results for both the bias-corrected global efficiency
scores: if an explanatory variable has a positive sign, it positively affects
the efficiency and if it has a negative sign, the opposite holds.
The results are very similar for both the model specifications, statisti-
cally significant and in line with the literature’s main findings. The eco-
nomic and financial variables have the expected sign. In fact, the degree
of accountability measured by the variable “autonomy” positively affects
the efficiency score, while the budget constraints measured by the vari-
able “revenues” have a negative impact on it. The effect of the municipal
characteristics on the efficiency scores confirms the descriptive analysis
of the two previous sections. As can be seen from the coefficients of the
dimensional dummy variables, when municipal size increases, the effi-
ciency score increases as well. So, consistently with the in-depth anal-
ysis stemming from both the efficiency composite indicators adoption,
the larger the municipalities the more efficient the expenditure manage-
ment. Additionally, the results of Wald tests show that the hypothesis of
4The bias-corrected efficiency scores are computed using 1000 replicates in the first
stage. Some of the current literature suggests further bias-corrections to get more robust
results (see e.g. Vidoli and Mazziotta, 2013). For the present analysis, several Robust CIs
have been computed: as they have a strong correlation with the CI obtained with the bias-
corrected efficiency scores, the CI adopted in the analysis is considered sufficiently robust.
The computations have been performed by using the statistical software R (Team, 2015), in
particular the packages “Benchmarking” (Bogetoft and Otto, 2010) and “Compind” (Vidoli
et al., 2015). Results are available upon request. The authors are grateful to an anonymous
referee for suggesting these additional robustness checks.
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Table 4.8: Tobit results.
VARIABLE DEA-like Average
AUTONOMY 0.12425*** 0.12842***
REVENUES -0.00006*** -0.00005***
DIM2 0.06775*** 0.04688***
DIM3 0.13973*** 0.10775***
DIM4 0.11424*** 0.09983***
DIM5 0.17529*** 0.12472***
DENSITY 0.00004 0.00002
MOUNTAIN -0.05683*** -0.04220***
TOURISM -0.35370*** -0.31774***
SECOND MANDATE 0.02884* 0.02066*
CONSTANT 0.54073*** 0.35756***
* 5% significance, ** 1% significance, *** 0.1% significance
no differences between Dim2, Dim3, Dim4 and Dim5 is strongly rejected.
The variable “density” shows a positive, though not statistically signif-
icant, impact on the efficiency index (as in the majority of the studies).
The negative impact of the variable “mountain” could be linked to the
demographical aspects, as the mountain municipalities tend to be of a
smaller size. Furthermore, the coefficient of the variable “tourism” con-
firms what shown in the descriptive analysis of the previous sections:
municipalities with high level of tourism tend to be less efficient. Finally,
the political variable “second mandate” has a positive coefficient: the in-
cumbent politicians, in an effort to signal their competence to the voters
so as to increase their chances to be reelected, tend to enlarge spending
(inefficiently) when they are close to new elections (Rogoff and Sibert,
1988). Administrations at the second mandate don’t have the possibil-
ity to be elected again and therefore the positive effect on the spending
efficiency is in line with the economic theory (see also Boetti et al., 2012).
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, the efficiency of Tuscan municipal expenditure is under
scrutiny by means of Data Envelopment Analysis. The data on munic-
ipal expenditure are taken from the available municipal balance sheets
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and the following functions are considered, given their importance on
the total current expenditure: “General administration”, “Educational
services”, “Social services”, “Road maintenance and local mobility” and
“Local police”.
For the function by function analysis, a separate DEA model is run for
each “fundamental” municipal area. For the overall analysis, addressing
some methodological issues to compute the global efficiency score, the
use of a DEA-like composite indicator is introduced, for the first time
in this strand of literature. Moreover, a further composite indicator is
proposed following another approach, strictly related to the municipal
expenditure compositions. In this latter case, the efficiency score of each
function enters in the global indicator with the same proportion that the
given function has with respect to total expenditure. Although the two
composite indicators are derived following two very different appro-
aches, the conclusions are basically the same. The first approach is closer
to the principle of DEA; the second one is more operative and it could
suggest some normative indication to the policy-makers in terms of the
expenditure distribution. In this light, the composite indicator obtained
by the municipal weight is also compared with the indicator obtained by
the Tuscan mean weight; there are possible suggestions as room for im-
provement for the inefficient municipalities: in some cases, just a change
in the composition of the expenditure could bring an increase of the com-
posite indicator efficiency score.
The results obtained through a DEA analysis and validated by the
Tobit regression appear consistent and could be a starting point for the
reallocation of the inefficient municipalities’ expenditure. In particular,
some evidence about the long debated issue of the municipal size comes
out. In fact, according to this analysis, the municipal size really affects the
efficiency of public expenditure: the bigger is a municipality, the greater
is its level of public spending efficiency, so that the regional measures to
reduce the present fragmentation of the Tuscan territory seem to be in
line with this evidence.
The performed analysis offers further insights from both a method-
ological point of view and an empirical one. Some of them are driven by
the limitations of the analysis itself. It is well-know that a complete effi-
ciency evaluation of local government activities should also include the
quality of the services and citizens’ satisfaction. As the present chapter
considers only quantitative data, a further stream of research could be the
definition of suitable variables embedding both these qualitative aspects.
Moreover, the way of combining qualitative and quantitative elements is
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still an open issue that should be investigated. The aggregation of these
kinds of different data might suggest the necessity of the construction of
other new composite indicators. With this regard, there exists a grow-
ing interest in the current scientific debate on the definition and the use
of new composite indicators. Furthermore, the present study considers
data referred just to one year. However, monitoring the changes on how
public resources are spent over a larger period of time can represent a
key point in the municipal spending efficiency analysis. For this reason,
longitudinal data could be used to perform an intertemporal efficiency
analysis by means of DEA window approaches.
In this chapter, we question whether the public expenditure is allo-
cated properly across the local functions and accordingly whether it is
managed in an efficient way. However, in the public spending analysis,
also exploring how successfully resources are used in reaching the set
goals is of primary concern: Chapter 5 investigates the resource effec-
tiveness in a specific public area, the education sector.
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Chapter 5
School Infrastructure
Spending and Educational
Outcomes in Northern Italy
5.1 Introduction
The goal of the policy-makers is both “doing things right”, but also “do-
ing right things”. Chapter 4 has addressed the first objective, while the
present chapter considers the second one, namely the evaluation of re-
source management in terms of effectiveness. In particular, public spend-
ing in the education sector is under analysis, as it represents one of the
most important expenditure items in public spending, despite the fact
that its effect on students’ achievement is still under discussion.
Whether or not school spending has an impact on student outcomes is
a highly debated issue in economics (Card and Krueger, 1996). The con-
temporary literature has been pioneered by Coleman (1966) in a promi-
nent report published by the US Government in 1966, whose main con-
clusion is that school funding does not play a central role in determining
students’ achievement. A wealth of studies follow in the footsteps of
Coleman (1966) and explore the relation between resources and educa-
tional outcomes (see e.g., Jackson et al., 2016; Neilson and Zimmerman,
2014). Overall, there is a lack of agreement on the impact of funding
on students’ performance. Whereas in a meta-analysis Greenwald et al.
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(1996, p.384) conclude that “school resources are systematically related to
student achievement and that these relations are large enough to be ed-
ucationally important,” many subsequent studies find little or no effect
(see e.g., Card and Krueger, 1996; Hanushek, 1996).
This disagreement is perhaps not very surprising as most of these
studies face severe difficulties in attempting to unravel a causal relation-
ship between school spending and educational outcome. Counterfactual
outcomes are sensitive to the choice of the estimator and the identifica-
tion strategy to address the endogeneity of school resources. Although
previous studies have made a good deal of progress in dealing with the
joint determination of educational inputs and outputs, modest estimated
effects of school spending could be a consequence of unresolved endo-
geneity biases (see Jackson et al., 2016). At the same time, studies often
explore very heterogeneous inputs of the educational production pro-
cess. Jones and Zimmer (2001) note that most of the literature focuses on
school-specific inputs, school organization inputs (e.g., class size), envi-
ronmental characteristics and socioeconomic (family) characteristics, but
neglects capital inputs such as school infrastructure. In fact, there are
only a handful of studies on the school infrastructure-students’ learn-
ing relationship and they focus predominantly on the US School Sys-
tem. Aaronson and Mazumder (2011) investigate the impact of the so-
called “Rosenwald initiative” in the US between 1914 and 1931 and find
that substantial improvements to school quality and access in relatively
deprived environments are followed by large productivity gains. Neil-
son and Zimmerman (2014) find strong evidence that school construc-
tion programs led, among other outcomes, to sustained gains in read-
ing scores for elementary and middle school students. Yet, Cellini et al.
(2010) and Martorell et al. (2016), who focus more specifically on school
facility investments, find little evidence that spending on facilities gener-
ates improvements in student achievement.
Against this background, we explore whether spending on physi-
cal infrastructure affects student outcomes by focusing on test scores
in mathematics and Italian language using data on Italian state high
schools. The issue of school capital funding features prominently in the
public debate, and in many countries the lack of investment remains a
pressing priority for state schools, where many school principals believe
that schools are not “fit for purpose” (Guardian, 27/01/2015).1 In Italy,
1To give an example, in 2017, the Australian government will bring forward $200 mil-
lion in capital investment to fast track state school infrastructure throughout Queens-
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school principals have long lamented that poorly maintained school fa-
cilities and a lack of funding to conduct essential repairs prevent schools
from delivering effective schooling (Corriere della Sera, 18/07/2017).
This is in line with theoretical arguments put forward by educational re-
searchers, social psychologists and sociologists on the importance of the
physical environment of schools and the condition of their facilities in ex-
plaining variation in students’ learning across schools (Bako´-Biro´ et al.,
2012; Earthman, 2002; Haverinen-Shaughnessy et al., 2015; Mendell and
Heath, 2004). Specifically, this literature has stressed the role of social
norms, conformity and social signalling in the school environment (Bran-
ham, 2004): the so-called “broken windows theory” (Wilson and Kelling,
1982) relies on the premise that the school environment “communicates”
to students and that “good signals” correlate with a more efficient learn-
ing process. The main idea is that a well maintained school environment
helps to create an atmosphere of order and comfortable place to study.
Lawrence (2003) reviews a number of studies exploring how the con-
dition of the school facility affects the health and morale of staff. This
interpretation may help to clarify the apparently conflicting results seen
in the literature so far and identifies a potential pathway to explain the
direction of educational outcome’s change in response to infrastructure
spending. An adequate school environment is perceived as the foun-
dation for building the future: “the school building should be telling a
country’s potential” and safety and infrastructure quality should be the
basis of a good school” (Repubblica, 16/10/2017). On the one hand, a
safe and clean school environment provides important signals to stu-
dents that the school is well managed, that teachers enforce discipline
in the classroom, and that e.g., bully behaviour is not tolerated. On the
other hand, unhealthy and unsafe buildings, with e.g., broken windows,
graffiti, nonfunctioning toilets, poor lighting, inoperative heating and
cooling systems, leaking roofs, signal a lack of attention and respect for
the students, who either put less efforts or distract colleagues and disrupt
the learning environment, as they perceive lower costs and risks of de-
tection. Students in well-maintained schools are therefore more likely to
focus on academic challenges than those who are distracted or depressed
land (https://goo.gl/GGe1Pf). In 2015-16, the UK Department for Education spent
GBP 4.5 billion in capital funding, and the National Audit Office has predicted that it
will take a further GBP 6.7 billion investment to bring all schools up to scratch (https:
//goo.gl/SQzHDE). In Germany, Martin Schulz, leader of the Social Democrats, vowed
to pour billions into crumbling schools infrastructure in campaigning for 2017 September’s
election (see FT, 17/07/2017).
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by the poorly maintained facilitates, avoiding chronic distractions and
missed school days. In addition, low-quality facilities undermine effort
among students and especially among the low-achieving ones. By the
same token, physical conditions also affect teachers’ feelings of effective-
ness and sense of personal safety in the classrooms. Moreover, badly
maintained buildings might not have the infrastructure to support the
latest technology or could lack modernized labs for science education
(Martorell et al., 2016). Finally, to be sure that there are no other con-
founding mechanisms, we specify what the extra-funding has been used
for: we gathered this information available upon request to the reference
province or to any authority in charge of the reparation implementation.
In our sample, interventions to the schoolhouses have been not invasive
and funds have been mostly used for the painting of scratched wall, the
lightening of a gym and the fixing of the heating system for example:
money has been used to support the school infrastructure and not to buy
PCs or other technological devices.
To handle the endogeneity of idiosyncratic changes in school fund-
ing, we use two strategies. First, we employ a quasi-experimental design
and make use of information on the extra funding that a specific group of
schools received in the aftermath of the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake.
In May 2012, the seismic events in Northern Italy caused considerable
damage to state buildings and prompted specific interventions for the
mitigation of the seismic risk. As a result, a large number of undam-
aged schools, but close enough to the areas affected by the earthquake,
received large extra funds to modernize and improve the quality of their
buildings as well as to mitigate their vulnerability to earthquakes. We
compute the differential effect of receiving extra funds on the treatment
group, i.e., undamaged schools outside the earthquake area, that were
awarded special funding, versus a control group of schools in neigh-
bouring municipalities. The schools in the control group are in areas
sufficiently far from the earthquake epicenter and at low risk of future
seismic activities; therefore these schools are both undamaged as well as
unfunded. This strategy allows us to estimate whether being a recipi-
ent of funding increases students’ achievement. Second, to evaluate the
elasticity of test scores with respect to funding, we implement an instru-
mental variables (IV) identification strategy. In particular, we use seismic
hazard maps and exploit exogenous values of peak ground acceleration
(henceforth PGA), which explains much of the variation in the amount
of funds received. Taken together, our results suggest that improving
the quality of school buildings has a positive effect on students’ achieve-
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ments. Moreover, we find that low-achieving students benefit the most
from improved physical infrastructure.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. We give a sketch of the
Italian school system in Section 5.2 and we describe the quake-related
events and the policies implemented afterwards in Section 5.3, so to put
into context our empirical analysis. Section 5.4 describes the data, while
we lay out our identification strategy in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 provides
a discussion of our main results. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.7.
5.2 The Italian school system framework
The work presented in this chapter aims at detecting the effect of school
infrastructure spending on educational achievement. To give an overview
of the institutional setting our analysis is built on, in this section we de-
scribe the schooling context in Italy, with a particular focus on school
funding and student outcome evaluation aspects.
Italian schooling is compulsory from ages 6 to 16. Grades are grouped
into three stages: primary school covers the first five grades; lower sec-
ondary school gathers grades from sixth to eight; high school runs from
the ninth to the thirteenth grade. The last two grades are not compulsory,
but the withdrawal rate is quite small.2
The Italian school system is predominantly public and its funding is
mainly managed by the Ministry of Education. Schools’ funding varies
across the three stages, but generally not within them. Schools are by
far mostly funded by public funds. The main source, according to which
funds are split across schools, is the “Fondo per il funzionamento del sistema
scolastico”. The criteria that regulate its allocation are basically two, as
stated in the ministerial decree # 21/2007:
(i) A fixed component that takes into account the school type. Lower
grades (primary and lower secondary) schools receive less funds
than high schools. Specifically, the first group of schools receives
an amount equal to e1.100; the second one e2.000.
(ii) A component that varies according to the number of enrolled stu-
dents. However, the amount of euros that each school receives per
student varies according to its type too: primary and lower sec-
ondary school receive 8 euros per student; as concerns the high
2Source: ISTAT http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/17290.
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schools, the state contribution per student ranges from 12 euros for
the licei to 48 euros for technical high schools.
Other transfers from the state to the school are made to cover schools’
additional costs such as short term teacher vacancies or to buy goods
and services to be used to assist students with disabilities. Teachers are
mainly paid by the state according to their seniority. No regard is made
on their qualifications, performance or conduct. The projects that could
be awarded either at the state-level or at the European Union (EU)-level
are the last source of funding. The likelihood of winning the project is
however uncertain, so their distribution across the Italian schools is quite
rare. Therefore, the basic structure of the Italian system is one in which
schools are funded through public money and such funds are mainly
managed by the Ministry of Education.
Figure 5.2 shows the financial flow diagram as depicted by the Eu-
ropean Commission (2014), to give an overview of the transfer of public
resources awarded in cash or in kind to schools. 3 Specifically, as con-
cerns capital goods, transfers in cash are gathered from the ministry of
education, of economy and of interior and allocated across the regions,
which in turn give them to the provincial councils. The same procedure
applies for the kind of funds assigned after the earthquake we deal with
in our analysis, as we further explain in the next section.
From the discussion made above, it clearly follows that there are no
measures that possibly relate to students’ achievements among the cri-
teria used to allocate funds across schools. Moreover, up to few years
ago the only index considered meaningful to signal the school “quality”
was its size, that is the number of students enrolled in the school. Only
since 2008 this proxy has been complemented by an assessment of Ital-
ian students’ skills and achievement carried out by an independent pub-
lic agency, namely the National Institute for the Educational Evaluation
of Instruction and Training (known by the Italian acronym INVALSI).
Specifically, from the school year 2010/11, at the end of each year IN-
VALSI administers a standardized test of Mathematics and Italian lan-
guage skills to students in second, fifth, eight and tenth grade according
to the following schedule: on May 3 the second and the fifth graders
take the Italian language test; then the same students take the Mathe-
3In Italy, regions and provincial councils are mainly in charge of allocating school funds
at high school level. Instead, municipalities are mainly in charge at primary and lower sec-
ondary school level, together with kindergarten. For a more in-depth discussion, European
Commission (2014).
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Figure 5.1: Financial flow diagram for the general upper secondary schools
Source: European Commission (2014)
matics test. Eighth graders take the two tests on the same day, on June
15, whereas the tenth graders take both them the 9th of May. The great
advantage of such procedure is that those tests are administered at the
same time to all students of the same grade and, above all, they are stan-
dardized, so eligible to make comparison across students from different
classes and schools.
Despite the fact that the INVALSI test results are publicly presented
once a year (at the end of the school year), highly debated by the national
broadcasters and generally discussed in each school in September (at the
beginning of the new school year), they have no impact whatsoever on
students’ life. In fact, they do not contribute to the final mark assigned
to students4 and, most importantly, they do not affect the way public
resources are allocated across schools: accordingly, school funding im-
4The only exception is represented by the test administrated during the national exam
students take to transit from the middle school to the high school (eight grade students).
However, its contribution amounts only to 2% of the final mark.
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plications are totally absent.
5.3 The Northern Italy earthquake overview
To investigate the effect of school capital spending on student outcome,
we use information on the extra funding that a group of schools received
after a natural disaster, namely the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake. In
the following, we give a brief sketch of the seismic-related events and
the post-quake interventions so to put into context the two intertwined
empirical strategies proposed for our causal estimation as described in
Section 5.5.
5.3.1 The May 2012 earthquake
On May 20, 2012, an earthquake of magnitude 5.9 ML hit a wide portion
of the Po Valley in the Northern part of Italy. The epicenter was located
near the town of Finale Emilia (MO), about 30 km west of the city of
Ferrara, and the earthquake involved exclusively an area of about 3.5
thousand square kilometers across the three regions of Emilia Romagna,
Veneto and Lombardy. The provinces affected by the earthquake were
those of Ferrara, Modena, Mantua, Bologna, Reggio Emilia, and Rovigo,
as officially stated in the law # 122/2012.
Figure 5.3.1 shows the epicentral area affected by the seism. Mod-
ena, Bologna, and Ferrara were the most affected provinces. In the first
province nearly thousand square kilometers were damaged by the earth-
quake (about 36% of its territory). In the province of Bologna the area
involved was 930 square kilometers (the 25% of the total). Finally, 31%
of the province of Ferrara reported damages, in a territory of 818 square
kilometers. The other three provinces were marginally impacted, with a
total hit territory amounting to a thousand square kilometers.
5.3.2 The damage evaluation
After the series of seismic events, a macroseismic survey has been per-
formed by the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (known
by the Italian acronym INGV) with the aim of assessing the amount of
physical damages in the area. The survey assigns an intensity value pro-
portional to the percentage of the damaged buildings in each locality—
considered jointly with their proper vulnerability and damage level. For
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TECTONIC SUMMARY
The May 20, 2012 M6.0 earthquake in northern Italy occurred as a result of shallow thrust faulting. At this location, the geology is dominated by compressional tectonics forming thrust-belt type
structures like the Apennine Mountains that dominate the Italian peninsula.
The broader Mediterranean region is seismically active due to the northward convergence (4-10 mm/yr) of the African plate with respect to the Eurasian plate along a complex plate boundary.
This convergence began approximately 50 Ma and was associated with the closure of the Tethys Sea. The modern day remnant of the Tethys Sea is the Mediterranean Sea. The highest rates of
seismicity in the Mediterranean region are found along the Hellenic subduction zone of southern Greece, along the North Anatolian Fault Zone of western Turkey and the Calabrian subduction
zone of southern Italy. Local high rates of convergence at the Hellenic subduction zone (35mm/yr) are associated with back-arc spreading throughout Greece and western Turkey above the
subducting Mediterranean oceanic crust. Crustal normal faulting throughout this region is a manifestation of extensional tectonics associated with the back-arc spreading. The region of the
Marmara Sea is a transition zone between this extensional regime, to the west, and the strike-slip regime of the North Anatolian Fault Zone, to the east. The North Anatolian Fault accommodates
much of the right-lateral horizontal motion (23-24 mm/yr) between the Anatolian micro-plate and Eurasian plate as the Anatolian micro-plate is being pushed westward to further accommodate
closure of the Mediterranean basin caused by the collision of the African and Arabian plates in southeastern Turkey. Subduction of the Mediterranean Sea floor beneath the Tyrrhenian Sea at the
Calabrian subduction zone causes a significant zone of seismicity around Sicily and southern Italy. Active volcanoes are located above intermediate depth earthquakes in the Cyclades of the
Aegean Sea and in southern Italy.
In the Mediterranean region there is a written record, several centuries long, documenting pre-instrumental seismicity (pre-20th century). Earthquakes have historically caused widespread damage
across central and southern Greece, Cyprus, Sicily, Crete, the Nile Delta, Northern Libya, the Atlas Mountains of North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. The 1903 M8.2 Kythera earthquake and
the 1926 M7.8 Rhodes earthquakes are the largest instrumentally recorded Mediterranean earthquakes, both of which are associated with subduction zone tectonics. Between 1939 and 1999 a
series of devastating M7+ strike-slip earthquakes propagated westward along the North Anatolian Fault Zone, beginning with the 1939 M7.8 Erzincan earthquake on the eastern end of the North
Anatolian Fault system. The 1999 M7.6 Izmit earthquake, located on the westward end of the fault, struck one of Turkey's most densely populated and industrialized urban areas killing, more
than 17,000 people. Although seismicity rates are comparatively low along the northern margin of the African continent, large destructive earthquakes have been recorded and reported from
Morocco in the western Mediterranean, to the Dead Sea in the eastern Mediterranean. The 1980 M7.3 El Asnam earthquake was one of Africa's largest and most destructive earthquakes within
the 20th century.
Large earthquakes throughout the Mediterranean region have also been known to produce significant and damaging tsunamis. One of the more prominent historical earthquakes within the region
is the Lisbon earthquake of November 1, 1755, whose magnitude has been estimated from non-instrumental data to be about 8.0. The 1755 Lisbon earthquake is thought to have occurred within
or near the Azores-Gibraltar transform fault, which defines the boundary between the African and Eurasian plates off the west coast of Morocco and Portugal. The earthquake is notable for both a
large death toll of approximately 60,000 people and for generating a tsunami that swept up the Portuguese coast inundating coastal villages and Lisbon. An earthquake of approximately M8.0
near Sicily in 1693 generated a large tsunami wave that destroyed numerous towns along Sicily's east coast. The M7.2 December 28, 1908 Messina earthquake is the deadliest documented
European earthquake. The combination of severe ground shaking and a local tsunami caused an estimated 60,000 to 120,000 fatalities.Seismic hazard is expressed as peak
ground acceleration (PGA) on firm
rock, in meters/sec², expected to be
exceeded in a 50-yr period with a
probability of 10 percent.
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Significant Earthquakes Mag >= 5.5
Year Mon Day  Time    Lat     Long   Dep  Mag
1915  01  13  0652  42.000   13.500    0  6.9
1969  10  26  1536  44.807   17.353   15  5.6
1969  10  27  0810  44.837   17.234   15  6.1
1976  05  06  2000  46.385   13.266 20.9  6.5
1976  09  11  1631  46.337   13.181  4.2  5.5
1976  09  15  0315  46.314   13.206  0.9  6.0
1976  09  15  0921  46.351   13.086  9.3  5.9
1979  09  19  2135  42.773   13.010   15  5.9
1984  05  07  1749  41.737   13.891 21.5  5.9
1997  09  26  0940  43.078   12.790    6  6.0
1997  10  14  1523  42.931   12.876 13.8  5.6
2002  10  31  1032  41.789   14.872   10  5.9
2003  03  29  1742  43.109   15.464   10  5.5
2009  04  06  0132  42.334   13.334    8  6.3
2009  04  07  1747  42.275   13.464   15  5.5
2012  05  20  0204  44.8     11.192  5.1  6.0
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Figure 5.2: Epicentral area affected by the seismic events
Source: USGS Earthquake Hazards Program
instance, a locality is cla ifie wi VIII grade when m ny buildings
with hig vul erability l vel (class A) show ver ea y d mage (D4)
and few o the sam buildings (class A) ar completely collaps . Tech-
nically, the m thod is b sed o h EMS-98 int nsity d finition: it classi-
fies the buildin s in o 6 cla s s of ecreasi g vulne abil ty, from A to F
(Figure 5.3.2a); th n it defi es the dama dis ribution depending on the
intensity level. The damage levels are 5 (from D1 to D5) and are based on
the structural and non-structural features of the buildings (Figure 5.3.2b).
The level D0 means the lack of any damage.
5.3.3 Perception of the risk, reconstruction and funding
The region was not considered a highly exposed seismic zone until 2012.
With the exception of the seismic sequence of Ferrara in 1570, Argenta
in 1624 and Bologna in 1929 (Vannoli et al., 2015), few other small inten-
sity earthquakes have had an impact on the collective memory of their
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Figure 5.3: Buildings vulnerability and damage level.
Source: Gru¨nthal (1998, pp.14–15)
inhabitants. As a result, the perception of a seismic risk was really small
in this area compared with the rest of Italy. In fact, PGA values in this
area are, on average, only 20% of those characterizing the nearby Apen-
nine mountain chain. 5 Moreover, the INGV estimated the zone’s seismic
hazard to be about 0.05 and 0.15 in terms of maximum horizontal ground
acceleration rate, up to five times smaller than the one estimated in the
Appenini zone in the rest of the Italian peninsula.6 Accordingly, in this
area housing construction was not subject to any specific anti-seismic
measure compared with the rest of the country.
In the aftermath of the earthquake the perception of the risk dramat-
ically changed and money has been sent to finance the reconstruction as
well as to secure the whole area. The intervention was implemented in
two stages. A first phase concerned the urgent operations required to
provide first aid, to refurbish buildings and equipments, especially those
5See http://zonesismiche.mi.ingv.it/
6Source: INGV http://www.mi.ingv.it/pericolosita-sismica.
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related to water, electric and drainage system . It was implemented in
the very next days that followed the end of the seismic sequence. A sec-
ond phase aimed at financing a number of projects that were precisely
targeted to secure and refurbish buildings in accordance with the new
seismic risk. On the whole, 11 million euros have been disposed in the
province of Mantua, 122 millions in the provinces of Bologna, Ferrara,
Modena, and Reggio Emilia, and 8.8 in the province of Rovigo. Money
has been sent not only to finance the reconstruction, but also to secure
the whole area and to reinforce the anti-seismic system of the buildings,
sometimes also getting the chance to make a better sustainability of the
energy consumption so to ameliorate the building system, while increas-
ing the seismic safety and the urban quality.
5.3.4 Government actions after the earthquake
After the seismic events in May and June 2012, the Italian government
managed the emergency entrusting this task to the Italian Civil Protec-
tion and issued several actions for the reconstruction. The law # 122/2012
contains the main measures enacted to regulate the procedures for the in-
tervention during the emergency and reconstruction phases. First of all, a
dedicated “fund for the reconstruction of the earthquake-affected areas”
was established. The governors of the affected regions were appointed to
coordinate the reconstruction activities of their respective administrative
competencies. Moreover, the guidelines for the reconstruction measures
were listed, detailed as follows.
i) The legal aims of the reconstruction: the term “reconstruction” does
not refer only to the actions devoted to repair and restore the build-
ings affected by the earthquake, but also to increase the seismic
safety and the urban quality.
ii) The objects of the reconstruction: all the private and public build-
ings, infrastructure and productive building units that suffered dam-
age due to the earthquake in a number of municipalities defined by
law as epicentral area.
iii) The public authority responsible for the implementation of the re-
construction operations: the regional governors and the deputy
commissioners for the reconstruction, in agreement with other ad-
ministrative entities such as the provinces and the municipalities.
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iv) The eligible interventions that could have been financed: the works
necessary to repair the damage caused by the seismic events and to
allow the full restoration of the building functionality; the inter-
ventions for energy efficiency enabling the reduction of losses and
the use of renewable energy sources; the restoring interventions of
existing facilities or the complete renovation if the repair is too ex-
pensive.
v) The administrative procedure to get the funding.
Among the several laws enacted by the government, we can keep
track of the distinction between the funds assigned just to secure safety
or reinforce the anti-seismic measures of the buildings and the funds de-
voted to reconstruction and rebuilding: this specification is available for
the schoolhouses as well and this is how we get the information con-
cerning the extra funding the schools received in the aftermath of the
earthquake.
5.4 Data sources and summary statistics
For our analysis we consider several sources of data at school, municipal,
provincial and regional level. Table 5.1 contains summary statistics of the
main variables as described in the remaining part of this section.
5.4.1 Educational achievement and school data
As introduced in Section 5.2, the National Institute for Educational Eval-
uation of Instruction and Training (INVALSI) is in charge of the Italian
students’ skills and achievements evaluation7. We collect test scores for
both Mathematics and Italian language of tenth graders and we track the
same schools over six years, from 2010/11 to 2015/16, that is two years
before and four years after the earthquake. The test scores range between
a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 100 reached when all the answers
are correct. As the test scores are provided at student level, we aggregate
them so to construct several variables at state high school level, for both
7We refer to Angrist et al. (2014) and Battistin and Meroni (2016) for a thorough descrip-
tion of the test and a more comprehensive overview. Battistin and Meroni (2016) also offer
a novel study on instruction time and students’ performance in Italy, using the same kind
of data.
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mathematics and Italian test scores. The variable “Score (mean)” mea-
sures the average result of the tenth graders for each school. Then we
measure the average test scores of the low-achieving students by con-
sidering the fraction of students in the 5th and 10th percentile of the
score distribution, so that we have respectively “Score (p5)” and “Score
(p10)”. In a similar way, we measure the average test scores of the high-
achieving students by considering the fraction of students in the 90th
and 95th percentile of the score distribution, so that we have respectively
“Score (p90)” and “Score (p95)”.
We obtain INVALSI data also on the share of male and native students
and on the cohort size referring to the tenth grade of each state high
school.
5.4.2 Earthquake damage assessment and seismic hazard
We use the INGV macroseismic survey which provides estimations of
the volume of buildings with a certain level of damage in a given munic-
ipality. It matches information from the macroseismic intensity values
and the level of vulnerability of the buildings in the municipality, that
varies across six classes of vulnerability in relation to the structural char-
acteristics of the buildings. The INGV macroseismic survey is based on a
sub-municipal territorial classification provided by the “Italian Revenue
Agency” and kindly shared with us by Meroni et al. (2017): for more
details we refer to Galli et al. (2012).
We also collect the data for the variable “Seismic hazard (PGA)” from
the following INGV official website http://esse1-gis.mi.ingv.it/s1 en.php.
The seismic hazard is the earthquake occurrence probability within a
given window of time and in a given geographic area. Several aspects
are taken into account in the hazard assessment: source and patterns of
earthquake occurrence, soil types and groundwater conditions. The haz-
ard estimation leads to a risk assessment that affects the land use plan-
ning and the building and infrastructure projects. Specifically, we fo-
cus on the horizontal peak ground acceleration (PGA), as it is one of the
shaking parameters displayed in the probabilistic seismic hazard maps
of the Italian national territory for which disaggregate values are avail-
able (municipal level). It is commonly used as an index for seismic haz-
ard intensity, i.e. the higher the PGA the larger will be the intensity of
possible earthquake in a specific geographic area: accordingly, the higher
the PGA, the higher will be the probability to suffer damage on physical
infrastructure and buildings. The unit of measure is the gravity accelera-
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tion and it refers to the maximum ground acceleration during the earth-
quakes. For each PGA evaluation the distribution of the 50th percentile
is available, for nine different probabilities of exceedance in 50 years (we
consider the 10% probability). In our sample, the PGA varies between
0.087 and 0.207, with an average intensity of 0.155.
5.4.3 School funding data
The presidents of the quake-affected regions were appointed as deputy
commissioners to promote interventions to reconstruct and to secure the
affected areas. Accordingly, several legislative acts were enacted provid-
ing the guidelines of such interventions and, among others, also those
ones related to the school funding. As explained in Section 5.3, the funds
were intended for reconstruction, securing the whole area and reinforc-
ing the anti-seismic system of the buildings, accompanied by an increase
of the seismic safety and urban quality in terms of energy consumption
sustainability. Both public and private buildings belonging to the munic-
ipalities defined by law as the epicentral area were eligible for extra fund-
ing. The Italian government made available more than 24.4 millions of
euros to several state buildings in 236 municipalities, including 276 state
high schools, with the aim of reconstructing damaged buildings, renew-
ing and maintaining all school buildings safe from future seismic threats.
From the legislative acts we get the information on the funding received
by the state high schools located in the quake-affected areas. These docu-
ments report the name of the school, the imputed total amount of money,
a short description of the required intervention, the municipality where
they belong to and the body responsible for the implementation of the
measures, among others. We collect information on 68 state high schools
which reported no damage but they were in municipalities that received
about 3.6 million of euros to improve the quality of the school buildings.
Summary statistics show that these schools received on average 198 eu-
ros per student, about 100% of the annual amount in capita expenditure
spent in 2013 in Italy (OECD, 2016).8 This group of schools has been
complemented by 105 additional ones, as belonging to adjacent munic-
ipalities that had neither been hit by the earthquake nor received extra-
8According to the OECD report, the average total spending per student in Italy in 2013
was 9,174 euros; but only 2% (i.e., 184 euros) was devoted to school capital. This amount
is very small if one compares it with that funding transferred to schools in other European
countries of the same size: capital expenditure in Germany, for example, was about 1,300
euros, and about 1,200 euros in France.
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funding according to the enacted measures. To sum up, our sample has
173 state high school and it covers 43 municipalities: for further explana-
tions on these two groups of schools, we refer to the next section. Addi-
tionally, we geolocate each school of our sample in sub-municipal areas
through a map navigation as provided by the “Italian Revenue Agency”,
so to be able to match this information with the macroseismic survey one.
Furthermore, we can keep track of the way funds have been em-
ployed in the reconstruction carried out in each school: this informa-
tion is publicly available upon request to the responsible province and it
is useful to detect whether or not the interventions in the schoolhouses
were invasive.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max count
Panel A – Treatment and IV
Spending dummy 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 173
Funds per capita (× 10)a 7.79 20.58 0.00 161.29 173
Funds per capita (× 10)b 19.82 29.07 1.45 161.29 68
Seismic hazard (PGA) 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.21 173
Panel B – Mathematics
Score (mean) 3.80 0.33 2.79 4.46 692
Score (p5) 3.09 0.62 0.00 4.30 692
Score (p10) 3.28 0.50 0.00 4.32 692
Score (p90) 4.15 0.28 3.11 4.59 692
Score (p95) 4.22 0.26 3.11 4.59 692
Panel C – Italian Language
Score (mean) 4.10 0.27 1.59 4.50 696
Score (p5) 3.57 0.60 0.00 4.39 696
Score (p10) 3.73 0.47 0.00 4.44 696
Score (p90) 4.34 0.20 1.59 4.58 696
Score (p95) 4.38 0.18 1.59 4.59 696
Panel D – Controls
% Male 0.56 0.26 0.00 1.00 692
% Native 0.82 0.14 0.21 1.00 692
Cohort Size 88.57 77.39 3.00 372.00 692
Notes: a All sample. b Only treated.
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5.5 Empirical strategy
The aim of this work is to detect the impact of school resources on stu-
dents’ achievement. However, the educational outcome and the school
spending levels are potentially simultaneously determined. For this rea-
son, we look for exogenous variation in infrastructure spending and we
address the endogeneity issue by using data on school funding provided
after a natural disaster, namely the Northern Italy earthquake in 2012.
The seismic events represent an external shock that enables us to com-
pare similar schools with different entitlement for extra-funding and they
ensure random selection for funding eligibility. Accordingly, we imple-
ment two intertwined yet different identification strategies: the first one
exploits the information on the allocation process, that is whether schools
received funding or not (difference-in-differences method); the second
one uses the amount of funding that each school received as function of
pre-determined seismic risks (IV approach).
Before going into the technical details of each method as presented in
Section 5.5.1 and in Section 5.5.2, we would like to clarify some concerns
that might arise regarding the empirical framework depicted so far. Sim-
ilar reasoning can be found in Cipollone and Rosolia (2007), despite the
fact that it applies to a different context and refers to a different empirical
analysis.
First of all, the students’ performance might have been affected not
only by the additional resources the schools received, but also by other
quake-related shocks. Given the massive collapse of buildings and dev-
astation in few quake-affected areas, the earthquake could have had an
impact on the students not only because of the extra-funds provided in
the aftermath of the earthquake, but also because of direct consequences
in the students’ daily life: this could have been the case if, for example,
students were not allowed to enter the school or they could not attend
class regularly. Second, as the earthquake affected a wide area, the eco-
nomic environment where the schools are located might have been dif-
ferent, adding confounding factors in the school spending management
and in the impact of additional resources in the school system. Third, the
earthquake might have played a direct effect on individual schooling:
for example, parents might have been concerned to send their children
to school, leading to direct consequences on the students’ performance.
Moreover, the earthquake might have affected the students’ performance
even in the area not directly involved in the seismic events, by means of
geographic spillovers: for example students might have been reallocated
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in safer schools so that the learning environment would have experience
a dramatical change.
To rule out the concerns presented above, we focus on the least af-
fected areas and on schools whose buildings had no damage at all. We
use information on the volume of damaged buildings in each municipal-
ity as estimated by the INGV in the aftermath of the seism using a macro-
seismic survey. We only select municipalities where the level of damage
of their buildings was assessed by the INGV as “negliglible” (D1) or null
(D0): for a thorough description of the macroseismic survey and the lev-
els of damage we refer to Section 5.3. In more details, we collect data for a
total of 236 municipalities, as shown on the map in Figure 5.5. Out of 236,
69 are discarded as they had a level of damage greater than D1 (see grey
shaded areas in Figure 5.5): we keep only schoolhouses located in mu-
nicipalities where hair-line cracks in the walls or small pieces of plaster
broken off could not possibly affect negatively the learning process of the
students. Out of the 167 remaining municipalities, only 43 have at least
one high school, for a total of 173 schools (white dots in Figure 5.5). The
treated schools are those located in treated municipalities (shaded areas
in Figure 5.5) and make up a good portion of the total number of schools,
39% (68). Our control group is made up of 105 schools that received no
extra-funding and were not affected by the earthquake, but they are lo-
cated in municipalities proximate to the treated areas (i.e., they either
share borders with the treated areas or there is no more than one munic-
ipality between them and the treated areas, see dashed areas in Figure
5.5). The map also contains information on the PGA values. The colour
bar shows the gradient of PGA for each municipality, from low to high.
The amount of extra funding per student in the treated areas was mostly
driven by the necessity of safeguarding school buildings from future seis-
mic threats and minimize potential damages to school infrastructure. 9
Hence it is a function, among other things, of PGA levels.
The geographic proximity across the two groups of schools rules out
the possibility of having additional shocks stemming from the economic
environment. Moreover, as both the school groups are located in the
surrounding earthquake zones, both treated and control schools are in
not damaged at all areas: in this way we avoid the possibility that direct
effect across the two groups could have been different. It is also worth
recalling that the seismic events occurred in May–June, so almost at the
9See the first decrees enacted by the deputy commissioner, i.e., ODC #2 (16 June 2012)
and the ODC #4 (3 July 2012).
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end of the school year: as the next school year started in mid-September,
there was enough time to ensure school safety and promote calmness
among parents.
As for the presence of possible geographic spillovers, by law (e.g.
#ODC July 2012, 25) new schools built from scratch or prefabricated
school buildings needed to be ready at the beginning of the new school
year in place of the schools heavily damaged or even destroyed by the
earthquake. Therefore, kids were not supposed to go to surrounding
schools. As an additional evidence to this argument, the trend for the av-
erage number of enrolled students (10th graders) shows that there is no
significant different behaviour after the earthquake events between the
two groups (Figure 5.4 ).
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Figure 5.4: Average number of enrolled students (treated and control group)
Finally, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the pre-treatment differences in test
scores and covariates, respectively, between treated and control group.
As we can see, there are no remarkable differences between the treated
and the control schools for the mathematics test scores and for the stu-
dents’ characteristics across the two groups.
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Figure 5.5: Treated and control areas
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Table 5.2: Pre-treatment Test Scores
Score (mean) Score (p5) Score (p10) Score (p90) Score (p95)
Panel A Mathematics.
T-C 1.575 0.803 0.620 2.370 1.908
(2.177) (1.840) (1.925) (2.535) (2.621)
Control 47.490∗∗∗ 27.683∗∗∗ 32.177∗∗∗ 63.329∗∗∗ 67.599∗∗∗
(1.376) (1.164) (1.195) (1.618) (1.652)
Panel B Italian language.
T-C 3.955∗∗ 5.298∗∗ 4.303∗ 3.023∗∗ 2.322∗
(1.899) (2.612) (2.464) (1.456) (1.349)
Control 66.643∗∗∗ 45.274∗∗∗ 51.292∗∗∗ 80.476∗∗∗ 83.372∗∗∗
(1.295) (1.636) (1.585) (1.078) (0.989)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270
Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.3: Pre-treatment Covariates
% Males % Natives Cohort size
T-C -0.067 0.017 7.961
(0.044) (0.025) (13.058)
Control 0.589∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 80.848∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.015) (7.332)
Observations 270 270 270
Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.5.1 Difference-in-differences estimation strategy
Our identification strategy is twofold. First, we use the quasi-experimental
setting induced by the 2012 Northern Italy earthquake to get a handle
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on the direction of causation in the infrastructure spending – students’
achievement relationship: in other words, we investigate the treatment
effect of receiving or not additional funding. Using information from the
map in Figure 5.5, we can measure the impact of receiving additional
resources on test scores by comparing the evolution of test scores be-
fore and after the allocation of funds in the recipient areas as compared
to those that did not receive extra-funds. We start with a simple empiri-
cal research design, a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, which
takes the following form:
log yit = α0 + α1Di + α2Pt−1 + α3Di ∗ Pt−1 +X ′itα4+
+ µi + ηp ∗ Pt + θTrend+ εit
(5.1)
where the outcome variable yit denotes the average test score in either
mathematics or Italian language in school i in year t; Di is a dummy that
takes value one if the school belongs to the treated area; Pt is a dummy
that takes value one if the observation is in the post-treatment period (i.e.,
post 2012);10 Xit is a vector of school covariates which includes the school
size, the shares of male as well as the share of native students in each
school; µi is the school fixed effect, which absorbs school-specific con-
stant (or slow-moving) features; as provinces could have implemented
local interventions after the earthquake, we interact province fixed effect
ηp with Pt to control for province-specific policies after 2012;11 θ is the
coefficient of a school-specific time trend variable and εit is an error or
disturbance term. Di∗Pt is the interaction between the treatment schools
Di and Pt, the dummy variable equal to one in the post-treatment period;
therefore, α3 is our parameter of interest, the difference-in-differences
estimates of the impact of receiving funding on students’ achievement.
Note that, for small values of the coefficient, 100*α3 can be interpreted
as the percentage increase in the test score when schools receive extra
funding.
10We lag the treatment by one year to allow time for the funding to be invested.
11A province is an administrative division between a municipality and a region, and
constitute the third NUTS administrative level. Provinces have, among other functions,
the local planning and the coordination of schools activities. In our sample, we have a total
of 10 provinces.
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5.5.2 Instrumental variable strategy
Second, we want to offer estimates of the elasticity of test scores with
respect to spending per capita: in other words we want to explore the
treatment intensity effect depending on the amount of received fund-
ing. Yet, as noted above, idiosyncratic changes in school spending are
likely endogenous as the amount of funding allocated to each school can
be correlated with unobservable school-level characteristics. To quantify
this relation, we estimate 2SLS models where we instrument for school
spending with the values of peak ground acceleration (PGA), the max-
imum ground acceleration during the earthquakes. Recall that funding
was allocated to schools to reduce the vulnerability of their buildings
to earthquakes and more funding per capita was granted to schools in
municipalities with higher earthquake risks. The proposed instrument is
thus strongly correlated with school funding. At the same time, it is un-
correlated with school-level unobservables that might affect test scores.
Thus, PGA offers a valid instrument.
The second stage of the IV estimation is given by:
log yit = β0 + β1F̂UNDit−1 +X ′itβ2 + µi + ηp ∗ Pt + θTrend+ εit (5.2)
where the outcome variable yit, the vector of controls at the school level,
the trend variables and the fixed effects are the same as in equation (1).
F̂UNDit is the estimated funding per pupil as predicted by the first
stage. The equation we estimate in the first stage uses the PGA level
in the area where the school is located as an instrument for actual fund-
ing. Given the log-linearity of the model, the interpretation of β1 is that
of a proportional change in the test score given a unit change in funding,
holding all else constant.
5.6 Results
In Table 5.4 we present the relation between funding and student scores
in mathematics, whereas in Table 5.5 we focus on Italian language. In
column 1 of each table we use as dependent variable the average score
for all students, in columns 2 and 3 the test scores for students in the
5th and 10th percentile of the score distribution (i.e., low-achieving stu-
dents), and in columns 4 and 5 the test scores for students in the 90th and
95th percentile (i.e. high-achieving students).
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In panel A we show a naive OLS estimation, which reveals a positive
correlation between funding per pupil and test scores. If for purely illus-
trative purposes one interprets the OLS estimates as causal, then, accord-
ing to the estimates, a one-unit increase in school infrastructure spending
per student (that is, 10 euros) is associated with an estimated increase in
test scores in mathematics in the range of 0.1% to 0.7%, holding all else
constant. The relation is insignificant at conventional levels when we re-
place test scores in mathematics with those in Italian language (Panel A,
Table 5.5).12
In panel B we turn to our quasi-experimental design and we uncover
a positive effect of receiving extra funding on test scores, although the re-
lation is still not significantly different from zero for Italian language. In
more detail, test scores increase by 10% overall if a school is a recipient of
funding, and the effect is substantially larger for low-achieving students
(between 26% and 33%).
Turning to the elasticity of student outcomes with respect to the amount
of resources devoted to school infrastructure, recall that in panel A our
main coefficients of interest are most certainly contaminated by endo-
geneity from uncontrolled confounding variables. Therefore in panel C
we turn to the estimated coefficient of school funding in the second stage
of our 2SLS. We use the PGA, an index of seismic hazard, as exogenous
instrument. As we can see, the coefficients are now substantially larger
than those of the naive regressions in panel A and they are all statistically
different from zero. Distributing an extra 10 euros per pupil to schools
will produce an estimated test score gains in mathematics in the range
of 0.7% to almost 6.3%.13 Again, we find that the marginal return to in-
vestment in school infrastructure is greater the lower the grade of the
students. Interestingly, we now obtain similar results with test scores
in Italian language and the estimated magnitudes of the relationship be-
tween funding and students’ achievement are not only statistically sig-
nificant but also economically meaningful.
In panel D we show the reduced form and the first stage estimates.
As expected, we find that an increase in the PGA level has a sizable im-
12Note that all models include the share of males, of native students and the total num-
ber of students in each school as well as school fixed effects, time trends and interactions
between province fixed effects and post-treatment period dummy. Using linear trends,
quadratic trends, cubic polynomial in time (i.e., t, t2, and t3) or year dummies produce
similar results.
13These results are not driven by the upper tail of funds and are robust to the exclusion
of the top 5% of the schools from the sample, i.e. those that received more than 800 euros
per student.
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pact on students’ scores. At the same time, the first stage reveals that the
PGA level leads to a higher amount of infrastructure funding received by
the school. We report the Kleinbergen-Paap F-Statistic, which is similar
to the conventional F-statistic, but takes into account the clustering of the
standard errors. The values are all above conventional levels character-
izing weak instruments.
To dig deeper into the relationship between school funding and stu-
dents’ standardized test scores, Figure 5.6 shows the relation between
the estimated coefficient β1 in equation 5.2 and the quantiles of the dis-
tribution of the test scores. As the figure clearly reveals, allocating ad-
ditional funding to schools’ infrastructure has higher marginal effects on
the achievement of students with the lowest scores on the standardized
tests. Whereas in Italian language the pattern is less clear-cut, in math-
ematics the estimated effect decreases monotonically as we move from
the 10th to the 90th percentile of the standardized test score distribu-
tion. Results are overall similar when we look at relation between the
estimated coefficient α3 in equation 5.1 and the quantiles of the distribu-
tion of test scores (see Figure 5.7). We can conclude from these two ta-
bles that the previous results using a difference-in-differences approach
are strongly borne out by this new set of empirical results. The effect
of school funding on students’ achievement is overall quantitative large,
statistically significant and robust, in particular in mathematics and for
low-achieving students.
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Table 5.4: Secondary School, Mathematics: funding and students scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Score (mean) Score (p5) Score (p10) Score (p90) Score (p95) Funding p.c. (log)
Panel A OLS Estimation.
Funding p.c. (log) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B OLS Estimation.
Spending dummy 0.099∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.040∗
(0.024) (0.094) (0.063) (0.021) (0.021)
Panel C IV Estimation – Second Stage.
Funding p.c. (log) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.014) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002)
KP F-Statistic 17.324 17.324 17.324 17.324 17.324
Panel D Reduced Form and First Stage.
Seismic hazard 1.204∗∗∗ 3.284∗∗∗ 2.803∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 52.255∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.441) (0.291) (0.093) (0.099) (12.140)
Observations 692 692 692 692 692 692
Ni 173 173 173 173 173 173
Notes: School Fixed-effect models. All regressions include fraction of males, fraction of native students, and number of students in the tenth cohort
as well as linear trend and province dummies interacted with Pt. Funding per student are expressed in 10 euros. Standard errors are clustered at
the school level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5.5: Secondary School, Italian: funding and students scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Score (mean) Score (p5) Score (p10) Score (p90) Score (p95) Funding p.c. (log)
Panel A OLS Estimation.
Funding p.c. (log) 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Panel B OLS Estimation.
Spending dummy 0.020 0.073 0.051 0.008 0.005
(0.022) (0.064) (0.042) (0.019) (0.019)
Panel C IV Estimation – Second Stage.
Funding p.c. (log) 0.006∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
KP F-Statistic 14.771 14.771 14.771 14.771 14.771
Panel D Reduced Form and First Stage.
Seismic hazard 0.328∗∗∗ 0.623∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 54.827∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.345) (0.197) (0.106) (0.109) (13.773)
Observations 696 696 696 696 696 696
Ni 173 173 173 173 173 173
Notes: School Fixed-effect models. All regressions include fraction of males, fraction of native students, and number of students in the tenth cohort
as well as linear trend and province dummies interacted with Pt. Funding per student are expressed in 10 euros. Standard errors are clustered at
the school level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 5.6: Estimated impact of school funding on test scores by quantiles
of the distribution of test scores
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Figure 5.7: Estimated impact of receiving extra-funding on test scores by
quantiles of the distribution of test scores
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we explore the impact of school infrastructure invest-
ments on students’ achievement. We use data on school funding pro-
vided after a natural disaster, a magnitude 5.9 earthquake that hit the
Northern part of Emilia Romagna region in May 2012, affecting an area of
3,500 squared kilometers. We use information on the allocation process
(whether schools received funding or not) and on the amount of funding
that each school received (function of pre-determined seismic risks) to
implement two intertwined yet different identification strategies, so as
to give our regression estimates a causal interpretation.
Our empirical results suggest that doubling school infrastructure spend-
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ing reflects onto an increase of students’ test score up to 6.3% for mathe-
matics and low-achieving students. A set of facts, peculiar to the Italian
school system, may help us reconciling our findings with recent contri-
butions that specifically use US data. Contrary to the United States, few
resources are spent in school capital in Italy, about 184 euros per stu-
dent in 2013, which places Italy near the bottom of school infrastructure
spending (OECD, 2016). Whereas the average condition of school infras-
tructure is quite poor (by one estimate, more than 39% of school build-
ings need urgent maintenance, see e.g., Antonini et al., 2015) interven-
tions on school facilities are likely to affect the health, safety and morale
of students and teachers and in turn their ability to learn and teach. As
such, our study outlines the role of physical capital spending in improv-
ing the learning environment of high schools and offers potential policy
prescriptions for investing in school infrastructure.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and
Discussion
In line with the subsidiarity principle, services should be provided by
the government closest to the citizens. Local authorities have the poten-
tial to better recognize and respond to local needs. They can provide
services closer to the preferences and tastes of their citizens and more
quickly adapt to changing economic conditions (Slack and Bird, 2013). In
this way, services are delivered in a more targeted way and without an
imposition coming from higher levels of government, pursuing a greater
degree of efficiency in the management of increasingly limited and scarce
public resources (Da Cruz and Marques, 2014). Moreover, closer interac-
tion between government and locals enables higher citizen involvement
in the local decision-making process, ensuring accordingly a clearer ac-
countability and fostering a better combination of taxes and services in
terms of local competition (Asatryan and De Witte, 2015).
The concept behind this principle has been acknowledged world-
wide, at sub-national, national and international level. At European
level, the subsidiarity principle is one pillar of the functioning of the
European Union, since the Treaty of Maastricht signed in 1992. Article
5 of the ‘Treaty on European Union’ clearly states this principle, even
if the idea was already present in the ‘European Charter of Local Self-
Government’ adopted by the Council of Europe few years before, in 1985.
In the Charter, “local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local
authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial
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share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the
local population” (Article 3.1) and “public responsibilities shall generally be
exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen”
(Article 4.3), underlying the importance of the local form of government.
The crucial role of local responsibilities has been acknowledged even at
a more supranational level. In fact, local governments have been iden-
tified as the key to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
adopted by the UN General Assembly (2015) and to be achieved by 2030.
These goals deal not only with vital challenges, such eradicating poverty,
fighting gender inequality and tackling climate change, but also with
public goods provision like education, water services and health, among
others. Despite addressing global issues, they are directly relevant to
citizens’ daily lives and for this reason more tailored solutions should
originate from local action. Accordingly, sub-national governments are
considered as fundamental in fostering citizen participation and in bring-
ing higher forms of government closer to the citizens for SDGs’ achieve-
ment. Across countries, there is a huge degree of heterogeneity in the
size and number of sub-national governments (see for example OECD
2017d). Accordingly, while monitoring the services and assessing the
efficiency and effectiveness of the public expenditure at local level, the
considered evaluation tools should be flexible enough to tackle differ-
ent priorities and should take into account the heterogeneity within and
across country.
In this dissertation, modelling tools and empirical applications for
local level analysis are provided. In particular, the analysis of two com-
plementary aspects are taken into account, namely service provision and
resource management. On the one hand, as outlined above, local govern-
ments are in charge of providing many services, covering a broad variety
of intervention areas, such as educational and social care services, water
sanitation and waste disposal management, local security and housing
services, among others. Therefore, tools are required to measure the
overall level of provided services encompassing different functions or
alternatively to focus on a specific sector further investigating related is-
sues, for example questioning whether its provision is environmentally
sustainable or not. On the other hand, local governments face budget
constraints and limited resources. Therefore, the way resources are spent
for delivering local services cannot be ignored and its analysis should go
in pair with the service provision assessment, checking whether public
expenditure is managed in compliance with the principles of efficiency
and effectiveness. Chapter 2 and 3 deals with the service provision anal-
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ysis, encompassing first all the local tasks and then focusing on a specific
area, water management. Water is still not accessible to everyone and
its management has some peculiar characteristics which make it worth
to be explored: the presence of huge infrastructural costs has lead to
an increasingly significant public-private partnership, which in turn has
raised the attention on performance evaluation not only in terms of eco-
nomic and financial profitability, but also in line with the environmental
sustainability aspects for the sake of the people and of the planet. In a
symmetric way, Chapter 4 and 5 address the public spending analysis,
providing first an overall assessment across the main local competencies
and then focusing on a specific area, the education sector. Despite fund-
ing in the education sector representing a significant expenditure item on
the overall level of public spending, its effect on the students’ achieve-
ment is still debated: in a context where the lack of investment in school
infrastructure is an acknowledged issue worldwide and calls for more
school capital funding, this topic turns out to be relevant and worth to
be further investigated.
The measurement of municipal service provision is a complex task.
Local government competencies cover several intervention areas and there
is a wide degree of heterogeneity among municipalities in their politi-
cal preferences and in their local characteristics. To encompass all these
aspects in a single index, a dynamic robust conditional directional dis-
tance function Benefit-of-the-Doubt Composite Indicator with ARI re-
strictions is proposed in Chapter 2. Overall, the approach ensures an
objective way to determine how each municipal area enters in the evalu-
ation, while granting the most favourable aggregating scheme for the
units under analysis. The information on the municipal expenditure
composition is included through the weight restrictions specification.
The directional distance function formulation makes possible evaluation
even along undesirable features, which should be reduced rather than
maximized in the problem. The robust conditional version of the mo-
del controls for the municipal operating context and the time dimension.
The proposed composite indicator is suitable not only for benchmarking
and detecting best practises (OECD, 2008), but also for further investi-
gating other aspects. First of all, we can explore how municipal charac-
teristics influence overall service provision through statistical inference,
detecting whether the background condition inclusion favours or not the
assessment. More broadly, the obtained composite indicator can be used
to explore the relationship between the provided municipal services and
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some relevant issues in the municipal management, as for example gov-
ernment size expressed in terms of the tax burden imposed on citizens,
which pay the taxes for the local public goods they receive.
When evaluating the public good supply, the quality of the provided
services and their environmental impact should be considered as well.
These issues are relevant especially in particular areas, as for example
services related to the water industry. Accordingly, in Chapter 3 an in-
tegrated approach that combines insights from the Non-radial Direc-
tional Distance Function (NDDF) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP) in a Water Performance Index is proposed. As from the first tech-
nique, it is possible to simultaneously reduce inputs and bad outputs
while expanding good outputs to different extents. On the other hand, in
line with the AHP approach, the preferences of the decision makers (e.g.
water utility managers and water authorities) can be directly included
in the weights’ specification, determining the relative importance of in-
puts, good and bad outputs. Specifically, a particular emphasis can be
assigned to those units more “environmentally” focused and that would
have been otherwise penalized for the higher costs they face for keeping
their water quality commitment. The obtained water performance index
is suitable for further exploring the impact of external factor characteris-
tics, so to give the water authorities and the decision makers additional
insights for the water management service under analysis.
In public sector analysis, attention is not only on the service provi-
sion side, but also on the way resources are spent in terms of efficiency
and effectiveness. To evaluate local government expenditure efficiency
considering municipal competencies both one by one and all together, a
three-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model is introduced in
Chapter 4. The proposed model is flexible to focus first on each munic-
ipal area and then to perform an overall analysis aggregating in a com-
posite indicator the scores obtained in the previous step, according to
two different ways. The first one follows the DEA approach using a com-
mon system of weights to grant the comparison on a common ground;
the second one relies on the municipal expenditure composition infor-
mation available in the balance sheets. Despite being different, these two
indexes are complementary tools to provide useful insights to policy-
makers, enriched by further investigation of municipal features’ impact
on the estimated level of efficiency.
As the goal of policy-makers is not only “doing things right”, but also
“doing right things”, resource management needs to be evaluated also
in terms of effectiveness. In particular, spending in the education sector
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deserves to be carefully considered as it represents one of the most im-
portant expenditure item in public spending. More specifically, in Chap-
ter 5 the endogeneity arising while assessing school resource effective-
ness is tackled by two complementary quasi-experimental designs, the
Difference-in-Differences and the Instrumental Variable strategies. The
advantage of this intertwined approach is twofold: first, it is apt to get
whether receiving funds affects educational achievement; second, it mea-
sures the intensity effect of receiving capital investment on student out-
comes.
6.1 Evidence-based policy implications
To address specific questions relevant from a policy point of view while
showing the potentiality of the novel techniques proposed in the thesis,
we consider study cases from Belgium and Italy.
Specifically, in Chapter 2 the dynamic robust conditional directional
distance function Benefit-of-the-Doubt Composite Indicator with ARI re-
striction is estimated for 307 Flemish municipalities over 2006–2011. The
composite indicator scores show the methodological importance of the
proposed integrated and fully flexible analysis, as it creates a level play-
ing field among the municipalities under analysis. First of all, when con-
sidering the operating environment each municipality has to work in and
the priorities to be aligned with, it turns out that there is only little room
for municipal service provision improvement. Therefore, when bench-
marking and detecting the best practices, the municipal characteristics
should be strongly considered to grant a fair comparison. Moreover,
the background variables can be further explored in the way they affect
overall service provision through statistical inference, detecting whether
their inclusion favours or not the assessment. For example, in line with
the literature (see for example Kornai et al., 2003; Sˇt’astna´ and Gregor,
2015), the level of municipal fiscal income plays an unfavourable role in
the service provision, pointing at the so-called “wealth effect”, so that the
higher the level of available resources, the higher their potential misman-
agement. This suggests a more stringent control over those richer local
governments that have the potential to provide even more services to
the citizens (or of better quality). As concerns the share of elderly people
and foreigners, a favourable influence is found, possibly suggesting that
the provision of the related services to a greater catchment area would
benefit from scale economies. Looking at the political component, the
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findings confirm the idea that a more left-wing government favours a
higher overall level of municipal activities. Beyond these considerations,
the relationship between the composite indicator scores and the tax bur-
den is explored to test the existence of an optimal government size, for
the first time at municipal level. In this context, the tax burden is mea-
sured as tax revenue over local taxable income. This topic is still highly
debated and it affects not only policy decision making but also the cit-
izens, directly involved as they pay the taxes for the local services they
receive. In the presented application, an “inverted U-shape” is recurrent
and significant in every model and weight restriction specification, con-
firming the hypothesis proposed in the economic literature: beyond an
optimal point, despite a higher level of revenues, a lower level of public
goods is provided to the citizens (De Witte and Moesen, 2010). The esti-
mated optimal government size is the same as the current level of local
tax rate if considering the very basic and unrestricted model. However,
when including the economic variables and the expenditure structure,
the average optimal size estimated for Flemish municipalities increases
at 5.29%, 1,54% higher than the current tax rate in Flanders. This shows
room for increasing local taxation of those local governments adopting a
lower level of tax rate so to be able to afford a higher level of service pro-
vision, observing that municipalities with similar characteristics can do
it. As an alternative to the tax rate increase, this evidence might point to a
further need of municipal aggregation so to make wider the tax base and
to share the costs of the services among a higher number of taxpayers
(Slack and Bird, 2013).
In Chapter 3 the integrated Non-radial Directional Distance Func-
tion/Analytic Hierarchy Process model is estimated to compute Water
Performance Indexes for 96 Italian wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs)
in 2014, including nitrogen as one of the most harmful pollutants to be
removed in the outgoing treated water. The environmental efficiency
scores are explained by means of several variables related to the techni-
cal features of the WWTP. The obtained results could provide useful sug-
gestions for the water utilities, environmental agencies and regulators
in terms of policy implications (Akhmouch and Correia, 2016; OECD,
2017a). Generally, the evidence shows the added value arising from an
integrated performance assessment, that penalizes the WWTPs aiming
only at getting cost savings and achieving poor environmental standards
(Molinos-Senante et al., 2014a). Specifically, whenever the expansion of
outputs and the contraction of undesirable output are allowed, the ef-
ficiency scores are affected by the plants’ ability to respect the legal ni-
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trogen concentration threshold and by the percentage of the discharged
industrial wastewater. From the environmental agency side, the intro-
duced performance indexes suggest to conduct inspection activity on
small plants treating only domestic sewage. The result is in conflict with
prior literature that shows a poor performance among the plants treating
the sewage from factories and farms (Guerrini et al., 2016). The novelty of
the result obtained in this application can be attributed to the measure-
ment of nitrogen as undesirable output introduced for the first time in
this literature and commonly acknowledged as one of the most harmful
pollutants in the water (Metcalf & Eddy et al., 2003). The environmental
controls concerning the nitrogen concentration regulatory limit should
also be increased, so to stimulate a better functioning of those plants
that do not respect the set threshold and turn out to work in a less ef-
ficient way. Moreover, in line with the literature (e.g. Herna´ndez-Sancho
et al., 2011b; Molinos-Senante et al., 2014a,b) the population equivalent
size and the estimated dry weather flow have a significant impact on the
WWTP performance, irrespective of the model specification. This evi-
dence gives clear indication for water utilities in term of WWTPs’ size.
The managers should plan to exploit larger scale economies: this would
imply higher cost savings, but at the same time higher environmental
standards achievement. These findings are in line with the Principles
enacted by the OECD on Water Governance, promoting among others
the water management at the appropriate scale(s) and co-ordination between
the different scales (Principle 2, OECD, 2015), the enforcement of rules, pro-
cedures, incentives and tools (including rewards and penalties) to promote com-
pliance and achieve regulatory objectives in a cost-effective way (Principle 7.e,
OECD, 2015), the evidence-based assessment of the distributional consequences
of water-related policies on citizens, water users and places to guide decision-
making (Principle 11.d, OECD, 2015).
As for the municipal spending efficiency analysis, in Chapter 4 a
three-stage Data Envelopment Analysis model is applied to measure the
non-aggregate and the overall local government expenditure efficiency
for 282 Tuscan municipalities in 2011. Although the two proposed com-
posite indicators are derived following two very different approaches,
the conclusions are basically the same. Several municipal features can
be explored to detect their correlation with the level of the estimated
efficiency scores: in particular, a way to cluster the municipalities into
four groups and to display them in four quadrants is presented, so to
investigate which are the municipal characteristics that drive the most
efficient performance and to detect possible room for improvement in
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the efficiency level just intervening in the composition of the expendi-
ture looking at the average. The results are consistent. In particular,
some new evidence about the long debated issue of the municipal size
comes out. In fact, according to the overall analysis, municipal size re-
ally affects the efficiency of public expenditure: the bigger is the mu-
nicipal catchment area, the lower the average cost in the provision of
municipal services, which in turn makes possible to provide more differ-
entiated and complex services (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Doumpos and
Cohen, 2014). In particular, inefficiency can be related to the presence
of too many small fragmented municipalities: this might suggest an ag-
gregation in terms of either mergers or joint-management of the main
functions among the smallest municipalities to exploit scale economies,
especially for more capital-intensive services, such as water, sewers, and
transportation (Geys et al., 2008; Slack and Bird, 2013). This is in line with
legislative measures enacted by the Tuscany region proposing mergers or
joint-management among municipalities and, more in general, it repre-
sents one of the solutions adopted across the European countries facing
the same issue.
To evaluate school resource effectiveness, in Chapter 5 a specific quasi-
experimental setting induced by 2012 Northern Italy earthquake is ex-
ploited to apply both Difference-in-Differences and Instrumental Vari-
able strategies: 173 high schools from the school year 2010/11 to 2015/16
are considered, sharing similar characteristics but different entitlement to
receive extra funds in the aftermath of the seismic events. As for the treat-
ment effect, a positive effect of receiving extra funding on mathematics
test scores is found and it is substantially larger for low-achieving stu-
dents. As for the treatment intensity effect, the evidence shows that dis-
tributing an extra 10 euros per pupil to schools will produce an estimated
test score gain in mathematics up to 6.3%, specifically for low-achieving
students. The findings are a bit in contrast with evidence obtained by
US analysis, where little or no effects are found in terms of resource ef-
fectiveness on educational outcome (Cellini et al., 2010; Martorell et al.,
2016), but this might be related with the school capital spending choice
across the countries. As in Italy several investments have been planned
to be implemented soon, the findings point to a potential radical change
in the trend highlighted by the OECD Pisa report (OECD, 2016b). In
fact, low-performance students turn out to perform worse than the av-
erage: school infrastructure investment might be able therefore to target
in particular this group of student and to have a positive impact on their
educational achievement.
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6.2 Study limitations and future lines of research
The analysis performed in this thesis offers further insights from both an
empirical and a methodological point of view. Some of them are driven
by the limitations of the analysis itself.
First of all, the proposed modelling tools are applied to specific con-
texts, accordingly the general validity of the findings should be consid-
ered carefully. Belgium and Italy are the study cases of the present em-
pirical analysis, interesting for their common and specific features, apt to
provide complementary insights and informative evidences. Obviously,
they have some characteristics that would not be shared by other coun-
tries, despite the fact that the topics addressed in this dissertation are
commonly questioned at European and even broader international level.
This is the reason why, for example, the findings in Chapter 5 are at odds
with the evidence obtained by US analysis, where little or no effects are
found in terms of resource effectiveness on educational outcome (Cellini
et al., 2010; Martorell et al., 2016). Actually, the peculiarity of the Italian
school framework does make the obtained insights meaningful and rel-
evant. In fact, differently from the 8% of capital expenditure share spent
in the United States, only the 2% is spent in upper secondary schools in
Italy (OECD, 2017b), positioning this country close to the bottom of the
OECD school infrastructure spending. This different starting point might
explain why an influx of cash turns out to be effective in the Italian school
infrastructure. However, as the lack of investment in school infrastruc-
ture is an acknowledged issue spread across OECD countries (e.g. Aus-
tralia, Italy, UK, US, Germany), an interesting line of further research
might point to exploit the information available from the OECD PISA
test scores to detect school resource effectiveness in a broader context.
Obviously, the main challenge is to find an insightful quasi-experiment
setting to be employed using policy evaluation techniques apt to unravel
the endogeneity issue and to provide more general findings.
Furthermore, the obtained results should be interpreted with caution
for other two main reasons: they might depend on the model specifica-
tion and/or on the data choice (Cordero et al., 2016). As concerns the
first point for example, the evidence obtained for Chapter 2 and 4 re-
lies on a specific linear aggregating scheme for the composite indicator
(CI) construction, that is the Benefit-of-the-Doubt (BOD) approach (Cher-
chye et al., 2007; Melyn and Moesen, 1991). However, alternative aggre-
gating schemes are available in the CI literature and specifically in the
BOD-setting, as for example the multiplicative aggregation to name one
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(for an extensive review, see Rogge, 2018; Van Puyenbroeck and Rogge,
2017; Verbunt and Rogge, 2018). In particular, recent studies tackle the
observation-specific optimal weights obtained in the basic BOD model
by proposing alternative ways to get a common set of weights and ac-
cordingly to make more intuitive the comparison of the units under anal-
ysis on a common ground. In Chapter 4, the approach proposed by
Bernini et al. (2013) has been considered, but other options might be ex-
plored, as for example the one introduced by Tofallis (2013) and more re-
cently by Van Puyenbroeck and Rogge (2017) and by Verbunt and Rogge
(2018), to provide complementary insights and check the consistency of
the proposed tools and results.
On the other hand, the choice of the variables and, more broadly
speaking, the data availability do play a role in the empirical applica-
tion. For example, in Chapter 3 the wastewater treatment plants’ effi-
ciency is addressed together with the environmental sustainability issue,
specifically referring to the quantity of nitrogen left in the outgoing wa-
ter. However, the analysis might take into account also other relevant
residuals such as phosphorus, pharmaceutical pollutants, toxic metals
and therefore further undesirable outputs might be chosen to enrich the
overall evaluation. In the analysis outlined as such, the suggested evalu-
ating tool might be very promising for further environmental efficiency
analysis of the wastewater treatment plants and, more generally, of the
supplied water services. As concerns the water utility services, water
losses might be included as undesirable output, encompassing another
issue acknowledged worldwide and directly linked to the ongoing wa-
ter crisis. Environmental sustainability is not the only key element to be
considered in water service evaluation: also customer satisfaction and
the quality of provided services are increasingly important (see Romano
et al., 2017). Accordingly, data related to this aspect should be included
as well so to provide a broader and more insightful assessment of the
services under analysis.
More broadly speaking, the relevance of the quality aspect and of cit-
izens’ satisfaction is remarkably pervading all public sector intervention
areas. This is witnessed for example by the increasing development of
on-line platforms to keep track of citizens’ needs and complains at mu-
nicipal level or even to encourage active participation and transparent
accountability. The importance of the co-production role of the citizens
is more and more emphasized (De Witte and Geys, 2013; Parks et al.,
1981; Whitaker, 1980) and several initiatives point toward this direction,
as for example the project “CitizenPoweredCities: Co-producing better
150
public services with citizens” at OECD level. Getting access to informa-
tion related to these topics and improving the proposed modelling tools
to include them in the analysis would add a very interesting dimension
to the local government evaluation as introduced in Chapter 2 and 4.
The possibility of including more data in public sector analysis points
to another important issue concerning both the efficiency and the effec-
tiveness analysis in general: the problem of omitted information and
specification bias. Referring to the effectiveness analysis, this problem
has been addressed by applying policy evaluation techniques as in Chap-
ter 5. However, as concerns the efficiency analysis, this is still an open
issue that cannot be neglected (Cordero et al., 2016; De Witte and Lo´pez-
Torres, 2017). In fact, the presence of potential endogeneity might first
cause biased results and second prevent the interpretation of the results
in a causal way. This topic started receiving increasing attention in the
recent literature (see for example Cazals et al., 2016; Cordero et al., 2015;
Santı´n and Sicilia, 2017; Simar et al., 2016) and it represents a promising
line of research. Specifically, an interesting way to tackle this issue is to
integrate performance efficiency tools with policy evaluation techniques,
combining the insights of the efficiency and the effectiveness analysis.
With reference to the Italian context for example, the spending efficiency
analysis as introduced in Chapter 4 might be extended accordingly. The
causal impact of mergers and/or joint management of municipal func-
tions on the overall spending efficiency level should be investigated by
exploiting quasi-experimental setting, controlling before and after the
implementation and monitoring those who complied or not with the leg-
islative measures.
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Appendix A
Supplementary material for
Chapter 2
A.1 Data sources and description
Data are available via http://statistieken.vlaanderen.be/QvAJAXZfc/
notoolbar.htm?document=SVR%2FSVR-alle-domeinen.qvw&host=
QVS%40cwv100154&anonymous=true.
In Table A.1, the list of the variables as downloaded is reported with
their original Dutch names. In addition to the listed variables, the data
linked to Population Growth and Ideological Complexion of the local Govern-
ment (ICG) have been provided by De Witte and Geys (2009).
Per capita variables as listed in Table 2.1 have been obtained using the
total number of residents per municipality. With reference to the variable
Net foreigners a normalization has been applied to avoid negative or zero
values.
Some of the explanatory variables have been categorized for method-
ological reasons (for more technical details, see Rogge et al., 2017, and
the references therein). Specifically, Income per capita and Financial debt
per capita has been divided into deciles, Population growth into quartiles
and Ideological Complexion of the local Government (ICG) has been split in
three parts.
Out of 308 Flemish municipalities, one municipality has not been in-
cluded in the analysis because of the lack of data.
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Table A.1: Downloaded variables used for the empirical application.
DOMEIN SUBDOMEIN INDICATOR INDICATOR
Arbeidsmarkt Werkloosheid Werkloosheidsgraad (15-64 jaar) (Steunpunt Werk) Unemployment rate (15-64) (Centre for Work)
Criminaliteit Geregistreerde misdrijven Diefstallen en afpersingen - per 1.000 inwoners Thefts and extortions - per 1,000 inhabitants
Criminaliteit Geregistreerde misdrijven Misdrijven tegen eigendom - per 1.000 inwoners Crimes against property - per 1,000 inhabitants
Criminaliteit Geregistreerde misdrijven Misdrijven tegen lichamelijke integriteit - per 1.000 inwoners Crimes against physical integrity - per 1,000 inhabitants
Cultuur Algemeen Cultuurevenementen: aantal per 1.000 inwoners Culture Events: number per 1,000 inhabitants
Demografie Structuur bevolking Inwoners - totaal Residents - total
Demografie Structuur bevolking Inwoners 65 jaar en ouder - aandeel Residents age 65 and older - share
Demografie Structuur bevolking Ouderen 80 jaar en ouder - aantal Older people aged 80 and over - Number
Demografie Huishoudens Private huishoudens - totaal aantal Private households - total
Demografie Migraties Saldo internationale migraties van vreemdelingen Net international migration of foreigners
Economie en innovatie Macro-economie Belastbaar inkomen per inwoner Taxable income per capita
Energie Energieverbruik Energieverbruik per inwoner door verwarming huishoudens Energy consumption per capita by household heating
Financin & Bestuur Gemeentebelastingen Totale belastingontvangsten per inwoner Total tax revenue per capita
Financin & Bestuur Financile schuld gemeenten Financile schuld per inwoner Financial debt per capita
Inburgering & Integratie Aanwezigheid Vreemdelingen - aandeel t.o.v. totale bevolking Foreigners - share relative to total population
Milieu en natuur Afval Restafval in kg per inwoner Waste in kg per capita
Mobiliteit Verkeersveiligheid Ongevallen - aantal Accidents - number
Onderwijs en vorming Kleuteronderwijs Totaal kleuteronderwijs - aantal leerlingen (naar vestigingplaats) Total kindergarten - number of students (by domicile)
Onderwijs en vorming Lager onderwijs Totaal lager onderwijs - aantal leerlingen (naar vestigingplaats) Total primary education - number of students (by domicile)
Ruimtelijke ontwikkeling Oppervlakte Bebouwde oppervlakte Built up area
Note: The first three columns show the path followed to get the chosen variables. Accordingly, the original Dutch names are reported. The last column presents the English version as translated by the authors.
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A.2 Municipal-specific weights
In the following, the specific lower and upper bound weights for each
Flemish municipality and for each municipal function are listed.
Table A.2: Lower bound municipal-specific weights
Municipality Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
Aalst 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.06
Aalter 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.05
Aarschot 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.03
Aartselaar 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.04
Affligem 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.06
Alken 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05
Alveringem 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.04
Antwerpen 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.04
Anzegem 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.07
Ardooie 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.05
Arendonk 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.07
As 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04
Asse 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.03
Assenede 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.04
Avelgem 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.05
Baarle-Hertog 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.05
Balen 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06
Beernem 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.04
Beerse 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07
Beersel 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.03
Begijnendijk 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05
Bekkevoort 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.07
Beringen 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.08
Berlaar 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.05
Berlare 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.06
Bertem 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.06
Bever 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.04
Beveren 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Bierbeek 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.07
Bilzen 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07
Blankenberge 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.03
Bocholt 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.03
Boechout 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.04
Bonheiden 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06
Boom 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04
Boortmeerbeek 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.09
Borgloon 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.04
Bornem 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.06
Borsbeek 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.03
Boutersem 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.10
Brakel 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.06
Brasschaat 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03
Brecht 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04
Bredene 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.02
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Bree 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.04
Brugge 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.04
Buggenhout 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05
Damme 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.06
De Haan 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.02
De Panne 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.04
De Pinte 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.06
Deerlijk 0.25 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03
Deinze 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04
Denderleeuw 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Dendermonde 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05
Dentergem 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.05
Dessel 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.05
Destelbergen 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.06
Diepenbeek 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05
Diest 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.06
Diksmuide 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06
Dilbeek 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
Dilsen-Stokkem 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04
Drogenbos 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.02
Duffel 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04
Edegem 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03
Eeklo 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06
Erpe-Mere 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.08
Essen 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05
Evergem 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.04
Galmaarden 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.06
Gavere 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.04
Geel 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.05
Geetbets 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.06
Genk 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03
Gent 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03
Geraardsbergen 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06
Gingelom 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.04
Gistel 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.03
Glabbeek 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.04
Gooik 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.06
Grimbergen 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.03
Grobbendonk 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08
Haacht 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Haaltert 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.05
Halen 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.03
Halle 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.04
Ham 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.07
Hamme 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06
Hamont-Achel 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.06
Harelbeke 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06
Hasselt 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.03
Hechtel-Eksel 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.04
Heers 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.04
Heist-op-den-Berg 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.05
Hemiksem 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03
Herent 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05
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Herentals 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
Herenthout 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04
Herk-de-Stad 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.04
Herne 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.08
Herselt 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.04
Herstappe 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03
Herzele 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04
Heusden-Zolder 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05
Heuvelland 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.06
Hoegaarden 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04
Hoeilaart 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04
Hoeselt 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.05
Holsbeek 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.05
Hooglede 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.06
Hoogstraten 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04
Horebeke 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.07
Houthalen-Helchteren 0.22 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03
Houthulst 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.06
Hove 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.02
Huldenberg 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.05
Hulshout 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.06
Ichtegem 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07
Ieper 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04
Ingelmunster 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.05
Izegem 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.07
Jabbeke 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04
Kalmthout 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.04
Kampenhout 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06
Kapelle-op-den-Bos 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.07
Kapellen 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04
Kaprijke 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.07
Kasterlee 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06
Keerbergen 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.09
Kinrooi 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.04
Kluisbergen 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06
Knesselare 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06
Knokke-Heist 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.03
Koekelare 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.07
Koksijde 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04
Kontich 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04
Kortemark 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08
Kortenaken 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.05
Kortenberg 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06
Kortessem 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.04
Kortrijk 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04
Kraainem 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.04
Kruibeke 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04
Kruishoutem 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.03
Kuurne 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Laakdal 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.05
Laarne 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.05
Lanaken 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.06
Landen 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.04
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Langemark-Poelkapelle 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.05
Lebbeke 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04
Lede 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.07
Ledegem 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05
Lendelede 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.08
Lennik 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.04
Leopoldsburg 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.04
Leuven 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.03
Lichtervelde 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.08
Liedekerke 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07
Lier 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05
Lierde 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.07
Lille 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.10
Linkebeek 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.02
Lint 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.04
Linter 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04
Lo-Reninge 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.04
Lochristi 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.07
Lokeren 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
Lommel 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.03
Londerzeel 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.04
Lovendegem 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08
Lubbeek 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06
Lummen 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.06
Maarkedal 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05
Maaseik 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.03
Maasmechelen 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.04
Machelen 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02
Maldegem 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05
Malle 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04
Mechelen 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.05
Meerhout 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
Meeuwen-Gruitrode 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.05
Meise 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04
Melle 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.05
Menen 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03
Merchtem 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03
Merelbeke 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06
Merksplas 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04
Mesen 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.04
Meulebeke 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.05
Middelkerke 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.05
Moerbeke 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07
Mol 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.05
Moorslede 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.06
Mortsel 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02
Nazareth 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04
Neerpelt 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.07
Nevele 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.03
Niel 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.04
Nieuwerkerken 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.05
Nieuwpoort 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.05
Nijlen 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.04
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Ninove 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.07
Olen 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08
Oostende 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.04
Oosterzele 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.07
Oostkamp 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
Oostrozebeke 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04
Opglabbeek 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05
Opwijk 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04
Oud-Heverlee 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04
Oud-Turnhout 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.08
Oudenaarde 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.07
Oudenburg 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.06
Overijse 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04
Overpelt 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03
Peer 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.03
Pepingen 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.09
Pittem 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.07
Poperinge 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.05
Putte 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09
Puurs 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.05
Ranst 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05
Ravels 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.07
Retie 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.09
Riemst 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.06
Rijkevorsel 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.05 0.05
Roeselare 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.02
Ronse 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04
Roosdaal 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05
Rotselaar 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07
Ruiselede 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.08
Rumst 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04
Schelle 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04
Scherpenheuvel-Zichem 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03
Schilde 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.07
Schoten 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.05
Sint-Amands 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.07
Sint-Genesius-Rode 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.06
Sint-Gillis-Waas 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06
Sint-Katelijne-Waver 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
Sint-Laureins 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.10
Sint-Lievens-Houtem 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07
Sint-Martens-Latem 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.05
Sint-Niklaas 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.06
Sint-Pieters-Leeuw 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05
Sint-Truiden 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04
Spiere-Helkijn 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.04
Stabroek 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05
Staden 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.06
Steenokkerzeel 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05
Stekene 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07
Temse 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08
Ternat 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04
Tervuren 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.04
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Tessenderlo 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.06
Tielt 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05
Tielt-Winge 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.05
Tienen 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.05
Tongeren 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.03
Torhout 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
Tremelo 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.06
Turnhout 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03
Veurne 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05
Vilvoorde 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.03
Vleteren 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.06
Voeren 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.11
Vorselaar 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05
Vosselaar 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.10
Waarschoot 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03
Waasmunster 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08
Wachtebeke 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.08
Waregem 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.07
Wellen 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.05
Wemmel 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04
Wervik 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.02
Westerlo 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.07
Wetteren 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05
Wevelgem 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03
Wezembeek-Oppem 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.05
Wichelen 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05
Wielsbeke 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.04
Wijnegem 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02
Willebroek 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.04
Wingene 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.08
Wommelgem 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04
Wortegem-Petegem 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.05
Wuustwezel 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.04
Zandhoven 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04
Zaventem 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.03
Zedelgem 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06
Zele 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.06
Zelzate 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.06
Zemst 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.08
Zingem 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
Zoersel 0.19 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03
Zomergem 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.06
Zonhoven 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.04
Zonnebeke 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03
Zottegem 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.04
Zoutleeuw 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.06
Zuienkerke 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.05
Zulte 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04
Zutendaal 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.05
Zwalm 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08
Zwevegem 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.03
Zwijndrecht 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04
160
Table A.3: Upper bound municipal-specific weights
Municipality Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
Aalst 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.17
Aalter 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.15
Aarschot 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.51 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.09
Aartselaar 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.03 0.23 0.18 0.12
Affligem 0.41 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.26 0.17 0.17
Alken 0.32 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.02 0.21 0.11 0.15
Alveringem 0.42 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.36 0.11 0.12
Antwerpen 0.33 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.30 0.11
Anzegem 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.20
Ardooie 0.20 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.09 0.26 0.14 0.14
Arendonk 0.27 0.15 0.17 0.32 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.21
As 0.30 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.23 0.12 0.11
Asse 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.29 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.09
Assenede 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.26 0.17 0.11
Avelgem 0.20 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.29 0.15 0.15
Baarle-Hertog 0.51 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.35 0.14 0.14
Balen 0.21 0.26 0.06 0.30 0.08 0.24 0.15 0.17
Beernem 0.24 0.29 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.39 0.17 0.12
Beerse 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.35 0.06 0.20 0.12 0.21
Beersel 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.08 0.32 0.17 0.09
Begijnendijk 0.29 0.15 0.17 0.32 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.14
Bekkevoort 0.39 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.23 0.11 0.20
Beringen 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.23
Berlaar 0.29 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.09 0.23 0.20 0.14
Berlare 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.15 0.18
Bertem 0.38 0.20 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.29 0.14 0.17
Bever 0.41 0.03 0.14 0.23 0.03 0.35 0.12 0.12
Beveren 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.32 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
Bierbeek 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.15 0.03 0.20 0.15 0.21
Bilzen 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.20
Blankenberge 0.27 0.30 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.27 0.09
Bocholt 0.27 0.47 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.09 0.09
Boechout 0.33 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.35 0.14 0.12
Bonheiden 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.18 0.17
Boom 0.30 0.17 0.30 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.24 0.12
Boortmeerbeek 0.26 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.03 0.26 0.14 0.27
Borgloon 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.11
Bornem 0.23 0.26 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.17 0.17
Borsbeek 0.32 0.14 0.21 0.33 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.09
Boutersem 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.29
Brakel 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.27 0.17 0.18
Brasschaat 0.23 0.14 0.18 0.42 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.08
Brecht 0.24 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.33 0.17 0.12
Bredene 0.29 0.21 0.27 0.00 0.09 0.26 0.23 0.06
Bree 0.20 0.26 0.17 0.02 0.06 0.33 0.17 0.12
Brugge 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.11
Buggenhout 0.33 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.14
Damme 0.24 0.30 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.29 0.14 0.18
De Haan 0.18 0.29 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.36 0.26 0.06
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De Panne 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.23 0.12
De Pinte 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.06 0.23 0.14 0.17
Deerlijk 0.74 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.08
Deinze 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.12
Denderleeuw 0.35 0.15 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.14
Dendermonde 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.18 0.15
Dentergem 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.29 0.05 0.20 0.15 0.15
Dessel 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.15
Destelbergen 0.23 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.17 0.17
Diepenbeek 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.14
Diest 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.24 0.18 0.18
Diksmuide 0.20 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.18
Dilbeek 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.18
Dilsen-Stokkem 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.41 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.11
Drogenbos 0.36 0.09 0.11 0.41 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.06
Duffel 0.17 0.20 0.09 0.36 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.11
Edegem 0.44 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.09
Eeklo 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.23 0.17
Erpe-Mere 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.27 0.18 0.24
Essen 0.27 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.17 0.14
Evergem 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.11
Galmaarden 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.33 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.18
Gavere 0.27 0.14 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.23 0.20 0.12
Geel 0.39 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.14
Geetbets 0.30 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.14 0.18
Genk 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.09
Gent 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.09
Geraardsbergen 0.24 0.18 0.29 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.18
Gingelom 0.27 0.11 0.08 0.44 0.03 0.26 0.11 0.12
Gistel 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.08 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.09
Glabbeek 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.35 0.12 0.12
Gooik 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.18
Grimbergen 0.29 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.09
Grobbendonk 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.24
Haacht 0.33 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17
Haaltert 0.33 0.18 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.26 0.20 0.14
Halen 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.29 0.14 0.09
Halle 0.24 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.27 0.11
Ham 0.30 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.21
Hamme 0.38 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.17
Hamont-Achel 0.23 0.35 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.33 0.11 0.17
Harelbeke 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.29 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.17
Hasselt 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.15 0.06 0.20 0.23 0.09
Hechtel-Eksel 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.11
Heers 0.35 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.38 0.17 0.12
Heist-op-den-Berg 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.21 0.35 0.15
Hemiksem 0.50 0.11 0.12 0.41 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.09
Herent 0.50 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.15
Herentals 0.32 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.14
Herenthout 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.30 0.08 0.24 0.12 0.12
Herk-de-Stad 0.23 0.33 0.29 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.15 0.11
Herne 0.30 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.26 0.20 0.23
Herselt 0.32 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.12 0.11
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Herstappe 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.09
Herzele 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.17 0.12
Heusden-Zolder 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.18 0.14
Heuvelland 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.30 0.15 0.18
Hoegaarden 0.33 0.17 0.12 0.30 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.12
Hoeilaart 0.18 0.29 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.24 0.12 0.11
Hoeselt 0.27 0.24 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.33 0.15 0.15
Holsbeek 0.23 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.45 0.14 0.14
Hooglede 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.27 0.14 0.18
Hoogstraten 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.35 0.05 0.23 0.18 0.12
Horebeke 0.45 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.18 0.21
Houthalen-Helchteren 0.65 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.09
Houthulst 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.32 0.11 0.18
Hove 0.38 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.14 0.06
Huldenberg 0.26 0.14 0.17 0.32 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.15
Hulshout 0.27 0.05 0.26 0.23 0.08 0.29 0.12 0.17
Ichtegem 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.20
Ieper 0.21 0.42 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.11
Ingelmunster 0.29 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.30 0.14 0.14
Izegem 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.18 0.20
Jabbeke 0.20 0.32 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.24 0.12 0.12
Kalmthout 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.48 0.06 0.27 0.14 0.11
Kampenhout 0.32 0.14 0.23 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.18
Kapelle-op-den-Bos 0.29 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.17 0.20
Kapellen 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.11
Kaprijke 0.36 0.17 0.23 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.21
Kasterlee 0.41 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.18
Keerbergen 0.26 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.26
Kinrooi 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.02 0.35 0.08 0.11
Kluisbergen 0.21 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.14 0.17
Knesselare 0.33 0.30 0.21 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.18
Knokke-Heist 0.17 0.33 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.26 0.09
Koekelare 0.23 0.32 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.35 0.11 0.21
Koksijde 0.26 0.38 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.12
Kontich 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.11
Kortemark 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.11 0.23
Kortenaken 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.47 0.12 0.14
Kortenberg 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.17
Kortessem 0.27 0.30 0.12 0.23 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.11
Kortrijk 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.12
Kraainem 0.29 0.06 0.14 0.20 0.09 0.24 0.27 0.12
Kruibeke 0.26 0.18 0.29 0.09 0.06 0.23 0.18 0.12
Kruishoutem 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.15 0.30 0.14 0.09
Kuurne 0.17 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.18
Laakdal 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.29 0.03 0.27 0.15 0.15
Laarne 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.29 0.15 0.15
Lanaken 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.17
Landen 0.29 0.17 0.26 0.12 0.03 0.24 0.20 0.11
Langemark-Poelkapelle 0.33 0.26 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.29 0.09 0.15
Lebbeke 0.21 0.30 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.23 0.17 0.12
Lede 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.27 0.18 0.21
Ledegem 0.27 0.27 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.14
Lendelede 0.23 0.36 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.23
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Lennik 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.35 0.30 0.12
Leopoldsburg 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.17 0.12
Leuven 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.26 0.08
Lichtervelde 0.21 0.24 0.14 0.21 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.23
Liedekerke 0.29 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.20
Lier 0.33 0.26 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.23 0.14
Lierde 0.29 0.36 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.14 0.21
Lille 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.29
Linkebeek 0.24 0.06 0.18 0.42 0.06 0.26 0.17 0.06
Lint 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.26 0.14 0.12
Linter 0.29 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.05 0.33 0.15 0.12
Lo-Reninge 0.44 0.26 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.12
Lochristi 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.27 0.09 0.27 0.12 0.21
Lokeren 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.20
Lommel 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.21 0.09
Londerzeel 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.29 0.27 0.12
Lovendegem 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.24
Lubbeek 0.27 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.02 0.17 0.14 0.18
Lummen 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.06 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.18
Maarkedal 0.33 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.09 0.21 0.15 0.15
Maaseik 0.20 0.35 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.14 0.09
Maasmechelen 0.23 0.23 0.35 0.08 0.02 0.23 0.18 0.12
Machelen 0.24 0.18 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.06
Maldegem 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.08 0.11 0.20 0.18 0.14
Malle 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.12
Mechelen 0.27 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.30 0.14
Meerhout 0.29 0.08 0.26 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.15
Meeuwen-Gruitrode 0.36 0.32 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.36 0.06 0.14
Meise 0.30 0.20 0.11 0.39 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.11
Melle 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.24 0.20 0.14
Menen 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.09
Merchtem 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.59 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.09
Merelbeke 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.15 0.18
Merksplas 0.18 0.35 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.11
Mesen 0.50 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.14 0.11
Meulebeke 0.24 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.15 0.27 0.17 0.14
Middelkerke 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.30 0.14 0.14
Moerbeke 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.06 0.20 0.12 0.20
Mol 0.41 0.18 0.24 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.15
Moorslede 0.21 0.39 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.26 0.11 0.18
Mortsel 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.06
Nazareth 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.14 0.12
Neerpelt 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.45 0.12 0.21
Nevele 0.23 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.09
Niel 0.44 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.03 0.26 0.15 0.11
Nieuwerkerken 0.35 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.02 0.27 0.15 0.15
Nieuwpoort 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.14
Nijlen 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.48 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.11
Ninove 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.09 0.30 0.18 0.20
Olen 0.32 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.20 0.14 0.24
Oostende 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.29 0.11
Oosterzele 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.26 0.12 0.21
Oostkamp 0.30 0.36 0.17 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.17
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Oostrozebeke 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.12
Opglabbeek 0.45 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.15
Opwijk 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.45 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.12
Oud-Heverlee 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.48 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.11
Oud-Turnhout 0.29 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.23
Oudenaarde 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.20
Oudenburg 0.20 0.32 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.32 0.15 0.17
Overijse 0.29 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.06 0.15 0.18 0.11
Overpelt 0.33 0.23 0.32 0.02 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.09
Peer 0.42 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.11 0.09
Pepingen 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.17 0.26
Pittem 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.14 0.27 0.11 0.20
Poperinge 0.17 0.35 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.14 0.15
Putte 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.00 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.26
Puurs 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.15
Ranst 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.32 0.20 0.14
Ravels 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.27 0.03 0.32 0.12 0.20
Retie 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.12 0.27
Riemst 0.24 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.32 0.11 0.17
Rijkevorsel 0.29 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.50 0.14 0.14
Roeselare 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.05
Ronse 0.21 0.20 0.33 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.11
Roosdaal 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.08 0.21 0.18 0.15
Rotselaar 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.12 0.20
Ruiselede 0.32 0.30 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.27 0.15 0.23
Rumst 0.29 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.15 0.11
Schelle 0.26 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.11
Scherpenheuvel-Zichem 0.15 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.30 0.15 0.08
Schilde 0.27 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.29 0.20 0.21
Schoten 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.14
Sint-Amands 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.14 0.20
Sint-Genesius-Rode 0.21 0.09 0.24 0.20 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.18
Sint-Gillis-Waas 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.24 0.15 0.18
Sint-Katelijne-Waver 0.27 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14
Sint-Laureins 0.21 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.06 0.26 0.17 0.29
Sint-Lievens-Houtem 0.27 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.15 0.20 0.21
Sint-Martens-Latem 0.20 0.24 0.11 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.18 0.15
Sint-Niklaas 0.27 0.21 0.32 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.17
Sint-Pieters-Leeuw 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.14
Sint-Truiden 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.11
Spiere-Helkijn 0.26 0.27 0.12 0.00 0.24 0.35 0.09 0.12
Stabroek 0.38 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.17 0.14
Staden 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.26 0.12 0.17
Steenokkerzeel 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.15
Stekene 0.29 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.21
Temse 0.33 0.21 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.24
Ternat 0.26 0.32 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.12
Tervuren 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.03 0.27 0.17 0.12
Tessenderlo 0.24 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.17 0.17
Tielt 0.24 0.36 0.23 0.03 0.06 0.21 0.12 0.14
Tielt-Winge 0.32 0.24 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.11 0.15
Tienen 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.20 0.23 0.14
Tongeren 0.48 0.24 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.09
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Torhout 0.21 0.27 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.17
Tremelo 0.38 0.12 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.18 0.17
Turnhout 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.09
Veurne 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.14
Vilvoorde 0.32 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.27 0.08
Vleteren 0.30 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.14 0.18
Voeren 0.39 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.11 0.33
Vorselaar 0.36 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.14
Vosselaar 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.14 0.18 0.12 0.29
Waarschoot 0.30 0.26 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.30 0.15 0.09
Waasmunster 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.23
Wachtebeke 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.23
Waregem 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.20
Wellen 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.38 0.15 0.15
Wemmel 0.23 0.05 0.30 0.38 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.12
Wervik 0.20 0.33 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.26 0.15 0.06
Westerlo 0.24 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.21
Wetteren 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.14
Wevelgem 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.08
Wezembeek-Oppem 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.29 0.26 0.14
Wichelen 0.38 0.11 0.24 0.21 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.15
Wielsbeke 0.32 0.29 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.30 0.14 0.11
Wijnegem 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.05
Willebroek 0.35 0.18 0.29 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.21 0.12
Wingene 0.21 0.41 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.29 0.11 0.23
Wommelgem 0.29 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.11 0.23 0.18 0.12
Wortegem-Petegem 0.26 0.33 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.26 0.08 0.15
Wuustwezel 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.08 0.36 0.20 0.12
Zandhoven 0.23 0.18 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.24 0.17 0.11
Zaventem 0.29 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.35 0.08
Zedelgem 0.27 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.17
Zele 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.26 0.21 0.18
Zelzate 0.21 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.23 0.17
Zemst 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.24
Zingem 0.41 0.23 0.08 0.33 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.15
Zoersel 0.57 0.14 0.02 0.33 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.09
Zomergem 0.23 0.30 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.18
Zonhoven 0.35 0.27 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.18 0.12
Zonnebeke 0.24 0.38 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.12 0.08
Zottegem 0.54 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.12
Zoutleeuw 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.38 0.15 0.18
Zuienkerke 0.38 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.33 0.18 0.15
Zulte 0.29 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.12
Zutendaal 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.15 0.14
Zwalm 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.26 0.14 0.23
Zwevegem 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.11 0.08
Zwijndrecht 0.29 0.18 0.32 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.11
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A.3 Spearman correlation tables
Table A.4: Spearman correlation among weight restriction models
Unconditional
MinMax Average Municipal
MinMax restrictions 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.8755 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.6796 0.7973 1.0000
Robust Unconditional
MinMax Average Municipal
MinMax restrictions 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.9202 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.8235 0.8913 1.0000
Robust Conditional Model 1
MinMax Average Municipal
MinMax restrictions 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.8834 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.8365 0.9074 1.0000
Robust Conditional Model 2
MinMax Average Municipal
MinMax restrictions 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.8052 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.7928 0.9423 1.0000
Robust Conditional Model 3
MinMax Average Municipal
MinMax restrictions 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.7629 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.7466 0.9279 1.0000
Note: MinMax restrictions refer to the minimum and maximum share of expen-
diture in each municipal area across all the municipalities. Average restrictions
consider the average spending share (lower and upper bound equal to its±50%).
Municipal-specific restrictions are based on the municipal-specific current spend-
ing allocation (lower and upper bound equal to the ±50% of each municipal
spending share).
Unconditional refers to the baseline Benefit-of-the-Doubt Directional Distance
function model, without correction for outlying observations, as it is instead in
the Robust specification. Model 1 includes the economic and financial character-
istics (Fiscal income, Financial debt and Unemployment). Model 2 adds to the
economic and financial characteristics the socio-demographic structure (Share of
elderly people, Share of foreigners and Population growth). Model 3 adds to the
economic-financial and socio-demographic variables also the political component
(Ideological Complexion of the local Government). In every conditional model
specification a year dummy is also included.
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Table A.5: Spearman correlation among model specifications
MinMax weight restrictions
Unconditional Rob. Uncond. Rob. Cond. 1 Rob. Cond. 2 Rob. Cond. 3
Unconditional 1.0000
Rob. Uncond. 0.9553 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 1 0.6708 0.7372 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 2 0.2151 0.2475 0.3313 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 3 0.1331 0.1592 0.2292 0.2930 1.0000
Average weight restrictions
Unconditional Rob. Uncond. Rob. Cond. 1 Rob. Cond. 2 Rob. Cond. 3
Unconditional 1.0000
Rob. Uncond. 0.9862 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 1 0.7454 0.7643 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 2 0.2118 0.2192 0.2914 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 3 0.1129 0.1228 0.1978 0.3651 1.0000
Municipal-specific weight restrictions
Unconditional Rob. Uncond. Rob. Cond. 1 Rob. Cond. 2 Rob. Cond. 3
Unconditional 1.0000
Rob. Uncond. 0.9142 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 1 0.6660 0.7548 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 2 0.1682 0.2162 0.2986 1.0000
Rob. Cond. 3 0.1040 0.1416 0.2152 0.3477 1.0000
Note: MinMax restrictions refer to the minimum and maximum share of expenditure in each municipal area across all
the municipalities. Average restrictions consider the average spending share (lower and upper bound equal to its ±50%).
Municipal-specific restrictions are based on the municipal-specific current spending allocation (lower and upper bound
equal to the ±50% of each municipal spending share).
Unconditional refers to the baseline Benefit-of-the-Doubt Directional Distance function model, without correction for out-
lying observations, as it is instead in the Robust specification. Model 1 includes the economic and financial characteris-
tics (Fiscal income, Financial debt and Unemployment). Model 2 adds to the economic and financial characteristics the
socio-demographic structure (Share of elderly people, Share of foreigners and Population growth). Model 3 adds to the
economic-financial and socio-demographic variables also the political component (Ideological Complexion of the local
Government). In every conditional model specification a year dummy is also included.
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A.4 Shadow prices results
For the sake of brevity, only the shadow prices’ descriptive statistics com-
paring the unrestricted unconditional and the robust conditional analy-
sis for the three weight restriction models are presented below. Then,
the budget shares obtained from the computed shadow prices are pre-
sented, again comparing the Unrestricted Unconditional and the robust
conditional analysis for the three weight restriction models. For the sake
of brevity, we show in the following only the estimates for the condi-
tional model including the economic variables (Fiscal income, Financial
debt and Unemployment). The results for the conditional model encom-
passing also Socio-demographic and Political components are available
upon request from the authors.
For the sake of comparison, we recall below the average expendi-
ture composition across the eight municipal functions considered in the
present analysis.
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
MIN 0.08 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03
AVERAGE 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.10
MAX 0.49 0.31 0.23 0.39 0.16 0.33 0.23 0.22
We can observe that imposing weight restrictions gives back more
reliable results, as closer with the current municipal composition. Bud-
get allocation cannot be changed drastically, as otherwise suggested by
the unrestricted results, and a minimum expenditure share is granted to
each function in this way, avoiding zero weights whenever a minimum
amount of investment is required in a certain municipal function.
For completeness, also the descriptive statistics related to the free
variable v contained in the model introduced in Section 2.3 (formula 2.2)
are presented.
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Table A.6: Descriptive statistics of the shadow prices for each municipal
function (Unrestricted unconditional and Robust conditional estimates)
Unrestricted unconditional estimates
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment v
Mean 0.0906 0.0038 0.0667 0.0012 0.0004 0.0214 0.2042 0.9926 -0.1917
SD 0.0476 0.0042 0.1229 0.001 0.0006 0.0257 0.2882 0.3988 0.3611
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.7904
Max 0.2033 0.0166 0.6791 0.005 0.0028 0.1582 2.6924 1.8997 1.0795
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
MinMax weight restrictions
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment v
Mean 0.4134 0.0093 0.1211 0.0016 0.0008 0.0277 0.2085 0.1832 0.4395
SD 0.1219 0.0069 0.0794 0.0015 0.0007 0.0183 0.1098 0.1013 0.1592
Min 0.1101 0.0025 0.0062 0 0.0001 0.0052 0.0549 0.0277 -0.0422
Max 0.6581 0.0348 0.3118 0.0065 0.0026 0.0994 0.5476 0.4386 0.8127
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
Average weight restrictions
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment v
Mean 0.296 0.0146 0.1746 0.0016 0.0008 0.0335 0.2252 0.1975 0.3927
SD 0.0555 0.0041 0.0455 0.0005 0.0003 0.0118 0.0807 0.0567 0.1094
Min 0.1318 0.0079 0.0709 0.0005 0.0003 0.012 0.0628 0.0577 0.0295
Max 0.4483 0.0275 0.2675 0.0027 0.0016 0.0655 0.4308 0.3214 0.6256
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
Municipal-specific weight restrictions
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment v
Mean 0.2948 0.0148 0.1709 0.0015 0.0008 0.0345 0.2229 0.2037 0.3816
SD 0.0992 0.006 0.0658 0.0012 0.0006 0.0186 0.0847 0.0899 0.1479
Min 0.0891 0.0029 0.0073 0 0.0001 0.0026 0.0704 0.0366 -0.0548
Max 0.7595 0.0592 0.3511 0.0067 0.0032 0.0981 0.6727 0.4956 0.7499
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
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Table A.7: Descriptive statistics of the budget shares across the municipal
functions (Unrestricted unconditional and Robust conditional estimates)
Unrestricted unconditional estimates
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
Mean 7% 3% 6% 7% 3% 8% 9% 56%
SD 4% 3% 13% 7% 4% 9% 11% 21%
Min 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Max 18% 19% 67% 47% 23% 51% 61% 89%
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
MinMax weight restrictions
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
Mean 35% 6% 10% 10% 5% 12% 10% 11%
SD 9% 5% 6% 9% 5% 7% 5% 5%
Min 9% 2% 1% 0% 1% 3% 4% 3%
Max 49% 26% 23% 39% 16% 33% 23% 22%
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
Average weight restrictions
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
Mean 25% 10% 14% 10% 5% 14% 11% 12%
SD 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 4% 3% 2%
Min 10% 7% 6% 5% 3% 7% 5% 5%
Max 27% 21% 17% 14% 8% 22% 16% 15%
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
Municipal-specific weight restrictions
Administration Culture Care services Education Housing Local mobility Security Environment
Mean 25% 10% 14% 9% 5% 15% 11% 12%
SD 7% 4% 5% 8% 4% 7% 4% 5%
Min 9% 2% 1% 0% 1% 2% 4% 3%
Max 65% 34% 29% 42% 20% 34% 31% 29%
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
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A.5 Statistical inference results
In the following, the statistical inference results are reported for each
weight restriction specification:
1. MinMax restrictions refer to the minimum and maximum share of
expenditure in each municipal area across all the municipalities;
2. Average restrictions consider the average spending share (lower and
upper bound equal to its ±50%);
3. Municipal-specific restrictions are based on the municipal-specific
current spending allocation (lower and upper bound equal to the
±50% of each municipal spending share).
For the conditional model specification, three groups of background vari-
ables are considered (in every conditional model specification a year dummy
is also included):
1. Model 1 includes the economic and financial characteristics (Fiscal
income, Financial debt and Unemployment);
2. Model 2 adds to the economic and financial characteristics the socio-
demographic structure (Share of elderly people, Share of foreigners
and Population growth);
3. Model 3 adds to the economic-financial and socio-demographic vari-
ables the political component (Ideological Complexion of the local
Government).
For the sake of clarity, we say that the background variable has an un-
favourable influence on the service provision assessment when the mu-
nicipal composite indicator score increases only because the municipality
under assessment is evaluated among similar municipalities: the service
provision it can afford is lower compared with the one of municipali-
ties facing a different context. The opposite holds when a background
variable is found to have a favourable influence.
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Table A.8: Influence of background conditions on municipal service com-
posite indicator
MinMax weight restrictions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value
Economic-financial
Fiscal income Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Financial debt Unfavourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Unemployment Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.170 Unfavourable 0.085 *
Socio-demographic
Residents over 65 Favourable 0.075 * Favourable 0.000 ***
Foreigners Favourable 0.045 ** Favourable 0.080 *
Population growth Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Political
ICG Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Average weight restrictions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value
Economic-financial
Fiscal income Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Financial debt Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Unemployment Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Socio-demographic
Residents over 65 Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.210
Foreigners Favourable 0.100 Favourable 0.030 **
Population growth Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Political
ICG Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Municipal-specific weight restrictions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value
Economic-financial
Fiscal income Unfavourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Financial debt Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Unemployment Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.750 Unfavourable 0.005 ***
Socio-demographic
Residents over 65 Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Foreigners Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.035 **
Population growth Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Political
ICG Unfavourable 0.000 ***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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A.6 Government size results
Table A.9 presents the optimal tax rate computed across the different mo-
del specifications and Figure A.1 shows the “inverted U-relationship”
recurrent in every model specification.
Table A.9: Optimal tax rates across different model specifications
Unconditional Robust Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
MinMax 2.04% 3.65% 5.30% 9.41% 9.51%
Average 5.00% 4.83% 5.29% 9.98% 9.36%
Municipal average 4.07% 3.58% 4.96% 12.15% 11.67%
Note: MinMax restrictions refer to the minimum and maximum share of expenditure in each municipal
area across all the municipalities. Average restrictions consider the average spending share (lower and
upper bound equal to its±50%). Municipal-specific restrictions are based on the municipal-specific current
spending allocation (lower and upper bound equal to the ±50% of each municipal spending share).
Unconditional refers to the baseline Benefit-of-the-Doubt Directional Distance function model, without
correction for outlying observations, as it is instead in the Robust specification. Model 1 includes the
economic and financial characteristics (Fiscal income, Financial debt and Unemployment). Model 2 adds to
the economic and financial characteristics the socio-demographic structure (Share of elderly people, Share
of foreigners and Population growth). Model 3 adds to the economic-financial and socio-demographic
variables the political component (Ideological Complexion of the local Government). In every conditional
model specification a year dummy is also included.
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The municipal tax burden is measured along the horizontal axis and the municipal composite indicator is measured along the vertical axis.
Figure A.1: “Inverted U-relationship” between municipal tax burden and
municipal service provision level
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A.7 Robustness check results
In the following, the main robustness check results are presented. Specif-
ically, this further analysis has been performed excluding from the sam-
ple the 13 largest Flemish cities (so-called “Centrumsteden”), to make
sure that the main findings are not influenced by the municipal size.
Table A.10: Descriptive statistics of the service provision composite indica-
tor scores estimated for 294 municipalities over 2006–2011 (Analysis with-
out “Centrumsteden”)
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Unrestricted Unconditional 0.8324 0.0639 0.6261 1.0000
Unconditional
MinMax restrictions 0.7704 0.0674 0.6219 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.7003 0.0632 0.5790 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.6895 0.0713 0.4933 1.0000
Robust Unconditional
MinMax restrictions 0.9501 0.1171 0.7768 2.1155
Average restrictions 0.8596 0.0973 0.6815 1.5953
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.8519 0.1104 0.6593 1.9019
Robust Conditional Model 1
MinMax restrictions 0.9718 0.0355 0.7820 1.0009
Average restrictions 0.9142 0.0642 0.6893 1.0005
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.9084 0.0703 0.6558 1.0002
Robust Conditional Model 2
MinMax restrictions 0.9967 0.0098 0.8622 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.9836 0.0283 0.7703 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.9821 0.0319 0.7142 1.0000
Robust Conditional Model 3
MinMax restrictions 0.9981 0.0063 0.9059 1.0000
Average restrictions 0.9900 0.0207 0.7771 1.0000
Municipal-specific restrictions 0.9887 0.0241 0.7194 1.0000
Note: Unrestricted indicates the absence of weight restrictions. MinMax restrictions refer
to the minimum and maximum share of expenditure in each municipal area across all the
municipalities. Average restrictions consider the average spending share (lower and up-
per bound equal to its ±50%). Municipal-specific restrictions are based on the municipal-
specific current spending allocation (lower and upper bound equal to the ±50% of each
municipal spending share).
Model 1 includes the economic and financial characteristics (Fiscal income, Financial debt
and Unemployment). Model 2 adds to the economic and financial characteristics the
socio-demographic structure (Share of elderly people, Share of foreigners and Popula-
tion growth). Model 3 adds to the economic-financial and socio-demographic variables
the political component (Ideological Complexion of the local Government). In every con-
ditional model specification a year dummy is also included.
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Table A.11: Influence of background conditions on municipal service com-
posite indicator (Analysis without “Centrumsteden”)
MinMax weight restrictions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value
Economic-financial
Fiscal income Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Financial debt Unfavourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Unemployment Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.075 * Unfavourable 0.155
Socio-demographic
Residents over 65 Favourable 0.995 Favourable 0.005 ***
Foreigners Favourable 0.885 Favourable 0.355
Population growth Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Political
ICG Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Average weight restrictions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value
Economic-financial
Fiscal income Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Financial debt Unfavourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Unemployment Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Socio-demographic
Residents over 65 Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Foreigners Favourable 0.345 Favourable 0.570
Population growth Unfavourable 0.005 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Political
ICG Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Municipal-specific weight restrictions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value
Economic-financial
Fiscal income Unfavourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 *** Favourable 0.000 ***
Financial debt Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Unemployment Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.010 ** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Socio-demographic
Residents over 65 Favourable 0.025 ** Favourable 0.000 ***
Foreigners Favourable 0.005 *** Favourable 0.005 ***
Population growth Unfavourable 0.000 *** Unfavourable 0.000 ***
Political
ICG Unfavourable 0.000 ***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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The municipal tax burden is measured along the horizontal axis and the municipal composite indicator is measured along the vertical axis.
Figure A.2: “Inverted U-relationship” between municipal tax burden and
municipal service provision level (Analysis without “Centrumsteden”)
Table A.10 shows the descriptive statistics of the service provision
composite indicator scores estimated for 294 municipalities over 2006–
2011. Table A.11 presents the statistical influence results for each weight
restriction and each conditional model specification. Figure A.2 shows
the “inverted U-relationship” recurrent in every model specification. The
presented results confirm the findings obtained performing the analysis
over the whole sample.
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B.1 Some essential notions of wastewater treat-
ment
To understand the background of the present analysis, a short descrip-
tion of wastewater treatment is provided. Due to the breadth of the sub-
ject, only the information strictly related to those technical features, ex-
plicitly recalled in the previous sections is provided. For a comprehen-
sive and detailed presentation the reader can refer for example to Metcalf
& Eddy et al. (2003).
Wastewater may be defined as a mix of liquid or water-borne wastes
discharged by houses, commercial properties, factories, farms and pub-
lic institutions. Ground, surface and stormwaters may be also included
as components of the wastewater flow. As a preliminary step, wastew-
ater is collected in sewers and then conveyed to treatment or disposal
facilities. Regarding sewerage, two different systems can be identified:
combined or separate sewerage. The first one transports both stormwa-
ter and wastewater, while separate sewerage is designed either to convey
wastewater (sanitary sewers), or to drain surface runoff (storm sewers).
For both combined and separate sewerage, the estimated dry weather
flow is a relevant value. In fact, during the period of dry weather, infil-
tration and surface runoff have a minimum influence in combined sew-
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erage. Therefore the estimated dry weather flow provides a basis for
works design. Wastewater entering in the treatment plant is called in-
fluent or ingoing water and it is characterized by the presence of sev-
eral physical, chemical and biological constituents such as suspended
solids (Ss), nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), carbon (C) and biodegradable
organics; the latter is usually measured in terms of biochemical oxygen
demand (BOD) and of chemical oxygen demand (COD). Together with
constituents, pathogens and priority pollutants (e.g. heavy metals, phar-
maceutical molecules) can be found in the influent wastewater. One of
the main objectives of a wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) should be
the removal of as many contaminants as possible and the purification
of the water for further reuse. A suitable wastewater treatment should
guarantee an acceptable level of overall water quality and this can be
done by using different methods. The treatment methods which exploit
physical phenomena are referred as Unit Operations (UO); on the other
hand, if the removal of contaminants is based on chemical reactions, then
the process is called Unit Process (UP).
To ensure a certain level of contaminant removal, unit operations and
processes are jointly performed according to different wastewater treat-
ment technologies:
• preliminary treatment removes gross solids (large objects, rags, grit);
• primary treatment eliminates floating and settable materials;
• advanced primary treatment allows the removal of suspended solids;
• secondary treatment eliminates organic contaminants thanks to bi-
ological and chemical processes which are carried out;
• tertiary treatment eliminates other pollutants that cannot be removed
by means of primary and secondary treatments.
The secondary treatment removes also nitrogen and phosphorus (in this
context they are also referred as nutrients) together with other pathogens
and some heavy metals (Metcalf & Eddy et al., 2003). Among the differ-
ent technologies that can be used in the secondary treatment, it is worth
mentioning the activated sludge process. This can be considered as the
main biological process in secondary treatment and it basically refers to a
mass of microorganisms metabolizing the suspended and soluble matter
in an aeration basin. Solids and in particular biosolids can be consid-
ered by-products of the wastewater treatment; they are often referred to
as “sludge” and they are by far the largest removed constituents. After
a primary treatment, solids can be further biologically, chemically or by
heat treated (e.g. stabilization, composting, dewatering, drying, thicken-
ing) so to get them suitable for reuse (agriculture, home gardens...). The
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term biosolids indicates that solids are further treated and an important
distinction between class A biosolids and class B biosolids has to be made
(Metcalf & Eddy et al., 2003). Biosolids belonging to the first class are also
known as “clean sludge” while Class B biosolids have a reduced concen-
tration of pathogens and other unhealthy contaminants (mainly metals),
but they do not satisfy specific legal requirements and therefore their ap-
plication to land is strictly regulated. Sludge which is not eligible for fur-
ther use, is then transported to either landfill or incinerators. Moreover,
among the other constituents, nitrogen occupies a preeminent position
in wastewater treatment activities; excessive concentrations of nitrogen
can be harmful to humans and wildlife. Nitrogen can be found in the
wastewater under various forms, namely organic nitrogen and inorganic
nitrogen which is in turn divided into ammonia nitrogen, nitrite nitro-
gen and nitrate nitrogen. Ammonia concentrations can affect hatching
and growth rates of fish. If excessive amounts of nitrates are discharged
into the aquatic environment, it can lead to the growth of undesirable
aquatic life and then to eutrophication. Nitrate can even affect human
health if it is present in drinking water. Moreover, a great discharged of
total nitrogen onto land can lead to the pollution of groundwater, caus-
ing excessive vegetative growth and a reduction of crop quality. Due to
this, many alternative technologies have been designed to remove total
nitrogen from wastewater (suspended growth nitrification and denitrifi-
cation variations, attached growth nitrification and denitrification vari-
ations, biological nutrient removal variations). On the other hand, it is
almost impossible to completely remove nitrogen from wastewater re-
maining in the effluent flow.
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B.2 Water Performance Indexes results
In the following, the Water efficiency Performance Index (WPI) results
for 96 wastewater treatment plants are reported, according to different
model specifications and two sets of weights: the label “Non-radial”
refers to the set of weights proposed by Zhou et al. (2012), while the
label “AHP-non-radial” is related to the set of weights obtained apply-
ing the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach. The indexes WPI1,
WPI2 and WPI3 have been defined according to the following model
specifications:
Table B.1: Indexes
Input model Input/Good Out. model Input/Good/Bad Out. model
β β = (βx) β = (βx, βy) β = (βx, βy, βb)
g g = (−x, 0, 0) g = (−x, y, 0) g = (−x, y,−b)
Index WPI1 = 1−
N∑
n=1
wxnβxn WPI2 =
1−
N∑
n=1
wxnβxn
1 +
M∑
m=1
wymβym
WPI3 =
1−
 N∑
n=1
wxnβxn +
J∑
j=1
wbjβbj

1 +
M∑
m=1
wymβym
WPI0 has been constructed by considering a non-radial Directional
Distance Function model where the undesirable output is completely ig-
nored for the sake of comparison with the other model specifications.
Referring to the parameter specification, the form of β and g has been
set as β = (βx, βy) and g = (−x, y), while the equality constraint asso-
ciated with the weak disposability of the undesirable output has been
cancelled. The set of weights of WPI0 coincides with the one for WPI2.
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Table B.2: Water efficiency Performance Indexes results
Non-radial AHP-non-radial
WWTP WPI0 WPI1 WPI2 WPI3 WPI0 WPI1 WPI2 WPI3
1 0.726 0.776 0.735 0.778 0.652 0.695 0.688 0.791
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
4 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
5 0.431 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.423 1.000 1.000 1.000
6 0.282 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.347 1.000 1.000 1.000
7 0.342 0.545 0.367 0.434 0.397 0.463 0.437 0.574
8 0.662 0.792 0.790 0.893 0.772 0.903 0.903 0.959
9 0.190 0.402 0.232 0.260 0.223 0.342 0.297 0.565
10 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
11 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
12 0.082 0.473 0.083 0.090 0.236 0.441 0.237 0.411
13 0.286 0.241 0.252 0.540 0.208 0.241 0.242 0.686
14 0.198 0.184 0.197 0.332 0.154 0.208 0.220 0.474
15 0.291 0.404 0.409 0.683 0.251 0.492 0.492 0.814
16 0.426 0.430 0.440 0.436 0.350 0.480 0.480 0.509
17 0.709 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.706 1.000 1.000 1.000
18 0.287 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.184 1.000 1.000 1.000
19 0.415 0.417 0.423 0.400 0.290 0.418 0.335 0.381
20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
21 0.192 0.415 0.356 0.439 0.161 0.423 0.423 0.695
22 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
23 0.236 0.240 0.272 0.325 0.151 0.248 0.241 0.342
24 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
25 0.647 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.561 1.000 1.000 1.000
26 0.355 0.465 0.365 0.284 0.324 0.445 0.358 0.376
27 0.397 0.416 0.473 0.575 0.265 0.428 0.428 0.632
28 0.247 0.501 0.253 0.268 0.419 0.518 0.497 0.454
29 0.631 0.697 0.697 0.728 0.551 0.705 0.705 0.666
30 0.321 0.522 0.343 0.395 0.414 0.457 0.451 0.605
31 0.195 0.395 0.220 0.267 0.231 0.307 0.308 0.589
32 0.366 0.431 0.417 0.483 0.225 0.415 0.385 0.585
33 0.403 0.550 0.594 0.653 0.271 0.580 0.580 0.709
34 0.194 0.400 0.241 0.312 0.219 0.284 0.287 0.548
35 0.497 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.522 1.000 1.000 1.000
36 0.469 0.525 0.573 0.539 0.366 0.546 0.484 0.515
37 0.186 0.282 0.307 0.324 0.107 0.287 0.219 0.357
38 0.374 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.677 1.000 1.000 1.000
39 0.252 0.589 0.333 0.370 0.437 0.630 0.630 0.774
40 0.399 1.000 1.000 0.304 0.335 1.000 1.000 0.245
41 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.580 0.822 1.000 1.000 0.446
42 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
43 0.048 0.158 0.048 0.050 0.099 0.173 0.134 0.122
44 0.375 0.521 0.456 0.574 0.543 0.576 0.547 0.773
45 0.338 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.515 1.000 1.000 1.000
46 0.182 0.462 0.311 0.444 0.138 0.554 0.286 0.569
47 0.179 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.125 1.000 1.000 1.000
48 0.027 0.585 0.048 0.049 0.085 0.527 0.141 0.174
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49 0.293 0.399 0.431 0.483 0.201 0.438 0.380 0.521
50 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
51 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
52 0.279 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.332 1.000 1.000 1.000
53 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
54 0.335 0.477 0.354 0.341 0.243 0.542 0.317 0.289
55 0.144 0.410 0.222 0.322 0.123 0.267 0.234 0.565
56 0.150 0.246 0.167 0.183 0.113 0.229 0.227 0.493
57 0.067 0.261 0.074 0.097 0.098 0.187 0.130 0.179
58 0.052 0.158 0.056 0.054 0.070 0.149 0.124 0.215
59 0.126 0.242 0.154 0.214 0.088 0.225 0.212 0.534
60 0.286 0.509 0.476 0.555 0.163 0.367 0.331 0.603
61 0.438 0.479 0.459 0.431 0.292 0.516 0.376 0.370
62 0.262 0.634 0.344 0.194 0.402 0.780 0.407 0.240
63 0.415 0.669 0.427 0.395 0.405 0.701 0.480 0.345
64 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
65 0.595 0.649 0.605 0.505 0.521 0.693 0.539 0.412
66 0.275 0.587 0.332 0.320 0.312 0.565 0.543 0.562
67 0.335 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.464 1.000 1.000 1.000
68 0.079 0.429 0.112 0.104 0.086 0.346 0.175 0.171
69 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
70 0.216 0.525 0.227 0.174 0.298 0.583 0.398 0.318
71 0.399 0.679 0.405 0.341 0.267 0.737 0.310 0.242
72 0.136 0.506 0.200 0.219 0.260 0.508 0.418 0.690
73 0.397 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.365 1.000 1.000 1.000
74 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
75 0.157 0.395 0.280 0.350 0.087 0.338 0.270 0.500
76 0.228 0.500 0.274 0.233 0.170 0.503 0.453 0.487
77 0.317 0.534 0.328 0.289 0.233 0.619 0.314 0.268
78 0.159 0.522 0.310 0.375 0.085 0.348 0.185 0.307
79 0.233 0.553 0.364 0.408 0.159 0.552 0.365 0.403
80 0.312 0.453 0.389 0.365 0.206 0.368 0.308 0.349
81 0.107 0.400 0.165 0.136 0.082 0.312 0.157 0.217
82 0.049 0.365 0.050 0.055 0.114 0.371 0.130 0.067
83 0.287 0.486 0.382 0.380 0.171 0.427 0.298 0.343
84 0.259 0.507 0.259 0.255 0.166 0.497 0.198 0.187
85 0.353 0.541 0.510 0.580 0.262 0.611 0.477 0.490
86 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
87 0.158 0.329 0.204 0.237 0.089 0.304 0.164 0.218
88 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
89 0.138 0.434 0.173 0.129 0.090 0.438 0.219 0.242
90 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
91 0.095 0.504 0.235 0.277 0.049 0.413 0.185 0.273
92 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
93 0.058 0.615 0.212 0.234 0.032 0.548 0.160 0.236
94 0.092 0.622 0.266 0.239 0.063 0.500 0.304 0.456
95 0.131 0.604 0.312 0.374 0.069 0.520 0.184 0.309
96 0.297 0.741 0.431 0.457 0.235 0.797 0.457 0.370
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C.1 Municipal efficiency scores and composite
indicators at local and global level
Table C.1: Municipal efficiency scores and composite indicators at local and
global level
Municipality General Local Educational Road Social DEA-like Municipal Tuscan
administation police services maintenance services overall weights weights
Abbadia San Salvatore 0.683 0.422 0.421 0.263 0.772 0.490 0.561 0.589
Abetone 0.215 0.020 0.316 0.032 0.394 0.197 0.139 0.236
Agliana 0.969 0.604 0.504 0.430 0.427 0.567 0.622 0.671
Altopascio 0.681 0.522 0.770 0.842 0.952 0.751 0.742 0.766
Anghiari 0.654 0.453 0.508 0.224 0.177 0.406 0.409 0.451
Arcidosso 0.474 0.352 0.297 0.294 0.511 0.371 0.416 0.422
Arezzo 0.845 1.000 0.785 1.000 1.000 0.918 0.903 0.902
Asciano 0.556 0.572 0.369 0.304 0.441 0.439 0.470 0.469
Aulla 0.599 0.750 0.310 0.209 0.873 0.521 0.511 0.580
Badia Tedalda 0.634 0.231 0.181 0.138 0.050 0.229 0.246 0.331
Bagni di Lucca 0.458 0.343 0.305 0.170 0.578 0.356 0.383 0.417
Bagno a Ripoli 0.676 0.467 0.359 0.371 0.695 0.489 0.569 0.574
Bagnone 0.267 0.241 0.346 0.133 0.467 0.291 0.269 0.309
Barberino di Mugello 0.605 0.538 0.398 0.336 0.414 0.449 0.493 0.489
Barberino Val d’Elsa 0.328 0.760 0.510 0.543 0.196 0.486 0.354 0.388
Barga 0.514 0.380 0.225 0.246 1.000 0.438 0.439 0.536
Bibbiena 0.760 0.828 0.506 0.336 0.687 0.608 0.649 0.655
Bibbona 0.294 0.419 0.190 0.331 0.231 0.288 0.279 0.277
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Bientina 0.774 0.511 0.497 0.478 0.242 0.495 0.537 0.547
Borgo a Mozzano 0.517 0.440 0.423 0.187 0.517 0.410 0.438 0.455
Borgo San Lorenzo 0.753 0.606 0.492 0.241 0.460 0.500 0.543 0.568
Buggiano 0.706 0.670 0.380 0.738 0.374 0.559 0.556 0.575
Buonconvento 0.468 0.253 0.405 0.369 0.135 0.330 0.344 0.351
Buti 0.693 0.356 0.537 0.278 0.287 0.429 0.500 0.495
Calci 0.557 0.473 0.477 0.345 0.239 0.421 0.451 0.437
Calcinaia 0.693 0.531 0.651 0.452 0.457 0.560 0.602 0.589
Calenzano 0.652 0.404 0.526 0.460 0.444 0.493 0.537 0.540
Camaiore 0.659 0.373 0.526 0.288 0.571 0.475 0.545 0.549
Campagnatico 0.488 0.258 0.475 0.170 0.310 0.344 0.395 0.388
Campi Bisenzio 0.563 0.683 1.000 0.362 1.000 0.741 0.693 0.723
Campiglia Marittima 0.643 0.381 0.565 0.573 0.505 0.530 0.565 0.569
Campo nell’Elba 0.249 0.374 0.271 0.172 0.598 0.325 0.264 0.335
Camporgiano 0.895 0.159 0.306 0.159 0.602 0.387 0.471 0.581
Cantagallo 0.407 0.407 0.945 0.199 0.242 0.484 0.387 0.433
Capalbio 0.436 0.323 0.268 0.364 0.284 0.326 0.367 0.355
Capannoli 0.757 0.668 0.661 0.636 0.321 0.614 0.626 0.618
Capannori 0.526 1.000 0.616 1.000 0.707 0.773 0.630 0.678
Capoliveri 0.301 0.257 0.298 0.215 0.384 0.288 0.290 0.306
Capolona 0.846 0.653 0.380 0.314 0.399 0.497 0.571 0.585
Capraia e Limite 0.811 1.000 0.599 0.477 0.391 0.654 0.659 0.653
Capraia Isola 0.488 0.071 0.447 1.000 1.000 0.581 0.467 0.629
Caprese Michelangelo 0.622 0.158 0.258 0.141 0.241 0.266 0.380 0.377
Careggine 0.470 0.251 0.748 0.181 0.503 0.448 0.440 0.471
Carmignano 0.945 0.556 0.496 0.517 0.437 0.571 0.638 0.669
Carrara 0.735 0.585 0.607 0.363 0.956 0.633 0.673 0.708
Casale Marittimo 0.552 0.135 0.393 1.000 0.159 0.445 0.428 0.455
Casciana Terme 0.526 0.419 0.616 0.393 0.492 0.496 0.516 0.508
Cascina 0.807 0.952 0.574 1.000 0.881 0.824 0.793 0.820
Casola in Lunigiana 0.529 0.067 0.278 0.101 0.416 0.261 0.346 0.373
Casole d’Elsa 0.473 0.551 0.259 0.298 0.203 0.349 0.357 0.359
Castagneto Carducci 0.449 0.319 0.344 0.486 0.295 0.375 0.384 0.390
Castel del Piano 0.514 0.546 0.411 0.274 0.711 0.478 0.488 0.516
Castel Focognano 0.664 0.465 0.286 0.150 0.361 0.366 0.419 0.453
Castel San Niccol 0.630 0.579 0.284 0.181 0.112 0.347 0.329 0.394
Castelfiorentino 0.838 0.612 0.404 0.621 0.831 0.629 0.704 0.720
Castelfranco di Sopra 0.720 0.415 0.431 0.237 0.070 0.371 0.346 0.438
Castelfranco di Sotto 0.596 0.689 1.000 0.405 0.533 0.676 0.601 0.633
Castell’Azzara 0.414 0.220 0.238 0.185 0.378 0.275 0.345 0.333
Castellina in Chianti 0.445 0.261 0.296 0.422 0.247 0.328 0.363 0.357
Castellina Marittima 0.499 0.305 0.361 0.295 0.255 0.339 0.411 0.379
Castelnuovo Berardenga 0.619 0.862 0.389 0.569 0.194 0.524 0.451 0.495
Castelnuovo di Garfagnana 0.526 0.289 0.366 0.316 0.210 0.338 0.385 0.381
Castelnuovo di Val di Cecina 0.435 0.329 0.335 0.711 0.227 0.406 0.388 0.395
Castiglion Fibocchi 0.541 0.192 0.585 0.140 0.458 0.387 0.432 0.453
Castiglione d’Orcia 0.442 0.266 0.316 0.272 0.514 0.350 0.388 0.403
Castiglione della Pescaia 0.205 0.192 0.254 0.143 0.261 0.213 0.204 0.217
Castiglione di Garfagnana 0.700 0.451 0.364 0.149 0.408 0.398 0.459 0.490
Cavriglia 0.553 0.733 0.492 0.532 0.294 0.525 0.490 0.494
Cecina 0.696 0.501 0.581 0.319 0.702 0.550 0.620 0.617
Cerreto Guidi 0.872 0.508 0.370 0.611 0.398 0.527 0.574 0.618
Certaldo 0.705 0.643 0.366 0.264 0.816 0.531 0.590 0.616
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Cetona 0.502 0.287 0.379 0.343 0.318 0.361 0.420 0.403
Chianciano Terme 0.475 0.302 0.270 0.269 0.671 0.376 0.410 0.448
Chianni 0.455 0.171 0.196 0.160 0.301 0.241 0.313 0.318
Chiesina Uzzanese 0.816 0.281 0.544 0.323 0.521 0.483 0.594 0.600
Chitignano 0.792 0.073 0.498 0.258 0.161 0.350 0.486 0.474
Chiusdino 0.417 1.000 0.243 0.267 0.290 0.438 0.350 0.387
Chiusi 0.678 0.370 0.473 0.275 0.739 0.489 0.571 0.585
Chiusi della Verna 0.496 0.243 0.170 0.149 0.392 0.268 0.325 0.355
Cinigiano 0.493 0.203 0.215 0.178 0.761 0.341 0.376 0.448
Civitella in Val di Chiana 0.868 1.000 0.465 0.399 0.169 0.572 0.467 0.592
Civitella Paganico 0.330 0.205 0.250 0.201 0.111 0.219 0.239 0.240
Colle di Val d’Elsa 0.893 0.555 0.680 0.299 1.000 0.666 0.759 0.784
Collesalvetti 0.661 0.576 0.399 0.403 0.683 0.525 0.579 0.585
Comano 0.699 0.143 0.330 0.179 0.198 0.295 0.423 0.414
Coreglia Antelminelli 0.542 0.758 0.528 0.233 0.254 0.471 0.448 0.452
Cortona 0.795 0.688 0.340 0.283 0.715 0.533 0.607 0.630
Crespina 0.527 0.353 0.333 0.267 0.273 0.343 0.406 0.390
Cutigliano 0.327 0.163 0.268 0.079 0.727 0.296 0.253 0.367
Dicomano 0.860 0.789 0.335 0.250 0.318 0.488 0.514 0.567
Empoli 1.000 0.552 0.506 0.617 0.683 0.643 0.731 0.762
Fabbriche di Vallico 0.345 0.068 0.854 0.180 0.158 0.362 0.322 0.344
Fauglia 0.494 0.525 0.400 0.410 0.530 0.464 0.471 0.479
Fiesole 0.420 0.328 0.505 0.317 0.830 0.474 0.473 0.510
Figline Valdarno 0.784 0.295 0.669 0.334 0.540 0.521 0.584 0.615
Filattiera 0.552 0.157 0.289 0.140 0.367 0.286 0.373 0.384
Firenzuola 0.566 0.646 0.251 0.277 0.334 0.399 0.408 0.431
Fivizzano 0.616 0.285 0.207 0.210 0.841 0.394 0.445 0.525
Foiano della Chiana 0.753 0.514 0.289 0.584 0.340 0.473 0.489 0.540
Follonica 0.402 0.368 0.630 0.341 0.827 0.518 0.487 0.529
Forte dei Marmi 0.162 0.104 0.131 0.167 0.205 0.150 0.156 0.163
Fosciandora 0.399 1.000 0.754 0.348 0.173 0.570 0.410 0.447
Fosdinovo 0.641 0.582 0.439 0.315 1.000 0.570 0.571 0.647
Fucecchio 0.865 0.599 0.652 0.363 0.833 0.647 0.744 0.740
Gaiole in Chianti 0.459 0.332 0.229 0.491 0.408 0.368 0.384 0.402
Gallicano 0.371 0.265 0.283 0.172 0.181 0.253 0.292 0.280
Gambassi Terme 0.825 0.511 0.337 0.422 0.324 0.462 0.546 0.554
Gavorrano 0.620 0.660 0.420 0.332 0.850 0.556 0.574 0.609
Giuncugnano 0.782 0.077 0.493 0.232 0.279 0.363 0.527 0.494
Greve in Chianti 0.749 1.000 0.401 1.000 0.563 0.724 0.664 0.698
Grosseto 0.938 0.575 0.525 0.994 0.782 0.736 0.773 0.811
Guardistallo 0.480 0.162 0.438 0.274 0.284 0.329 0.411 0.377
Impruneta 0.568 0.542 0.531 0.319 0.701 0.526 0.561 0.560
Incisa in Val d’Arno 0.703 0.413 0.330 0.313 0.239 0.385 0.444 0.463
Isola del Giglio 0.226 0.049 0.603 0.296 0.818 0.408 0.248 0.421
Lajatico 0.458 0.190 0.468 0.202 0.314 0.330 0.382 0.374
Lamporecchio 1.000 0.618 0.328 0.398 0.589 0.548 0.633 0.689
Larciano 0.719 0.478 0.408 0.388 0.452 0.473 0.555 0.546
Lari 0.556 0.357 0.317 0.402 0.532 0.415 0.463 0.476
Lastra a Signa 0.581 0.763 0.552 0.893 0.595 0.675 0.602 0.632
Laterina 0.673 0.453 0.453 0.325 0.434 0.458 0.541 0.521
Licciana Nardi 0.623 0.300 0.264 0.213 0.396 0.338 0.421 0.435
Livorno 0.697 0.935 0.665 0.674 0.596 0.715 0.677 0.684
Londa 0.521 0.384 0.634 0.112 0.181 0.384 0.388 0.400
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Lorenzana 0.662 0.104 0.425 0.276 0.341 0.351 0.481 0.457
Loro Ciuffenna 0.771 0.464 0.365 0.254 0.251 0.406 0.473 0.496
Lucca 0.935 0.613 0.744 0.559 0.472 0.663 0.661 0.724
Lucignano 0.549 0.278 0.409 0.277 0.101 0.324 0.331 0.367
Magliano in Toscana 0.425 0.249 0.377 0.487 0.455 0.393 0.408 0.418
Manciano 0.498 0.467 0.382 0.277 1.000 0.502 0.493 0.567
Marciana 0.256 0.167 0.222 0.138 0.193 0.194 0.218 0.214
Marciana Marina 0.227 0.080 0.321 0.151 0.244 0.210 0.216 0.226
Marciano della Chiana 0.812 0.397 0.373 0.328 0.527 0.462 0.563 0.581
Marliana 0.557 0.428 0.361 0.399 0.320 0.405 0.462 0.440
Marradi 0.584 0.290 0.485 0.187 0.203 0.352 0.401 0.407
Massa 0.624 1.000 0.742 0.925 0.693 0.805 0.703 0.726
Massa e Cozzile 0.867 0.479 0.408 0.437 0.523 0.518 0.618 0.628
Massa Marittima 0.553 0.383 0.558 0.369 0.533 0.479 0.515 0.513
Massarosa 0.582 0.588 0.425 0.611 0.474 0.528 0.527 0.535
Minucciano 0.478 0.690 0.253 0.117 0.351 0.366 0.344 0.384
Molazzana 0.518 0.123 0.483 0.142 0.184 0.295 0.365 0.358
Monsummano Terme 0.780 0.503 0.505 0.574 0.575 0.572 0.637 0.640
Montaione 0.397 0.344 0.290 0.606 0.020 0.334 0.127 0.313
Montalcino 0.306 0.244 0.370 0.168 0.147 0.256 0.247 0.258
Montale 0.763 0.430 0.307 0.713 0.400 0.498 0.530 0.570
Monte Argentario 0.379 0.205 0.597 0.505 0.517 0.451 0.403 0.448
Monte San Savino 0.792 0.442 0.567 0.280 0.516 0.510 0.593 0.601
Montecarlo 0.899 0.509 0.656 0.334 0.293 0.536 0.603 0.618
Montecatini Val di Cecina 0.424 0.577 0.237 0.927 0.388 0.498 0.450 0.457
Montecatini-Terme 0.449 0.206 0.428 0.202 0.963 0.432 0.450 0.516
Montelupo Fiorentino 0.830 0.534 0.396 0.264 0.605 0.500 0.577 0.614
Montemignaio 0.502 0.143 0.342 0.114 0.074 0.234 0.293 0.300
Montemurlo 0.512 0.409 0.497 0.334 0.596 0.465 0.503 0.499
Montepulciano 0.566 0.505 0.464 0.284 0.570 0.470 0.513 0.511
Monterchi 0.573 0.213 0.329 0.173 0.482 0.337 0.413 0.434
Monteriggioni 0.675 0.527 0.337 0.298 0.359 0.423 0.477 0.488
Monteroni d’Arbia 0.696 0.384 0.294 0.485 0.192 0.394 0.384 0.462
Montescudaio 0.480 0.062 0.590 0.319 0.202 0.344 0.353 0.381
Montespertoli 0.762 0.554 0.553 0.735 0.653 0.638 0.678 0.682
Montevarchi 0.696 0.515 0.463 0.361 0.859 0.557 0.643 0.640
Monteverdi Marittimo 0.263 0.252 0.389 1.000 0.239 0.438 0.294 0.366
Monticiano 0.409 0.215 0.247 0.211 0.376 0.280 0.330 0.335
Montieri 0.258 0.044 0.291 0.206 0.396 0.236 0.259 0.272
Montignoso 0.608 0.285 0.508 0.160 0.429 0.394 0.440 0.470
Montopoli in Val d’Arno 0.887 0.483 0.524 0.469 0.469 0.550 0.639 0.647
Mulazzo 0.730 0.189 0.541 0.099 0.302 0.368 0.411 0.479
Murlo 0.474 1.000 0.337 0.502 0.225 0.508 0.425 0.439
Orbetello 0.455 0.327 0.342 0.389 0.350 0.367 0.395 0.394
Orciano Pisano 1.000 0.053 0.528 0.504 0.178 0.438 0.590 0.595
Ortignano Raggiolo 0.734 0.097 0.318 0.150 0.072 0.260 0.345 0.389
Palaia 0.589 0.333 0.397 0.263 0.377 0.383 0.449 0.448
Palazzuolo sul Senio 0.397 0.206 0.554 0.186 0.043 0.298 0.237 0.300
Peccioli 0.298 0.428 0.258 0.257 0.069 0.266 0.217 0.243
Pelago 0.649 0.379 0.337 0.384 0.333 0.402 0.468 0.470
Pergine Valdarno 0.794 0.321 0.467 0.309 0.389 0.442 0.568 0.549
Pescaglia 0.631 0.246 0.321 0.114 0.290 0.306 0.369 0.407
Pescia 0.695 0.435 0.429 0.285 0.783 0.503 0.591 0.601
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Pian di Sco 0.813 0.582 0.545 0.344 0.360 0.522 0.605 0.588
Piancastagnaio 0.707 0.487 0.412 0.251 0.274 0.416 0.486 0.485
Piazza al Serchio 0.730 0.401 0.342 0.191 0.354 0.385 0.483 0.486
Pienza 0.464 0.207 0.262 0.184 0.316 0.275 0.347 0.342
Pietrasanta 0.428 0.274 0.424 0.259 0.503 0.374 0.408 0.412
Pieve a Nievole 0.985 0.382 0.391 0.544 0.376 0.507 0.590 0.643
Pieve Fosciana 0.672 0.476 0.486 0.416 0.420 0.487 0.571 0.536
Pieve Santo Stefano 0.571 0.837 0.393 0.193 0.068 0.416 0.285 0.400
Piombino 0.654 0.362 0.559 0.207 0.846 0.512 0.580 0.606
Pisa 0.553 0.555 0.608 0.442 0.723 0.575 0.578 0.588
Pistoia 0.784 0.858 0.487 0.490 0.763 0.656 0.677 0.700
Piteglio 0.351 0.177 0.234 0.137 0.400 0.249 0.291 0.304
Pitigliano 0.485 0.377 0.371 0.257 0.946 0.465 0.452 0.537
Podenzana 0.756 0.119 0.365 0.250 0.348 0.348 0.482 0.484
Poggibonsi 1.000 0.460 0.395 0.404 0.918 0.592 0.712 0.765
Poggio a Caiano 0.378 0.583 0.403 0.738 0.442 0.509 0.416 0.457
Pomarance 0.310 0.477 0.336 0.282 0.432 0.367 0.334 0.353
Ponsacco 0.893 0.647 0.439 0.562 0.951 0.663 0.737 0.771
Pontassieve 0.594 0.495 0.303 0.429 0.424 0.433 0.466 0.478
Ponte Buggianese 0.962 0.843 0.421 0.744 0.725 0.706 0.747 0.781
Pontedera 0.493 0.384 0.364 0.151 0.640 0.393 0.440 0.456
Pontremoli 0.457 0.494 0.339 0.273 0.558 0.413 0.431 0.441
Poppi 0.717 0.382 0.436 0.239 0.113 0.373 0.336 0.445
Porcari 0.653 0.509 0.452 0.431 0.276 0.460 0.485 0.493
Porto Azzurro 0.396 0.272 0.889 0.221 0.326 0.457 0.388 0.430
Portoferraio 0.498 0.432 0.471 0.254 0.411 0.413 0.439 0.438
Prato 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Pratovecchio 0.787 0.437 0.355 0.159 0.159 0.365 0.394 0.465
Quarrata 0.898 0.600 0.456 0.331 0.704 0.570 0.662 0.687
Radda in Chianti 0.387 0.276 0.437 0.298 0.426 0.367 0.371 0.385
Radicofani 0.441 0.076 0.402 0.118 0.292 0.265 0.340 0.331
Radicondoli 0.149 0.063 0.191 0.224 0.153 0.158 0.156 0.159
Rapolano Terme 0.495 0.371 0.425 0.321 0.379 0.396 0.437 0.425
Reggello 0.811 0.808 0.612 0.240 0.550 0.598 0.619 0.648
Rignano sull’Arno 0.854 0.624 0.365 0.706 0.325 0.553 0.567 0.613
Rio Marina 0.314 0.216 0.216 0.207 0.540 0.284 0.288 0.329
Rio nell’Elba 0.185 0.096 0.422 0.154 0.198 0.227 0.198 0.217
Riparbella 0.412 0.802 0.499 1.000 0.326 0.618 0.457 0.509
Roccalbegna 0.419 0.077 0.252 0.143 0.451 0.254 0.329 0.338
Roccastrada 0.685 0.518 0.295 0.400 0.995 0.541 0.587 0.645
Rosignano Marittimo 0.527 0.393 0.280 0.178 0.453 0.350 0.405 0.416
Rufina 0.780 0.277 0.465 0.509 0.262 0.448 0.506 0.534
Sambuca Pistoiese 0.426 0.446 0.390 0.116 1.000 0.457 0.369 0.518
San Casciano dei Bagni 0.404 0.234 0.181 0.217 0.267 0.247 0.309 0.299
San Casciano in Val di Pesa 0.807 0.459 0.371 0.286 0.765 0.506 0.596 0.634
San Gimignano 0.470 0.279 0.285 0.105 0.283 0.276 0.306 0.336
San Giovanni d’Asso 0.348 0.078 1.000 0.142 0.399 0.438 0.338 0.421
San Giovanni Valdarno 0.650 0.478 0.435 0.315 0.555 0.473 0.542 0.538
San Giuliano Terme 0.505 0.459 0.867 0.448 0.791 0.632 0.587 0.621
San Godenzo 0.437 1.000 0.483 0.087 0.216 0.458 0.331 0.396
San Marcello Pistoiese 0.624 0.426 0.289 0.210 0.600 0.405 0.468 0.497
San Miniato 0.624 0.519 0.596 0.428 0.614 0.554 0.593 0.585
San Piero a Sieve 0.708 0.507 0.331 0.309 0.266 0.409 0.475 0.478
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San Quirico d’Orcia 0.530 0.337 0.410 0.336 0.437 0.403 0.462 0.450
San Romano in Garfagnana 0.453 0.249 0.673 0.104 0.101 0.341 0.313 0.349
San Vincenzo 0.297 0.359 0.420 0.264 0.225 0.324 0.293 0.302
Sansepolcro 0.745 0.578 0.418 0.264 0.919 0.556 0.637 0.660
Santa Croce sull’Arno 0.659 0.500 0.461 0.357 0.444 0.475 0.517 0.527
Santa Fiora 0.479 0.186 0.356 0.228 0.395 0.321 0.393 0.385
Santa Luce 0.473 0.839 0.260 0.432 0.215 0.438 0.394 0.402
Santa Maria a Monte 0.848 0.965 0.544 0.482 0.505 0.658 0.674 0.683
Sarteano 0.551 0.409 0.401 0.343 0.087 0.360 0.296 0.382
Sassetta 0.460 0.247 0.568 0.650 0.305 0.457 0.469 0.448
Scandicci 0.950 0.529 0.382 0.450 0.857 0.593 0.699 0.740
Scansano 0.410 0.296 0.343 0.254 0.518 0.356 0.387 0.396
Scarlino 0.348 0.246 0.433 0.244 0.227 0.309 0.323 0.313
Scarperia 0.516 0.522 0.359 0.279 0.355 0.400 0.430 0.424
Seggiano 0.380 0.073 0.365 0.175 0.344 0.266 0.335 0.320
Semproniano 0.506 0.073 0.201 0.226 0.283 0.240 0.354 0.335
Seravezza 0.649 0.463 0.398 0.427 0.581 0.487 0.556 0.550
Serravalle Pistoiese 0.837 0.565 0.687 0.427 0.386 0.581 0.620 0.636
Sestino 0.710 0.113 0.325 0.131 0.215 0.283 0.401 0.413
Sesto Fiorentino 0.827 0.360 0.766 0.514 0.564 0.607 0.650 0.681
Siena 0.406 0.329 0.256 0.335 0.523 0.355 0.394 0.394
Signa 0.742 0.677 0.566 0.454 0.659 0.609 0.658 0.653
Sillano 0.488 0.442 0.317 0.107 0.236 0.313 0.335 0.351
Sinalunga 0.703 0.758 0.487 0.390 0.834 0.615 0.657 0.664
Sorano 0.557 0.456 0.302 0.326 0.560 0.422 0.475 0.480
Sovicille 0.797 0.942 0.309 0.590 0.529 0.607 0.590 0.640
Stazzema 0.549 0.410 0.261 0.109 0.224 0.299 0.336 0.361
Stia 0.597 0.474 0.336 0.198 0.321 0.374 0.434 0.431
Subbiano 0.772 0.863 0.470 0.196 0.422 0.534 0.542 0.578
Suvereto 0.760 0.375 0.473 0.539 0.274 0.476 0.546 0.542
Talla 0.616 0.200 0.302 0.143 0.205 0.281 0.384 0.378
Tavarnelle Val di Pesa 0.585 0.715 0.563 0.160 0.371 0.484 0.454 0.491
Terranuova Bracciolini 0.448 0.443 0.467 0.404 0.398 0.435 0.436 0.434
Terricciola 0.603 0.403 0.493 0.217 0.311 0.405 0.457 0.454
Torrita di Siena 0.653 0.686 0.411 0.262 0.990 0.574 0.574 0.647
Trequanda 0.417 0.216 0.298 0.182 0.261 0.270 0.341 0.316
Tresana 0.551 0.426 0.445 0.304 0.437 0.428 0.487 0.467
Uzzano 0.802 0.602 0.515 0.648 0.334 0.572 0.625 0.611
Vagli Sotto 0.342 0.390 0.380 0.129 0.478 0.343 0.315 0.358
Vaglia 0.518 0.318 0.361 0.258 0.143 0.318 0.358 0.357
Vaiano 0.702 0.538 0.309 0.456 0.447 0.469 0.524 0.535
Vecchiano 0.742 0.370 0.561 0.460 0.592 0.534 0.613 0.613
Vernio 0.550 0.538 0.320 0.380 0.264 0.402 0.428 0.424
Viareggio 0.434 0.320 0.511 0.436 0.493 0.442 0.446 0.452
Vicchio 0.711 0.553 0.428 0.402 0.329 0.474 0.523 0.525
Vicopisano 0.979 0.450 0.531 0.295 0.460 0.523 0.630 0.659
Villa Basilica 0.213 0.114 0.265 0.186 0.194 0.198 0.211 0.206
Villa Collemandina 0.795 0.331 0.342 0.136 0.378 0.374 0.477 0.506
Villafranca in Lunigiana 0.599 0.214 0.350 0.229 0.328 0.332 0.417 0.419
Vinci 0.754 0.601 0.612 0.293 0.505 0.549 0.592 0.604
Volterra 0.565 0.567 0.286 0.282 0.509 0.424 0.467 0.472
Zeri 0.521 0.074 0.206 0.076 0.508 0.253 0.317 0.376
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